hold harmless clause in Illinois

2017App. 3d at 415 , 794 N.E.2d at 389 . ¶ 54 In finding Christie in fact had the right to seek a lien, the Rogalla court held the obligation to pay the medical expenses incurred because of the actions of a third-party tortfeasor belonged to the third-party tortfeasor and not the injured party.

2017The hold-harmless clause stated the following: “ ‘Christie will look solely to PersonalCare for compensation for Covered Services provided to Members, except for copayments authorized by PersonalCare under the applicable Member Certificate relating to Medical Services set forth in Attachment B. *** Neither Christie, Christie Members, nor any authorized Health Services Contractor of Christie shall *** assert any claim for compensation against Members in excess of the copayments authorized by PersonalCare’s HMO.’ ” Rogalla, 341 Ill.

2015Hankins, 305 Ill.

2015Hankins, 305 Ill.

2001See 770 ILCS 35/1 (West 1998); Cooper, 125 Ill. 2d at 369 .

1979App. 3d 1055 , 358 N.E.2d 1244 .) However, even assuming the operating agreement does not require indemnification in this case, we believe the hold harmless clause in paragraph 13.1 of the sublease is sufficiently specific to require that defendant defend and indemnify Erie with respect to both of Brosmore’s claims.

1979Nelson); (4) considered when an agent’s cause of action accrues against its principal for the breach of a sales contract (Otter Creek); (5) considered the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the employee’s alleged dishonest acts to ascertain that loss or damage had definitely been sustained (National Slovak Society); (6) in a garnishment proceeding, considered a “no action” clause whereby the defendant was obliged to indemnify the insured for its liability as a carrier “only to the amount which they are obliged to pay and do pay” ( Hinchcliff at 120 ); (7) determined that the insured had s

1979Nelson); (4) considered when an agent’s cause of action accrues against its principal for the breach of a sales contract (Otter Creek); (5) considered the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the employee’s alleged dishonest acts to ascertain that loss or damage had definitely been sustained (National Slovak Society); (6) in a garnishment proceeding, considered a “no action” clause whereby the defendant was obliged to indemnify the insured for its liability as a carrier “only to the amount which they are obliged to pay and do pay” ( Hinchcliff at 120 ); (7) determined that the insured had s

1972The trial court entered an order finding that no genuine issue of material fact was created by the third party complaints, the motions for summary judgment and the affidavits filed therewith, and further finding that the hold harmless clause of the subcontract required third party defendant to indemnify the third party plaintiffs, under the authority of DeTienne v. S. N. Nielsen Co., 45 Ill.App.2d 231 , 195 N.E.2d 240 .

1972The trial court entered an order finding that no genuine issue of material fact was created by the third party complaints, the motions for summary judgment and the affidavits filed therewith, and further finding that the hold harmless clause of the subcontract required third party defendant to indemnify the third party plaintiffs, under the authority of DeTienne v. S. N. Nielsen Co., 45 Ill.App.2d 231 , 195 N.E.2d 240 .

1972Economy argues, however, that the language, “* * * whenever caused by or occasioned directly or indirectly by or to subcontractor, its agents, employees, invitees and its subcontractors * * qualifies the preceding “broad form” language of the clause and limits the indemnification to that of the negligence on the part of the indemnitor alone, thus bringing the instant clause within the limitation contained, in the case of Westinghouse Co. v. Building Corp., 395 Ill. 429 , 70 N.E.2d 604 .

1972Economy argues, however, that the language, “* * * whenever caused by or occasioned directly or indirectly by or to subcontractor, its agents, employees, invitees and its subcontractors * * qualifies the preceding “broad form” language of the clause and limits the indemnification to that of the negligence on the part of the indemnitor alone, thus bringing the instant clause within the limitation contained, in the case of Westinghouse Co. v. Building Corp., 395 Ill. 429 , 70 N.E.2d 604 .