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8 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Phelpsgreen1 sentence2025People -7- v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Kargol
green
2 sentences1998People v. Kargol, 219 Ill. 1998People v. Kargol , 219 Ill. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Conover
green
2 sentences1992Although a court in imposing sentence may not consider the bare elements of an offense as aggravating factors (see People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400 , 419 N.E.2d 906 ), it may consider “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, including the nature and extent of each element of the offense as committed by the defendant.’ ” People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268-69 , 497 N.E.2d 1138 , quoting People v. Hunter (1981), 101 Ill. 1992Although a court in imposing sentence may not consider the bare elements of an offense as aggravating factors (see People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400 , 419 N.E.2d 906 ), it may consider “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, including the nature and extent of each element of the offense as committed by the defendant.’ ” People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268-69 , 497 N.E.2d 1138 , quoting People v. Hunter (1981), 101 Ill. | 2 | 1991–1992 |
People v. Saldivar
green
2 sentences1992Although a court in imposing sentence may not consider the bare elements of an offense as aggravating factors (see People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400 , 419 N.E.2d 906 ), it may consider “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, including the nature and extent of each element of the offense as committed by the defendant.’ ” People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268-69 , 497 N.E.2d 1138 , quoting People v. Hunter (1981), 101 Ill. 1992Although a court in imposing sentence may not consider the bare elements of an offense as aggravating factors (see People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400 , 419 N.E.2d 906 ), it may consider “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, including the nature and extent of each element of the offense as committed by the defendant.’ ” People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268-69 , 497 N.E.2d 1138 , quoting People v. Hunter (1981), 101 Ill. | 2 | 1991–1992 |
People v. Griffin
neutral
1 sentence2024Citing several cases from the 1970s, namely People v. Kish, 58 Ill. App. 3d 215 (1978), People v. Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d 763 (1975), and People v. Griffin, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1070 (1972), the defendant asserts that the starting point for his sentence should have been the statutory minimum of twenty years’ imprisonment and that any additional time would be "dependent upon the court’s divination as to the length of time required to achieve rehabilitation.” Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 767 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Johnson
neutral
2 sentences2024Citing several cases from the 1970s, namely People v. Kish, 58 Ill. App. 3d 215 (1978), People v. Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d 763 (1975), and People v. Griffin, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1070 (1972), the defendant asserts that the starting point for his sentence should have been the statutory minimum of twenty years’ imprisonment and that any additional time would be "dependent upon the court’s divination as to the length of time required to achieve rehabilitation.” Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 767 . 2024Citing several cases from the 1970s, namely People v. Kish, 58 Ill. App. 3d 215 (1978), People v. Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d 763 (1975), and People v. Griffin, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1070 (1972), the defendant asserts that the starting point for his sentence should have been the statutory minimum of twenty years’ imprisonment and that any additional time would be "dependent upon the court’s divination as to the length of time required to achieve rehabilitation.” Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 767 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Kish
green
1 sentence2024Citing several cases from the 1970s, namely People v. Kish, 58 Ill. App. 3d 215 (1978), People v. Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d 763 (1975), and People v. Griffin, 8 Ill. App. 3d 1070 (1972), the defendant asserts that the starting point for his sentence should have been the statutory minimum of twenty years’ imprisonment and that any additional time would be "dependent upon the court’s divination as to the length of time required to achieve rehabilitation.” Johnson, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 767 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence2023Brown, 2019 IL App (5th) 160329, ¶ 18 . ¶ 98 In this case, the trial court explicitly stated it was not considering the elements of the offense as aggravating factors in sentencing defendant. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Hunter
green
1 sentence1992Although a court in imposing sentence may not consider the bare elements of an offense as aggravating factors (see People v. Conover (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 400 , 419 N.E.2d 906 ), it may consider “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, including the nature and extent of each element of the offense as committed by the defendant.’ ” People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268-69 , 497 N.E.2d 1138 , quoting People v. Hunter (1981), 101 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Tolliver
green
1 sentence1992App. 3d 692, 694 , 426 N.E.2d 666 ; People v. Tolliver (1981), 98 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.