Terry-type stop in Illinois

2013As in Terry, “ ‘[t]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ). ¶ 40 This court follows Terry and its rationale, and has concluded that a Terry-type stop must be justified at its inception, and the “ ‘police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” Close, 238 Ill. 2d at 505 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ).

2013As in Terry, “ ‘[t]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ). -8- ¶ 40 This court follows Terry and its rationale, and has concluded that a Terry-type stop must be justified at its inception, and the “ ‘police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” Close, 238 Ill. 2d at 505 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 )

2013As in Terry, “ ‘[t]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ). ¶ 40 This court follows Terry and its rationale, and has concluded that a Terry-type stop must be justified at its inception, and the “ ‘police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” Close, 238 Ill. 2d at 505 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ).

2013As in Terry, “ ‘[t]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ). -8- ¶ 40 This court follows Terry and its rationale, and has concluded that a Terry-type stop must be justified at its inception, and the “ ‘police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” Close, 238 Ill. 2d at 505 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 )

2007The *** tests were the least intrusive means by which [the officer] could verify or dispel his suspicion that [the defendant] may have been driving while intoxicated." (Elsewhere in the opinion, the court states that the officer "asked" the defendant to step out of his car but "told" the defendant "he was going to perform field sobriety tests." Harrod, slip op. at ___.) Likewise, in Commonwealth v. McGrail, 419 Mass. 774 , 779 n.9, -7- No. 2--06--0104 647 N.E.2d 712 , 715 n.9 (1995), where an officer stopped a car and asked the driver to perform sobriety tests (which the driver refused), the c

2007The *** tests were the least intrusive means by which [the officer] could verify or dispel his suspicion that [the defendant] may have been driving while intoxicated." (Elsewhere in the opinion, the court states that the officer "asked" the defendant to step out of his car but "told" the defendant "he was going to perform field sobriety tests." Harrod, slip op. at ___.) Likewise, in Commonwealth v. McGrail, 419 Mass. 774 , 779 n.9, -7- No. 2--06--0104 647 N.E.2d 712 , 715 n.9 (1995), where an officer stopped a car and asked the driver to perform sobriety tests (which the driver refused), the c

1990App. 2d 146 , 235 N.E.2d 1 (“suspicious” car leaving gas station which was closed for the night).) In spite of Officer Beuhle’s testimony that his sole purpose in requesting to see Herlindo’s driver’s license was identification, the trial judge felt that “[a] lot of things *** what Mr. Herlindo was doing [were] very suspicious.” Furthermore, the judge stated that the most important issue to decide was whether there was an illegal search, for “[i]f there was no search conducted, this motion is moot.” These statements imply that the judge found that the officer conducted a permissible Terry-type

1990App. 3d 942 , 410 N.E.2d 1040 .) At any rate, the circumstances clearly justified the Terry-type stop which occurred here, since the officers could have reasonably suspected one of the car’s occupants was a man wanted in connection with the possession of recently stolen goods.

1989Granted in Jones v. United States (1958), 357 U.S. 493 , 2 L.

1989Granted in Jones v. United States (1958), 357 U.S. 493 , 2 L.

1989Cir. 1989), 711 F. Supp. 639 , involving a Terry-type stop of a bus passenger traveling from New York to Washington, D.C.

1989Ed. 2d 890 , 100 S. Ct. 2752 .) A hunch does not qualify as justification for a Terry-type stop.

1989Ed. 2d at 906 , 88 S. Ct. at 1880 .) Another way of stating the rule is that a Terry-type stop “must be supported at least by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity.” (Reid, 438 U.S. at 440, 65 L.

1984As a general proposition, it would seem that a negative answer is called for, as in Terry the Court approved the intrusions made there by noting that they did not involve an actual arrest, which ‘is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement.’ Certainly when a taking to the station is accompanied by ‘burdens substantially like those of arrest,’ such as ‘fingerprinting, photographing and completion of a lengthy arrest form,’ such procedures should not be upheld absent a showing of grounds for arrest. [United States v. Jennings (9th Cir. 1972), 468 F.

1983App. 3d 431 , 305 N.E.2d 418 .) It has also been held that, absent some restraint on a person’s freedom to walk away from an officer, no Terry-type stop can be said to have occurred.

1983(People v. Tilden (1979), 70 Ill.