widely accepted rule in Illinois

2007App. 3d 229 , 835 N.E.2d 435 (2005) (employing the right-to-control test and indicating it has been the most widely accepted test of liability under the loaned-servant doctrine).

2007App. 3d 229 , 835 N.E.2d 435 (2005) (employing the right-to-control test and indicating it has been the most widely accepted test of liability under the loaned-servant doctrine).

2007In fact, in his response brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Behrens cited Crespo v. Weber Stephen Products Co., 275 Ill.

2007In fact, in his response brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Behrens cited Crespo v. Weber Stephen Products Co., 275 Ill.

2005Addressing this issue, the Supreme Court stated what has become the widely accepted test for determining the constitutionality of notice procedures: "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 , 70 S.Ct. at 657 , 94 L.Ed. at 873.

2005Addressing this issue, the Supreme Court stated what has become the widely accepted test for determining the constitutionality of notice procedures: "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 , 70 S.Ct. at 657 , 94 L.Ed. at 873.

1980Gutknecht v. City of Chicago (1953), 414 Ill. 600, 611, 612 ; Poole v. City of Kankakee (1950), 406 Ill. 521, 530 ; Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority (1948), 399 Ill. 579, 591-592 .) * * * We have indicated that there is no constitutional prohibition against the use of public funds which inure to the benefit of private interests, so long as the money is utilized for a public purpose.' The above is no more than a statement of a widely accepted rule of law.

1980Gutknecht v. City of Chicago (1953), 414 Ill. 600, 611, 612 ; Poole v. City of Kankakee (1950), 406 Ill. 521, 530 ; Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority (1948), 399 Ill. 579, 591-592 .) * * * We have indicated that there is no constitutional prohibition against the use of public funds which inure to the benefit of private interests, so long as the money is utilized for a public purpose.’ The above is no more than a statement of a widely accepted rule of law.

1980Gutknecht v. City of Chicago (1953), 414 Ill. 600, 611, 612 ; Poole v. City of Kankakee (1950), 406 Ill. 521, 530 ; Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority (1948), 399 Ill. 579, 591-592 .) * * * We have indicated that there is no constitutional prohibition against the use of public funds which inure to the benefit of private interests, so long as the money is utilized for a public purpose.' The above is no more than a statement of a widely accepted rule of law.

1980Gutknecht v. City of Chicago (1953), 414 Ill. 600, 611, 612 ; Poole v. City of Kankakee (1950), 406 Ill. 521, 530 ; Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority (1948), 399 Ill. 579, 591-592 .) * * * We have indicated that there is no constitutional prohibition against the use of public funds which inure to the benefit of private interests, so long as the money is utilized for a public purpose.’ The above is no more than a statement of a widely accepted rule of law.

1980(See, e.g., Berman v. Parker (1954), 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 , 99 L.

1980(See, e.g., Berman v. Parker (1954), 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 , 99 L.

1990While it is apparently an accepted proposition of law in Illinois that laches ( Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 145, 148 , 81 Ill.Dec. 413 , 466 N.E.2d 1215 ) and estoppel ( Wachta v. Pollution Control Board (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 436, 439 , 289 N.E.2d 484 ) may be asserted against a municipal corporation, the cases cited by the majority do not apply such equitable principles against a municipality to deprive it of title, use or benefit of public land.

1990While it is apparently an accepted proposition of law in Illinois that laches ( Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 145, 148 , 81 Ill.Dec. 413 , 466 N.E.2d 1215 ) and estoppel ( Wachta v. Pollution Control Board (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 436, 439 , 289 N.E.2d 484 ) may be asserted against a municipal corporation, the cases cited by the majority do not apply such equitable principles against a municipality to deprive it of title, use or benefit of public land.

1990The majority agrees with the widely accepted rule that adverse possession cannot be asserted against a public body. ( Terwelp v. Sass (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 133, 138 , 66 Ill.Dec. 878 , 443 N.E.2d 804 .) Although the majority asserts that title cannot be lost to public lands by adverse possession, it ultimately finds that use of and benefit *939 from public lands can be obtained by way of laches or estoppel.

1990The majority agrees with the widely accepted rule that adverse possession cannot be asserted against a public body. ( Terwelp v. Sass (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 133, 138 , 66 Ill.Dec. 878 , 443 N.E.2d 804 .) Although the majority asserts that title cannot be lost to public lands by adverse possession, it ultimately finds that use of and benefit *939 from public lands can be obtained by way of laches or estoppel.

1990While it is apparently an accepted proposition of law in Illinois that laches ( Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 145, 148 , 81 Ill.Dec. 413 , 466 N.E.2d 1215 ) and estoppel ( Wachta v. Pollution Control Board (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 436, 439 , 289 N.E.2d 484 ) may be asserted against a municipal corporation, the cases cited by the majority do not apply such equitable principles against a municipality to deprive it of title, use or benefit of public land.

1990While it is apparently an accepted proposition of law in Illinois that laches ( Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 145, 148 , 81 Ill.Dec. 413 , 466 N.E.2d 1215 ) and estoppel ( Wachta v. Pollution Control Board (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 436, 439 , 289 N.E.2d 484 ) may be asserted against a municipal corporation, the cases cited by the majority do not apply such equitable principles against a municipality to deprive it of title, use or benefit of public land.

1986(See Wilson v. Continental Body Corp. (1981), 93 Ill.

1980(See, e.g., Berman v. Parker (1954), 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 , 99 L.Ed. 27, 38 , 75 *369 S.Ct. 98, 102-03; Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development Authority (Fla. 1975), 315 So.2d 451, 455-56 ; State ex rel.

1979As a result we feel it best to apply the widely accepted rule that “[a]n instrument is to be construed most strongly against its author.” (Cedar Park Cemetery Association, Inc. v. Village of Calumet Park (1947), 398 Ill. 324, 333 , 75 N.E.2d 874 .) The record indicates that the plan was drafted by defendant Greyhound Computer Corporation, and any ambiguity is to be resolved against Greyhound.

1979As a result we feel it best to apply the widely accepted rule that “[a]n instrument is to be construed most strongly against its author.” (Cedar Park Cemetery Association, Inc. v. Village of Calumet Park (1947), 398 Ill. 324, 333 , 75 N.E.2d 874 .) The record indicates that the plan was drafted by defendant Greyhound Computer Corporation, and any ambiguity is to be resolved against Greyhound.

1979In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Reich (1955), 131 Colo. 407, 411 , 282 P.2d 1091, 1093 , the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted an extra compensation agreement remarkably similar to the plan at issue here.

1979In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Reich (1955), 131 Colo. 407, 411 , 282 P.2d 1091, 1093 , the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted an extra compensation agreement remarkably similar to the plan at issue here.