46 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rojas v. Stategreen2 sentences2009"The widely-accepted rule, regardless of whether viewing variance as a sufficiency of the evidence problem or as a notice-related problem, is that a variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant's 'substantial rights' is immaterial." Hart v. State, 173 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (quoting Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 247–48; and referencing Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Tex. Crim. 2009"The widely-accepted rule, regardless of whether viewing variance as a sufficiency of the evidence problem or as a notice-related problem, is that a variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant's 'substantial rights' is immaterial." Hart v. State , 173 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (quoting Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 247-48 ; and referencing Rojas v. State , 986 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Tex. Crim. | 19 | 19 |
Hart v. Stategreen2 sentences2009"The widely-accepted rule, regardless of whether viewing variance as a sufficiency of the evidence problem or as a notice-related problem, is that a variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant's 'substantial rights' is immaterial." Hart v. State, 173 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (quoting Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 247–48; and referencing Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Tex. Crim. 2009"The widely-accepted rule, regardless of whether viewing variance as a sufficiency of the evidence problem or as a notice-related problem, is that a variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant's 'substantial rights' is immaterial." Hart v. State , 173 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (quoting Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 247-48 ; and referencing Rojas v. State , 986 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 6 |
Stevens v. Stategreen2 sentences2006"The widely-accepted rule, regardless of whether viewing variance as a sufficiency of the evidence problem or as a notice-related problem, is that a variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant's 'substantial rights' is immaterial." Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 247–48; see Stevens v. State , 891 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. Crim. 2005“The widely-accepted rule, regardless of whether viewing variance as a sufficiency of the evidence problem or as a notice-related problem, is that a variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant’s ‘substantial rights’ is immaterial.” Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 247-48 ; see Stevens v. State, 891 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); see also Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). | 6 | 6 |
Ex Parte Myrickgreen2 sentences2003Ex parte Myrick , 474 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, orig. proceeding). 2003Ex parte Myrick, 474 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, orig. proceeding). | 4 | 4 |
Smith v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2015On the contrary, the widely-accepted rule is that finality will be accorded to a directed verdict based on a finding of insufficient evidence, even when that finding is unilaterally issued by a trial court.7 See, e.g., Smith, 543 U.S. at 464-75 , 125 S. Ct. at 1132-38 (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause barred trial court from submitting count to jury when court had previously acquitted defendant of that count and rejecting argument that court's submission of that count to jury was permissible retraction of prior acquittal); Moreno, 294 S.W.3d at 600 (recognizing that, in jury trial case, tha 2015On the contrary, the widely-accepted rule is that finality will be accorded to a directed verdict based on a finding of insufficient evidence, even when that finding is unilaterally issued by a trial court.7 See, e.g., Smith, 543 U.S. at 464-75 , 125 S. Ct. at 1132-38 (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause barred trial court from submitting count to jury when court had previously acquitted defendant of that count and rejecting argument that court's submission of that count to jury was permissible retraction of prior acquittal); Moreno, 294 S.W.3d at 600 (recognizing that, in jury trial case, tha | 2 | 2 |
McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Continental Lloyds Insurance Co.green2 sentences2015Co., 7 S.W.3d 725, 731 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). - 27 - Moreover, it is a widely accepted principle that, in awarding attorney’s fees, the amount must be “reasonable and necessary.” Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). 2015Co., 7 S.W.3d 725, 731 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). - 28 - Moreover, it is a widely accepted principle that, in awarding attorney's fees, the amount must be "reasonable and necessary." Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). | 2 | 2 |
Bocquet v. Herringgreen2 sentences2015Co., 7 S.W.3d 725, 731 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). - 27 - Moreover, it is a widely accepted principle that, in awarding attorney’s fees, the amount must be “reasonable and necessary.” Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). 2015Co., 7 S.W.3d 725, 731 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). - 28 - Moreover, it is a widely accepted principle that, in awarding attorney's fees, the amount must be "reasonable and necessary." Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). | 2 | 2 |
Tapps v. State Tex.green2 sentences2010See Maher v. State, No. 03-07-00179-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5213 , *10 - *11 (Tex.App. -- Austin July 10, 2008, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (evidence of drugs found in appellant's backpack three weeks after alleged assault was inadmissible because it had no relevance to the offenses for which appellant was on trial and served only to prove appellant's bad character); Tapps v. State, 257 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. App. -- Austin 2008), aff'd on other grounds, 294 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. Crim. 2010See Maher v. State , No. 03-07-00179-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5213 , *10–*11 ( Tex.App .—Austin July 10, 2008, pet. ref’d ) ( mem . op., not designated for publication) (evidence of drugs found in appellant’s backpack three weeks after alleged assault was inadmissible because it had no relevance to the offenses for which appellant was on trial and served only to prove appellant's bad character); Tapps v. State , 257 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008), aff'd on other grounds , 294 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Morenogreen1 sentence2014On the contrary, the widely-accepted rule is that finality will be accorded to a directed verdict based on a finding of insufficient evidence, even when that finding is unilaterally issued by a trial court. 7 See, e.g., Smith, 543 U.S. at 464-75 , 125 S.Ct. at 1132-38 (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause barred trial court from submitting count to jury when court had previously acquitted defendant of that count and rejecting argument that court’s submission of that count to jury was permissible retraction of prior acquittal); Moreno, 294 S.W.3d at 600 (recognizing that, in jury trial case, tha | 1 | 1 |
cluster 22507green2 sentences2001United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d 845, 853 (5th Cir.2000)(footnotes omitted); see also Tsinhnahijinnie, 112 F.3d at 991 (analyzing variance claim under Jackson , court stated that variance is immaterial where it is "`not of a character which could have misled the defendant at the trial' and there is no danger of double jeopardy") (citations omitted); Woods v. State, 244 Ga.App. 359 , 535 S.E.2d 524, 525 (2000)(analyzing variance claim under Jackson , court said proper inquiry focuses on materiality: allegations must sufficiently inform defendant of charges against him so as to enable him to pr 2001United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d 845, 853 (5th Cir.2000)(footnotes omitted); see also Tsinhnahijinnie, 112 F.3d at 991 (analyzing variance claim under Jackson , court stated that variance is immaterial where it is “ ‘not of a character which could have misled the defendant at the trial’ and there is no danger of double jeopardy”) (citations omitted); Woods v. State, 244 Ga.App. 359 , 535 S.E.2d 524, 525 (2000)(analyzing variance claim under Jackson , court said proper inquiry focuses on materiality: allegations must sufficiently inform defendant of charges against him so as to enable him to p | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Stategreen2 sentences2001United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d 845, 853 (5th Cir.2000)(footnotes omitted); see also Tsinhnahijinnie, 112 F.3d at 991 (analyzing variance claim under Jackson , court stated that variance is immaterial where it is “ ‘not of a character which could have misled the defendant at the trial’ and there is no danger of double jeopardy”) (citations omitted); Woods v. State, 244 Ga.App. 359 , 535 S.E.2d 524, 525 (2000)(analyzing variance claim under Jackson , court said proper inquiry focuses on materiality: allegations must sufficiently inform defendant of charges against him so as to enable him to p 2001United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d 845, 853 (5th Cir.2000)(footnotes omitted); see also Tsinhnahijinnie, 112 F.3d at 991 (analyzing variance claim under Jackson , court stated that variance is immaterial where it is “ ‘not of a character which could have misled the defendant at the trial’ and there is no danger of double jeopardy”) (citations omitted); Woods v. State, 244 Ga.App. 359 , 535 S.E.2d 524, 525 (2000)(analyzing variance claim under Jackson , court said proper inquiry focuses on materiality: allegations must sufficiently inform defendant of charges against him so as to enable him to p | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences1988For a detailed discussion of the concerns voiced by critics of Frye , see Jones v. State, 716 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex.App.—Austin 1986, pet. refused). 1988For a detailed discussion of the concerns voiced by critics of Frye , see Jones v. State, 716 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. App.Austin 1986, pet. refused). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Paynegreen2 sentences1982See Ex parte Myrick, 474 S.W.2d at 772 (where the court held void a contempt judgment entered to force relator to sign, pursuant to a divorce decree, an agreement to create a trust for the support of his minor children and to pay attorney fees for services rendered in connection with enforcing the agreement); Ex parte Payne, 598 S.W.2d 312, 320 (Tex.Civ. 1982See Ex parte Myrick, 474 S.W.2d at 772 (where the court held void a contempt judgment entered to force relator to sign, pursuant to a divorce decree, an agreement to create a trust for the support of his minor children and to pay attorney fees for services rendered in connection with enforcing the agreement); Ex parte Payne, 598 S.W.2d 312, 320 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1980, no writ) (where the court held void a contempt sentence because it was unclear whether the judgment for attorney fees was attributable to services performed pursuant to enforcing child support orders or to services rendered | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gollihar v. State
green
2 sentences2018In Gollihar , the Court of Criminal Appeals held that "the widely-accepted rule ... is that a variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant's 'substantial rights' is immaterial." Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 249 -50 . 2014“The widely-accepted rule, regardless of whether viewing variance as a sufficiency of the evidence problem or as a notice-related problem, is that a variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant’s ‘substantial rights’ is immaterial.” Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 247-48 . | 32 | 2002–2018 |
Green v. United States
green
2 sentences2015This rule promotes the principles embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause identified by the Supreme Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 , cases where, by law, two witnesses, or one with corroborating circumstances, are required to authorize a conviction, if the requirement be not fulfilled, the court shall instruct the jury to render a verdict of acquittal, and they are bound by the instruction"). 7 There are few exceptions, none of which apply to this case, such as when the judge grants an acquittal notwithstanding the jury's verdict. 2014This rule promotes the principles embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause identified by the Supreme Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 , 78 S.Ct. 221, 223 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Tapps v. State
green
2 sentences2010See Maher v. State, No. 03-07-00179-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5213 , *10 - *11 (Tex.App. -- Austin July 10, 2008, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (evidence of drugs found in appellant's backpack three weeks after alleged assault was inadmissible because it had no relevance to the offenses for which appellant was on trial and served only to prove appellant's bad character); Tapps v. State, 257 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. App. -- Austin 2008), aff'd on other grounds, 294 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. Crim. 2010See Maher v. State , No. 03-07-00179-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5213 , *10–*11 ( Tex.App .—Austin July 10, 2008, pet. ref’d ) ( mem . op., not designated for publication) (evidence of drugs found in appellant’s backpack three weeks after alleged assault was inadmissible because it had no relevance to the offenses for which appellant was on trial and served only to prove appellant's bad character); Tapps v. State , 257 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008), aff'd on other grounds , 294 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
In Re Moers
green
2 sentences2011The Moers court reasoned that ―a trial court should exercise its contempt power with caution‖ and that ―because of this widely accepted principle, we have sought to limit any extension of the ‗duty to support‘ to services and costs required for enforcing child support.‖ In re Moers, 104 S.W.3d at 612 . 2011The Moers court reasoned that “a trial court should exercise its contempt power with caution” and that “because of this widely accepted principle, we have sought to limit any extension of the ‘duty to support’ to services and costs required for enforcing child support.” In re Moers, 104 S.W.3d at 612 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Meraz v. State
green
1 sentence2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Roland Addison, United States of America v. Albert Henry Raymond
green
1 sentence1988D.C. at 202, 498 F.2d at 744 , pointed out that the Frye test: ... protects prosecution and defense alike by assuring that a minimal reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the validly of a scientific determination in a particular case ... [T]he ability to produce rebuttal experts, equally conversant with the mechanics and methods of a particular technique, may prove to be essential. *408 While the Frye test has been the most widely accepted standard governing the admissibility of scientific evidence produced by novel techniques, it has not been without its critics. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.