widely accepted rule in California

2007(See, e.g., Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 ]; see also Ross, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 416 [“ ‘[cjourts are not qualified to pass an opinion as to the attainments of a student . . . and . . . courts will not review a decision of the school authorities relating to academic qualifications of the students’ ”].) “There is a widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention into the academic affairs of schools.” (Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal.3d 803, 808 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 602 P.2d 778 ] (Paulsen).) Our Supreme Court in Paulsen appli

2007(See, e.g., Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 ]; see also Ross, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 416 [“ ‘[cjourts are not qualified to pass an opinion as to the attainments of a student . . . and . . . courts will not review a decision of the school authorities relating to academic qualifications of the students’ ”].) “There is a widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention into the academic affairs of schools.” (Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal.3d 803, 808 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 602 P.2d 778 ] (Paulsen).) Our Supreme Court in Paulsen appli

2023As to Rassaii’s permanent disqualification, “[t]here is a widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention in the academic affairs of schools.” (Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal.3d 803, 808 ; see also Perez v. Hastings College (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 453 .) We will overturn a university’s decision only where we conclude it is arbitrary or capricious, not based on academic criteria, and the result of irrelevant or discriminatory criteria.

2022(Guz, at pp. 354.) In contrast to the burden-shifting analysis adopted for FEHA claims in California is the rule of academic deference, which the First District Court of Appeal summarized 25 years ago: “It is well settled that in actions challenging the academic decision of a private university regarding a student’s qualifications for a degree, we exercise a highly deferential and limited standard of review. ‘There is a widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention into the academic affairs of schools.’ (Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal.3d 803, 808 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 602 P

2023(See 11 U.S.C., §§ 541 (a)(1) and 323; see also, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (1983) 462 U.S. 198, 203-203 , fn. 9 . . . [‘a broad range of property,’ including causes of action, is included in the bankruptcy estate].)” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001 (Cloud).) This includes a claim for injuries to the person, even if such a claim is unliquidated at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.

1998(See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (a)(1) and 323; see also, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (1983) 462 U.S. 198, 203-205, fn. 9 [ 103 S.Ct. 2309, 2312-2313 , 76 L.Ed.2d 515 ] [“a broad range of property,” including causes of action, is included in the bankruptcy estate]; Jones v. Harrell (11th Cir. 1988) 858 F.2d 667, 669 [“A trustee in bankruptcy succeeds to all causes of action held by the debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed,” the debtor lacks standing to settle a personal injury claim]; Harris v. St.

2022(Id. at pp. 808–809; accord, Wong v. Regents of University of California (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 823, 830 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 502 ].) We must uphold the university’s decision ‘unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.’ (Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985) 474 U.S. 214, 225 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 523, 532 , 106 S.Ct. 507 ] (Ewing).)” (Banks 5 v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551 (Banks).) It is this doctrine of academic deference which the trial c

2022(Id. at pp. 808–809; accord, Wong v. Regents of University of California (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 823, 830 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 502 ].) We must uphold the university’s decision ‘unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.’ (Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985) 474 U.S. 214, 225 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 523, 532 , 106 S.Ct. 507 ] (Ewing).)” (Banks 5 v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551 (Banks).) It is this doctrine of academic deference which the trial c

2022(Id. at pp. 808–809; accord, Wong v. Regents of University of California (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 823, 830 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 502 ].) We must uphold the university’s decision ‘unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.’ (Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985) 474 U.S. 214, 225 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 523, 532 , 106 S.Ct. 507 ] (Ewing).)” (Banks 5 v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551 (Banks).) It is this doctrine of academic deference which the trial c

2022(Id. at pp. 808–809; accord, Wong v. Regents of University of California (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 823, 830 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 502 ].) We must uphold the university’s decision ‘unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.’ (Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985) 474 U.S. 214, 225 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 523, 532 , 106 S.Ct. 507 ] (Ewing).)” (Banks 5 v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551 (Banks).) It is this doctrine of academic deference which the trial c

2023(See 11 U.S.C., §§ 541 (a)(1) and 323; see also, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (1983) 462 U.S. 198, 203-203 , fn. 9 . . . [‘a broad range of property,’ including causes of action, is included in the bankruptcy estate].)” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001 (Cloud).) This includes a claim for injuries to the person, even if such a claim is unliquidated at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.

2023As we have already concluded those claims are time-barred, we deny this request. 10 the property of the bankrupt estate.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001 .) However, “[C]hapter 11 debtors, acting in the capacity of debtor in possession performing the duties of the trustee, do have authority to control property of the estate before plan confirmation.” (Diamond Z Trailer, Inc. v. JZ L.L.C (In re JZ L.L.C.) (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2007) 371 B.R. 412 , 418 (In re JZ).) They “also have such authority after plan confirmation,” unless the order confirming the plan provides o

2024As such, the underlying facts appear to be highly contested among the parties, and thus, de novo review is inappropriate. 14 implied [factual] findings [that are] supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] As to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, review is de novo; a disposition that rests on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] The trial court’s ‘application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ [Citation.]” (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159 (Charlisse C).) We therefore apply this widely

2023As to Rassaii’s permanent disqualification, “[t]here is a widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention in the academic affairs of schools.” (Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal.3d 803, 808 ; see also Perez v. Hastings College (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 453 .) We will overturn a university’s decision only where we conclude it is arbitrary or capricious, not based on academic criteria, and the result of irrelevant or discriminatory criteria.

2007(See, e.g., Banks v. Dominican College (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1551 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 ]; see also Ross, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 416 [“ ‘[cjourts are not qualified to pass an opinion as to the attainments of a student . . . and . . . courts will not review a decision of the school authorities relating to academic qualifications of the students’ ”].) “There is a widely accepted rule of judicial nonintervention into the academic affairs of schools.” (Paulsen v. Golden Gate University (1979) 25 Cal.3d 803, 808 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 602 P.2d 778 ] (Paulsen).) Our Supreme Court in Paulsen appli

1998(See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (a)(1) and 323; see also, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (1983) 462 U.S. 198, 203-205, fn. 9 [ 103 S.Ct. 2309, 2312-2313 , 76 L.Ed.2d 515 ] [“a broad range of property,” including causes of action, is included in the bankruptcy estate]; Jones v. Harrell (11th Cir. 1988) 858 F.2d 667, 669 [“A trustee in bankruptcy succeeds to all causes of action held by the debtor at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed,” the debtor lacks standing to settle a personal injury claim]; Harris v. St.

1996(Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 467 , 707 P.2d 840 ].) We review the trial court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction under the familiar abuse of discretion standard.

1996(Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 467 , 707 P.2d 840 ].) We review the trial court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction under the familiar abuse of discretion standard.

1995(Id. at pp. 808-809; accord, Wong v. Regents of University of California (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 823, 830 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 502 ].) We must uphold the university’s decision “unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.” (Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985) 474 U.S. 214, 225 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 523, 532 , 106 S.Ct. 507 ] (Ewing).) In keeping with this highly deferential standard of review, cases challenging academic dismissals often will appropriately be resolve

1995(Id. at pp. 808-809; accord, Wong v. Regents of University of California (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 823, 830 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 502 ].) We must uphold the university’s decision “unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.” (Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing (1985) 474 U.S. 214, 225 [ 88 L.Ed.2d 523, 532 , 106 S.Ct. 507 ] (Ewing).) In keeping with this highly deferential standard of review, cases challenging academic dismissals often will appropriately be resolve

1990(See Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 [ 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 , 410 P.2d 838 , 18 A.L.R.3d 1416 ] [defendant's discovery request must be made with "some degree of specificity" and with "plausible justification"].) In sum, the proposed new "reasonable doubt" standard for the discovery showing should be rejected, in favor of the widely accepted test based on "`general allegations which give some cause for discovery....'" ( Broome, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d 1479, 1489 , italics deleted, quoting Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 537 ), or a standard based on information and belief ( City

1990(See Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 [ 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 , 410 P.2d 838 , 18 A.L.R.3d 1416 ] [defendant's discovery request must be made with "some degree of specificity" and with "plausible justification"].) In sum, the proposed new "reasonable doubt" standard for the discovery showing should be rejected, in favor of the widely accepted test based on "`general allegations which give some cause for discovery....'" ( Broome, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d 1479, 1489 , italics deleted, quoting Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 537 ), or a standard based on information and belief ( City

1976(City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550, 563-564, 566-567 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 843 ]; Millbrae Assn, for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 222, 245-246 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 251 ]; see Johnston v. City of Claremont (1958) 49 Cal.2d 826, 835 [ 323 P.2d 71 ].) However, it is a widely accepted rule that the issuance of a conditional use permit does not amount to a zoning change, and hence need not be effected in compliance with rezoning procedures.

1976(City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550, 563-564, 566-567 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 843 ]; Millbrae Assn, for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 222, 245-246 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 251 ]; see Johnston v. City of Claremont (1958) 49 Cal.2d 826, 835 [ 323 P.2d 71 ].) However, it is a widely accepted rule that the issuance of a conditional use permit does not amount to a zoning change, and hence need not be effected in compliance with rezoning procedures.

1976(City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550, 563-564, 566-567 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 843 ]; Millbrae Assn, for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 222, 245-246 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 251 ]; see Johnston v. City of Claremont (1958) 49 Cal.2d 826, 835 [ 323 P.2d 71 ].) However, it is a widely accepted rule that the issuance of a conditional use permit does not amount to a zoning change, and hence need not be effected in compliance with rezoning procedures.

1976(City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550, 563-564, 566-567 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 843 ]; Millbrae Assn, for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 222, 245-246 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 251 ]; see Johnston v. City of Claremont (1958) 49 Cal.2d 826, 835 [ 323 P.2d 71 ].) However, it is a widely accepted rule that the issuance of a conditional use permit does not amount to a zoning change, and hence need not be effected in compliance with rezoning procedures.

1976(City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550, 563-564, 566-567 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 843 ]; Millbrae Assn, for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 222, 245-246 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 251 ]; see Johnston v. City of Claremont (1958) 49 Cal.2d 826, 835 [ 323 P.2d 71 ].) However, it is a widely accepted rule that the issuance of a conditional use permit does not amount to a zoning change, and hence need not be effected in compliance with rezoning procedures.

1976(City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550, 563-564, 566-567 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 843 ]; Millbrae Assn, for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 222, 245-246 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 251 ]; see Johnston v. City of Claremont (1958) 49 Cal.2d 826, 835 [ 323 P.2d 71 ].) However, it is a widely accepted rule that the issuance of a conditional use permit does not amount to a zoning change, and hence need not be effected in compliance with rezoning procedures.

1966(See Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, supra; Redding v. City of Los Angeles, 81 Cal.App.2d 888, 894 [ 185 P.2d 430 ]; Tandy v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal.App.2d 609 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 429 ]; Johanson v. City Council, 222 Cal.App.2d 68, 72 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 798 ].) We therefore conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandate.

1966(See Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, supra; Redding v. City of Los Angeles, 81 Cal.App.2d 888, 894 [ 185 P.2d 430 ]; Tandy v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal.App.2d 609 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 429 ]; Johanson v. City Council, 222 Cal.App.2d 68, 72 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 798 ].) We therefore conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandate.

1966(See Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, supra; Redding v. City of Los Angeles, 81 Cal.App.2d 888, 894 [ 185 P.2d 430 ]; Tandy v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal.App.2d 609 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 429 ]; Johanson v. City Council, 222 Cal.App.2d 68, 72 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 798 ].) We therefore conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandate.

1966(See Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, supra; Redding v. City of Los Angeles, 81 Cal.App.2d 888, 894 [ 185 P.2d 430 ]; Tandy v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal.App.2d 609 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 429 ]; Johanson v. City Council, 222 Cal.App.2d 68, 72 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 798 ].) We therefore conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandate.