Reply brief in Indiana

2012Enterprises, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) to support its argument that knowledge of the payments made by [Americare] should be imputed to [Rebecca] because of her close connections to [Americare] and its related entities.

1998The court may issue any appropriate order for the care of the child pending the outcome of the case.” Ind.Code § 31-6-5-2(c) (1993). 3: Rhodes v. Shirley , 234 Ind. 587 , 129 N.E.2d 60 (1955); Bell v. Matter of Adoption of A.R.H. , 654 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995); Matter of Adoption of Konar , 454 N.E.2d 886 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1121 , 111 S.Ct. 1075 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1991); Matter of Snyder , 418 N.E.2d 1171 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (applying Indiana Code Section 31-3-1-7 because the judgment was entered before the effective date of the new Juvenile Code). 4: In its Re

1998The court may issue any appropriate order for the care of the child pending the outcome of the case.” Ind.Code § 31-6-5-2(c) (1993). 3: Rhodes v. Shirley , 234 Ind. 587 , 129 N.E.2d 60 (1955); Bell v. Matter of Adoption of A.R.H. , 654 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995); Matter of Adoption of Konar , 454 N.E.2d 886 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1121 , 111 S.Ct. 1075 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1991); Matter of Snyder , 418 N.E.2d 1171 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (applying Indiana Code Section 31-3-1-7 because the judgment was entered before the effective date of the new Juvenile Code). 4: In its Re

1998The court may issue any appropriate order for the care of the child pending the outcome of the case.” Ind.Code § 31-6-5-2(c) (1993). 3: Rhodes v. Shirley , 234 Ind. 587 , 129 N.E.2d 60 (1955); Bell v. Matter of Adoption of A.R.H. , 654 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995); Matter of Adoption of Konar , 454 N.E.2d 886 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1121 , 111 S.Ct. 1075 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1991); Matter of Snyder , 418 N.E.2d 1171 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (applying Indiana Code Section 31-3-1-7 because the judgment was entered before the effective date of the new Juvenile Code). 4: In its Re

1998The court may issue any appropriate order for the care of the child pending the outcome of the case.” Ind.Code § 31-6-5-2(c) (1993). 3: Rhodes v. Shirley , 234 Ind. 587 , 129 N.E.2d 60 (1955); Bell v. Matter of Adoption of A.R.H. , 654 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995); Matter of Adoption of Konar , 454 N.E.2d 886 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1121 , 111 S.Ct. 1075 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1991); Matter of Snyder , 418 N.E.2d 1171 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (applying Indiana Code Section 31-3-1-7 because the judgment was entered before the effective date of the new Juvenile Code). 4: In its Re

1998The court may issue any appropriate order for the care of the child pending the outcome of the case.” Ind.Code § 31-6-5-2(c) (1993). 3: Rhodes v. Shirley , 234 Ind. 587 , 129 N.E.2d 60 (1955); Bell v. Matter of Adoption of A.R.H. , 654 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995); Matter of Adoption of Konar , 454 N.E.2d 886 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1121 , 111 S.Ct. 1075 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1991); Matter of Snyder , 418 N.E.2d 1171 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (applying Indiana Code Section 31-3-1-7 because the judgment was entered before the effective date of the new Juvenile Code). 4: In its Re

1998The court may issue any appropriate order for the care of the child pending the outcome of the case.” Ind.Code § 31-6-5-2(c) (1993). 3: Rhodes v. Shirley , 234 Ind. 587 , 129 N.E.2d 60 (1955); Bell v. Matter of Adoption of A.R.H. , 654 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995); Matter of Adoption of Konar , 454 N.E.2d 886 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1121 , 111 S.Ct. 1075 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1991); Matter of Snyder , 418 N.E.2d 1171 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (applying Indiana Code Section 31-3-1-7 because the judgment was entered before the effective date of the new Juvenile Code). 4: In its Re

1998The court may issue any appropriate order for the care of the child pending the outcome of the case.” Ind.Code § 31-6-5-2(c) (1993). 3: Rhodes v. Shirley , 234 Ind. 587 , 129 N.E.2d 60 (1955); Bell v. Matter of Adoption of A.R.H. , 654 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995); Matter of Adoption of Konar , 454 N.E.2d 886 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1121 , 111 S.Ct. 1075 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1991); Matter of Snyder , 418 N.E.2d 1171 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981) (applying Indiana Code Section 31-3-1-7 because the judgment was entered before the effective date of the new Juvenile Code). 4: In its Re

1996Baseball does not respond in its Reply brief to the State's assertion and, because it is axiomatic that we will not formulate a more relevant argument on Baseball's behalf, we cannot say that Baseball was denied due process of the law. > In any ease, the legislature has provided in Ind.Code 4-32-8-1 that the administrative process used to resolve tax related issues by the Department under Ind.Code 6-8.1 will be used to resolve charity-gaming issues, and this fact was specifically recognized by this court in Portland Summer Festival v. Dept. of Rev., 624 N.E.2d 45 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), reh'g denie

1995Specifically, Thornton cites Highley v. State (1989), Ind.App., 535 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 , for the proposition that "[a] party may inquire into a collateral matter on cross-examination, but the questioner is then ‘bound by the answer' received; the impeaching party cannot thereafter offer extrinsic evidence to disprove the answer unless the extrinsic evidence would be independently admissible.” We remind Thornton that, in this case, the State did not inquire into his conduct with his daughter’s friends.

1993The Reply brief cites to Indiana Chapter of NORML v. Sendak, (7th Cir.1980), 631 F.2d 734 (TABLE).

1983Begley v. State, (1981) Ind., 416 N.E.2d 824 ; Miller v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 635 , 372 N.E.2d 1168 .

1983Begley v. State, (1981) Ind., 416 N.E.2d 824 ; Miller v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 635 , 372 N.E.2d 1168 .

1983Begley v. State, (1981) Ind., 416 N.E.2d 824 ; Miller v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 635 , 372 N.E.2d 1168 .

1982In Moore v. State (1979), Ind., 393 N.E.2d 175 , a case where the Indiana Supreme Court dealt with the issue of a rape victim’s pregnancy, Justice Hunter set forth the purpose of Indiana’s Rape Shield Statute as being: “to ‘shield victims of sex crimes from a general inquiry into a history of their sexual conduct’ and to keep these victims from feeling that they are on trial.” (Citations omitted.) 393 N.E.2d at 178 .

1982In Moore v. State (1979), Ind., 393 N.E.2d 175 , a case where the Indiana Supreme Court dealt with the issue of a rape victim’s pregnancy, Justice Hunter set forth the purpose of Indiana’s Rape Shield Statute as being: “to ‘shield victims of sex crimes from a general inquiry into a history of their sexual conduct’ and to keep these victims from feeling that they are on trial.” (Citations omitted.) 393 N.E.2d at 178 .

1888In case of a known or conceded forgery, we are unable to discover any principle upon which a subsequent promise by the person whose name was forged can be held binding in the absence of an estoppel in pais, or without a new consideration for the promise; Workman v. Wright, supra ; Owsley v. Philips, supra. Notwithstanding the elaborate argument of counsel, our conclusion is, that neither the reply nor the instruction as applied to the evidence in the cáse before us presents the question of the ratification of ap forged instrument.