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9 Kansas opinions name it 1 courts 1937–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Christenson v. Akingreen2 sentences1978Accordingly, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a demand pleaded by way of a setoff, counterclaim or cross-claim is regarded as an affirmative action in most jurisdictions, and therefore, unlike a matter of pure defense, is subject to the operation of the statute of limitations. [Citations omitted.] “In Christenson v. Akin, [ 183 Kan. 207 , 326 P.2d 313 ], the court in considering 60-715 [predecessor to 60-213(d)], supra, said: “ ‘. . . 1978Accordingly, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a demand pleaded by way of a setoff, counterclaim or cross-claim is regarded as an affirmative action in most jurisdictions, and therefore, unlike a matter of pure defense, is subject to the operation of the statute of limitations. [Citations omitted.] “In Christenson v. Akin, [ 183 Kan. 207 , 326 P.2d 313 ], the court in considering 60-715 [predecessor to 60-213(d)], supra, said: “ ‘. . . | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rochester American Insurance v. Cassell Truck Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997We recognized that a demand pleaded by way of a setoff, counterclaim, or cross-claim is regarded as an affirmative action and, unlike a matter of pure defense, is subject to the operation of the statute of limitations. 195 Kan. at 56 . 1997We recognized that a demand pleaded by way of a setoff, counterclaim, or cross-claim is regarded as an affirmative action and, unlike a matter of pure defense, is subject to the operation of the statute of limitations. 195 Kan. at 56 . | 3 | 1978–2002 |
Muckenthaler v. Noller
green
2 sentences1952Jur. 57 , § 63; Woodworth v. Kendall, ante p. 332, this day decided; Collins v. Richardson, supra; McCarthy v. Sink, 152 Kan. 659 , 107 P. 2d 790 ; Muckenthaler v. Noller, 104 Kan. 551 , 180 Pac. 453 ; Malcolm v. Larson, 158 Kan. 423 , 148 P. 2d 291 ). 1952Jur. 57 , § 63; Woodworth v. Kendall, ante p. 332, this day decided; Collins v. Richardson, supra; McCarthy v. Sink, 152 Kan. 659 , 107 P. 2d 790 ; Muckenthaler v. Noller, 104 Kan. 551 , 180 Pac. 453 ; Malcolm v. Larson, 158 Kan. 423 , 148 P. 2d 291 ). | 3 | 1937–1952 |
Malcolm v. Larson
green
2 sentences1962S. 1935, 60-313) has no application to matters of pure defense.” (Syl. 3.) *608 In Malcolm v. Larson, 158 Kan. 423 , 148 P. 2d 291 , it was held: “In a case where a cross demand is pleaded as a matter of pure defense, it must be connected with and grow out of the same transaction or matter which forms the basis of the plaintiffs claim. 1962S. 1935, 60-313) has no application to matters of pure defense.” (Syl. 3.) *608 In Malcolm v. Larson, 158 Kan. 423 , 148 P. 2d 291 , it was held: “In a case where a cross demand is pleaded as a matter of pure defense, it must be connected with and grow out of the same transaction or matter which forms the basis of the plaintiffs claim. | 2 | 1952–1962 |
Waechter v. Amoco Production Co.
green
2 sentences1978When cross demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim or cross-claim could have been set up, neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other or by reason of the statute of limitations if arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the petition as the foundation of plaintiff’s claim or connected with the subject of the action; but the two demands must be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other.” By this statute a claim that may be barred by a stat 1978When cross demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim or cross-claim could have been set up, neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other or by reason of the statute of limitations if arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the petition as the foundation of plaintiff’s claim or connected with the subject of the action; but the two demands must be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other.” By this statute a claim that may be barred by a stat | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corporation
green
1 sentence1978When cross demands have existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had brought an action against the other, a counterclaim or cross-claim could have been set up, neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by the assignment or death of the other or by reason of the statute of limitations if arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the petition as the foundation of plaintiff’s claim or connected with the subject of the action; but the two demands must be deemed compensated so far as they equal each other.” By this statute a claim that may be barred by a stat | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Powers v. Sturgeon
neutral
2 sentences1975For another example of the use of an outlawed claim as a “pirre defense”, see Powers v. Sturgeon, 190 Kan. 604 , 376 P. 2d 904 . 1975For another example of the use of an outlawed claim as a “pirre defense”, see Powers v. Sturgeon, 190 Kan. 604 , 376 P. 2d 904 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
McCarthy v. Sink
green
2 sentences1952Jur. 57 , § 63; Woodworth v. Kendall, ante p. 332, this day decided; Collins v. Richardson, supra; McCarthy v. Sink, 152 Kan. 659 , 107 P. 2d 790 ; Muckenthaler v. Noller, 104 Kan. 551 , 180 Pac. 453 ; Malcolm v. Larson, 158 Kan. 423 , 148 P. 2d 291 ). 1952Jur. 57 , § 63; Woodworth v. Kendall, ante p. 332, this day decided; Collins v. Richardson, supra; McCarthy v. Sink, 152 Kan. 659 , 107 P. 2d 790 ; Muckenthaler v. Noller, 104 Kan. 551 , 180 Pac. 453 ; Malcolm v. Larson, 158 Kan. 423 , 148 P. 2d 291 ). | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Wyatt v. Collins
green
2 sentences1937On this subject the cases of Muckenthaler v. Noller, 104 Kan. 551 , 180 Pac. 453 , and Wyatt v. Collins, 105 Kan. 182 , 180 Pac. 789 , are cited, but both cases refer to the use of the general statute of limitations and not to the special one on wills. 1937On this subject the cases of Muckenthaler v. Noller, 104 Kan. 551 , 180 Pac. 453 , and Wyatt v. Collins, 105 Kan. 182 , 180 Pac. 789 , are cited, but both cases refer to the use of the general statute of limitations and not to the special one on wills. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.