time and place hearing in Kansas

1989K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 55-605 states that “notice shall state the time and place of hearing and contain such other information as will briefly and adequately disclose the matter to *175 be considered or the relief sought.” Appellants cite Day v. State Corporation Commission, 185 Kan. 165 , 341 P.2d 1028 , modified 185 Kan. 382 , 345 P.2d 651 (1959), in which we held the Commission could not unilaterally grant an exception to the rules of the B.P.O. if the B.P.O. did not allow the granting of an exception.

1989K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 55-605 states that “notice shall state the time and place of hearing and contain such other information as will briefly and adequately disclose the matter to *175 be considered or the relief sought.” Appellants cite Day v. State Corporation Commission, 185 Kan. 165 , 341 P.2d 1028 , modified 185 Kan. 382 , 345 P.2d 651 (1959), in which we held the Commission could not unilaterally grant an exception to the rules of the B.P.O. if the B.P.O. did not allow the granting of an exception.

1989K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 55-605 states that “notice shall state the time and place of hearing and contain such other information as will briefly and adequately disclose the matter to *175 be considered or the relief sought.” Appellants cite Day v. State Corporation Commission, 185 Kan. 165 , 341 P.2d 1028 , modified 185 Kan. 382 , 345 P.2d 651 (1959), in which we held the Commission could not unilaterally grant an exception to the rules of the B.P.O. if the B.P.O. did not allow the granting of an exception.

1989K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 55-605 states that “notice shall state the time and place of hearing and contain such other information as will briefly and adequately disclose the matter to *175 be considered or the relief sought.” Appellants cite Day v. State Corporation Commission, 185 Kan. 165 , 341 P.2d 1028 , modified 185 Kan. 382 , 345 P.2d 651 (1959), in which we held the Commission could not unilaterally grant an exception to the rules of the B.P.O. if the B.P.O. did not allow the granting of an exception.

1973In 1944 the case of In re Estate of Grindrod, 158 Kan. 345 , 148 P. 2d 278 , held that the district court did not acquire jurisdiction to try a will contest action on appeal from an order admitting a will to probate where the opponent of the will, after having received the required notice of the time and place of hearing for probate, made no objections of any kind or character to the validity of the will or to its probate and took no steps in the probate court to vacate or set aside the order of probate.

1973In 1944 the case of In re Estate of Grindrod, 158 Kan. 345 , 148 P. 2d 278 , held that the district court did not acquire jurisdiction to try a will contest action on appeal from an order admitting a will to probate where the opponent of the will, after having received the required notice of the time and place of hearing for probate, made no objections of any kind or character to the validity of the will or to its probate and took no steps in the probate court to vacate or set aside the order of probate.

1948IT 4.) In Erwin v. Erwin, 153 Kan. 703 , 113 P. 2d 349 , we held that a probate court had jurisdiction to approve or disapprove a family settlement in an estate being administered before it.

1948IT 4.) In Erwin v. Erwin, 153 Kan. 703 , 113 P. 2d 349 , we held that a probate court had jurisdiction to approve or disapprove a family settlement in an estate being administered before it.

1947The statute reads: “That upon the return of an officer on process or an affidavit duly filed' showing. any person guilty of indirect contempt, a writ of attachment or other lawful process may issue, and such person be arrested and brought before the court or judge in chambers; and thereupon■ a written accusation setting forth succinctly and clearly the facts alleged to constitute such contempt shall be filed, and the accused required to answer the same, by an order which shall fix the time therefor and also the time and place for hearing the matter; and the court or the judge in chambers shall

1947The statute reads: “That upon the return of an officer on process or an affidavit duly filed' showing. any person guilty of indirect contempt, a writ of attachment or other lawful process may issue, and such person be arrested and brought before the court or judge in chambers; and thereupon■ a written accusation setting forth succinctly and clearly the facts alleged to constitute such contempt shall be filed, and the accused required to answer the same, by an order which shall fix the time therefor and also the time and place for hearing the matter; and the court or the judge in chambers shall

1947The statute reads: “That upon the return of an officer on process or an affidavit duly filed' showing. any person guilty of indirect contempt, a writ of attachment or other lawful process may issue, and such person be arrested and brought before the court or judge in chambers; and thereupon■ a written accusation setting forth succinctly and clearly the facts alleged to constitute such contempt shall be filed, and the accused required to answer the same, by an order which shall fix the time therefor and also the time and place for hearing the matter; and the court or the judge in chambers shall

1947The statute reads: “That upon the return of an officer on process or an affidavit duly filed' showing. any person guilty of indirect contempt, a writ of attachment or other lawful process may issue, and such person be arrested and brought before the court or judge in chambers; and thereupon■ a written accusation setting forth succinctly and clearly the facts alleged to constitute such contempt shall be filed, and the accused required to answer the same, by an order which shall fix the time therefor and also the time and place for hearing the matter; and the court or the judge in chambers shall

1947The statute reads: “That upon the return of an officer on process or an affidavit duly filed' showing. any person guilty of indirect contempt, a writ of attachment or other lawful process may issue, and such person be arrested and brought before the court or judge in chambers; and thereupon■ a written accusation setting forth succinctly and clearly the facts alleged to constitute such contempt shall be filed, and the accused required to answer the same, by an order which shall fix the time therefor and also the time and place for hearing the matter; and the court or the judge in chambers shall

1947The statute reads: “That upon the return of an officer on process or an affidavit duly filed' showing. any person guilty of indirect contempt, a writ of attachment or other lawful process may issue, and such person be arrested and brought before the court or judge in chambers; and thereupon■ a written accusation setting forth succinctly and clearly the facts alleged to constitute such contempt shall be filed, and the accused required to answer the same, by an order which shall fix the time therefor and also the time and place for hearing the matter; and the court or the judge in chambers shall

1947App. 303 , 48 Pac. 602 .

1940It is to be noted that the court’s order of sale recited: “It appearing to the court that said guardian has given notice of the time and place of hearing said petition as by law required and in conformity with the orders of the court heretofore made,” etc. Appellants cite the case of Mickel v. Hicks, 19 Kan. 578 , where it was held that a defect in the notice made the sale void.

1932How he was originally notified of the proceedings became of no consequence (State v. Dolley, 82 Kan. 533 , 108 Pac. 846 ).

1932How he was originally notified of the proceedings became of no consequence (State v. Dolley, 82 Kan. 533 , 108 Pac. 846 ).

1924In Campion v. Gillan, 79 Neb. 364 (1907), it was held that the word “offenses” as used in the constitution is equivalent to crime, and that the governor had no authority to order a sheriff to release a person committed to his custody by the judgment of the court.

1910(Graden v. Mais, 77 Kan. 702.) Some time after the case had been remanded for a new trial steps were taken in the probate court to have the order mentioned entered nunc pro tunc, it being claimed that the order had actually been made at the proper time and that there was a failure to make it a matter of record.

1906(Rogers v. Clemmans, supra; Kelso v. Norton, ante, p. 442.) The statute which prescribes the kind and manner of notice to be given in such cases is found in section 2923 of the General Statutes of 1901, which reads: “The court shall require notice of the petition, and of the time and place of hearing the same, to be given for such length of time and in such manner as the court may see proper.” The order made by the court in this case reads: “It is ordered that said petition come on for final hearing on the 29th day of October, A. D. 1883, at the hour of ten o’clock A. M., at the probate court-