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9 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 2015–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Scottgreen2 sentences2020We will not repeat them here except to the extent necessary to explain the difference between the remedies offered to Dookhan defendants and Farak defendants. 6 misconduct over the course of two to three years by, among other things, making "a number of affirmative misrepresentations by signing drug certificates and testifying to the identity of substances in cases in which she had not in fact properly tested the substances in question." Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 348 (2014). 2018Accord Scott , supra at 357 ("[A] particular case may give rise to consideration of additional relevant factors ... such as whether the defendant was indicted on additional charges and whether the drug-related charges were a minor component of an over-all plea agreement"); Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist ., 476 Mass. 298 , 328 (2017) ( Bridgeman II ) (in Dookhan cases subject to Bridgeman II protocol, before district attorney may retry Dookhan defendant, he or she must "certify that ... the district attorney could produce evidence at a retrial, independent of Dookhan's sign | 3 | 4 |
Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2017At or after that hearing, if the single justice determines that relevant Dookhan defendants have been denied their right to counsel because of the inability of CPCS, despite its best efforts, to assign counsel to represent the defendants, the single justice may order that the drug convictions at issue be vacated and dismissed without prejudice, unless the interests of justice otherwise dictate.29 See Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 246 . 2017At or after that hearing, if the single justice determines that relevant Dookhan defendants have been denied their right to counsel because of the inability of CPCS, despite its best efforts, to assign counsel to represent the defendants, the single justice may order that the drug convictions at issue be vacated and dismissed without prejudice, unless the interests of justice otherwise dictate. 29 See Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 246 . | 2 | 2 |
Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Districtgreen2 sentences2024Furthermore, there is no risk that justice miscarried where the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Bridgeman II suggests the "relevant Dookhan defendants" do not include those "who already moved to vacate their pleas." Bridgeman II, 476 Mass. at 309 n.11. 2023The "List Two" defendants are the "relevant Dookhan defendants" -- those who were convicted of drug offenses or pleaded guilty after their drug certificate was signed by Dookhan, see id. at 306 n.8 -- whose cases the District Attorneys would identify for dismissal following an individualized review. | 1 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Resendegreen1 sentence2018See Resende , 475 Mass. at 17 -19 . | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Moffittgreen1 sentence2017But in the exercise of that discretion a judge should appoint counsel where the failure to do so would deprive an indigent defendant "of meaningful access" or result in "fundamental unfairness." Conceicao, supra at 262 , citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974), and Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981). 45 Here, all of the relevant Dookhan defendants who move for a new trial are entitled under our decision in Scott to a conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gookinsgreen2 sentences2017In State v. Gookins, 135 N.J. 42, 44-45 (1994), three defendants moved to vacate their guilty pleas for driving while under the influence of alcohol after the police officer involved in their arrests and the administration of their breathalyzer tests was convicted of falsifying the result of the breathalyzer test he had performed on an undercover agent, and of stealing money from drivers whom he had stopped. 2017The notice shall consist of a mailing that is approved by the single justice as to its content, its envelope, and its mode of delivery.28 The single justice shall also have the authority to order additional forms of public notice, such as through newspapers or social media, to enhance the effectiveness of the mailing and to attempt to reach those who might not receive it. "all the evidence that it considers to be untainted that would sustain the prosecution of these cases, . . . excluding the testimony of [the convicted officer]." Id. at 51 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hendersongreen1 sentence2015A defendant has a “constitutional due process right to a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Henderson, 411 Mass. 309, 310 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Ferrara v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 338-342 (2014). 4 We use the term “Dookhan defendants” to refer generally to those individuals who were convicted of drug offenses and in whose cases Dookhan signed the certificate of drug analysis (drug certificate) on the line labeled “Assistant Analyst.” These cases all arose in Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes, Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk Counties, except for one case that arose in Worcester County. 5 As noted by the single justice, the petitioners appear to propose notification to all Dookhan defendants, irrespective of wheth | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Attorney General
green
2 sentences2020Consequently, in contrast to the remedy created for Dookhan defendants, we determined that for Farak defendants the "very strong medicine of dismissal with prejudice [was] required." Id. at 725 . 2018Counsel Servs . v. Attorney Gen ., 480 Mass. 700 , 734-735 (2018) (defining class of "Farak defendants" to include defendants who pleaded guilty to drug charge, admitted to sufficient facts to warrant finding of guilty on drug charge, or were found guilty of drug charge at trial); Bridgeman II , 476 Mass. at 306, 67 N.E.3d 673 (providing comparable definition for "relevant Dookhan defendants"). | 2 | 2018–2020 |
Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District
green
2 sentences2020P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004): "Do the protections from harsher punishment established for 'Dookhan defendants'[5] in [Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465 (2015) (Bridgeman 4 The two aggravated rape charges each carry a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years which could be imposed consecutively. 2020We ultimately concluded that it would be wrong for Dookhan defendants to bear the burden "of a systemic lapse that, in the circumstances of the Hinton drug lab, we have said is entirely attributable to the government, even though there is no indication that prosecutors had actual knowledge of Dookhan's misconduct during their prosecutions of the Dookhan defendants." Id. at 476 . | 2 | 2017–2020 |
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.
green
1 sentence2017But in the exercise of that discretion a judge should appoint counsel where the failure to do so would deprive an indigent defendant "of meaningful access" or result in "fundamental unfairness." Conceicao, supra at 262 , citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974), and Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981). 45 Here, all of the relevant Dookhan defendants who move for a new trial are entitled under our decision in Scott to a conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Hung Tan Vo
green
1 sentence2017"The decision to allow a motion for a new trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge." Commonwealth v. Hung Tan Vo , 427 Mass. 464 , 467 (1998). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Charles
green
2 sentences2017Signaling a preference for a measured approach rather than the more drastic global remedy advocated by the petitioners, we noted that "our decisions in Scott and [Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63 (2013)], have provided Dookhan defendants . . . with meaningful solutions for addressing concerns that have arisen as these defendants attempt to challenge their drug convictions." Id. 2017Signaling a preference for a measured approach rather than the more drastic global remedy advocated by the petitioners, we noted that "our decisions in Scott and [Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63 (2013)], have provided Dookhan defendants . . . with meaningful solutions for addressing concerns that have arisen as these defendants attempt to challenge their drug convictions." Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Conceicao
green
1 sentence2017But in the exercise of that discretion a judge should appoint counsel where the failure to do so would deprive an indigent defendant "of meaningful access" or result in "fundamental unfairness." Conceicao, supra at 262 , citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974), and Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981). 45 Here, all of the relevant Dookhan defendants who move for a new trial are entitled under our decision in Scott to a conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Cronk
green
2 sentences2017Dookhan's conduct, serious as it was, did not result in "irremediable harm to the defendant's opportunity to obtain a fair trial." Cronk, 396 Mass. at 198 . 2017Dookhan’s conduct, serious as it was, did not result in “irremediable harm to the defendant’s opportunity to obtain a fair trial.” Cronk, 396 Mass. at 198 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Rivera
green
1 sentence2015Accordingly, we conclude that the testimony of a Dookhan defendant at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is only admissible at a subsequent trial for impeachment purposes if the defendant chooses to testify. 34 See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. at 637 , and cases cited (rule articulated in Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 , “has not been applied to exclude the use of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes”). 8. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Smaland Beach Ass'n v. Genova
green
1 sentence2015C. 3.7 (a) does not bar dual role representation of a Dookhan defendant at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, although “it would be particularly prudent first to secure client consent after consultation.” 32 Smaland, 461 Mass. at 226 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Simmons v. United States
green
1 sentence2015Accordingly, we conclude that the testimony of a Dookhan defendant at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is only admissible at a subsequent trial for impeachment purposes if the defendant chooses to testify. 34 See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. at 637 , and cases cited (rule articulated in Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 , “has not been applied to exclude the use of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes”). 8. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.