judge may consider factors in Massachusetts

2012In deciding a motion to sever, a judge may consider factors such as the time and place of the charged offenses, see Commonwealth v. Delaney, supra; the presence of factual similarities suggesting a common modus operandi, see Commonwealth v. Ferraro, 424 Mass. 87, 89-90 (1997); 6 and whether evidence in the trial of one offense would be admissible in the separate trial of another, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feijoo, supra at 494 .

2010See Commonwealth v. Ferraro, 424 Mass. 87, 89-90 (1997); Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 594 (1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1058 (1998); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 345 (1998); Commonwealth v. Pillai, supra. “Offenses are related if ‘the evidence in its totality shows a common scheme and pattern of operation that tends to prove’ each of the complaints.” Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Feijoo, 419 Mass. 486, 494-495 (1995).

2012In deciding a motion to sever, a judge may consider factors such as the time and place of the charged offenses, see Commonwealth v. Delaney, supra; the presence of factual similarities suggesting a common modus operandi, see Commonwealth v. Ferraro, 424 Mass. 87, 89-90 (1997); 6 and whether evidence in the trial of one offense would be admissible in the separate trial of another, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feijoo, supra at 494 .

2010See Commonwealth v. Ferraro, 424 Mass. 87, 89-90 (1997); Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 594 (1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1058 (1998); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 345 (1998); Commonwealth v. Pillai, supra. “Offenses are related if ‘the evidence in its totality shows a common scheme and pattern of operation that tends to prove’ each of the complaints.” Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Feijoo, 419 Mass. 486, 494-495 (1995).

2012In deciding a motion to sever, a judge may consider factors such as the time and place of the charged offenses, see Commonwealth v. Delaney, supra; the presence of factual similarities suggesting a common modus operandi, see Commonwealth v. Ferraro, 424 Mass. 87, 89-90 (1997); 6 and whether evidence in the trial of one offense would be admissible in the separate trial of another, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feijoo, supra at 494 .

2010See Commonwealth v. Ferraro, 424 Mass. 87, 89-90 (1997); Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 594 (1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1058 (1998); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 345 (1998); Commonwealth v. Pillai, supra. “Offenses are related if ‘the evidence in its totality shows a common scheme and pattern of operation that tends to prove’ each of the complaints.” Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Feijoo, 419 Mass. 486, 494-495 (1995).

2025See id. at 605-606 .

2022Rather, "an extension is warranted if 'there is a continued need for the order because the damage resulting from that physical harm [or sexual assault] affects the victim even when further physical attack [or sexual assault] is not reasonably imminent.'" Vera V., 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 317, quoting Callahan v. Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 374 (2014). "[T]he judge must make a discerning appraisal of the continued need for [a harassment] prevention order to protect the plaintiff from the impact of the violence already inflicted." Callahan, supra. Page 258 The judge may consider such factors as

2022Rather, "an extension is warranted if 'there is a continued need for the order because the damage resulting from that physical harm [or sexual assault] affects the victim even when further physical attack [or sexual assault] is not reasonably imminent.'" Vera V., 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 317, quoting Callahan v. Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 374 (2014). "[T]he judge must make a discerning appraisal of the continued need for [a harassment] prevention order to protect the plaintiff from the impact of the violence already inflicted." Callahan, supra. Page 258 The judge may consider such factors as

2022Rather, "an extension is warranted if 'there is a continued need for the order because the damage resulting from that physical harm [or sexual assault] affects the victim even when further physical attack [or sexual assault] is not reasonably imminent.'" Vera V., 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 317, quoting Callahan v. Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 374 (2014). "[T]he judge must make a discerning appraisal of the continued need for [a harassment] prevention order to protect the plaintiff from the impact of the violence already inflicted." Callahan, supra. Page 258 The judge may consider such factors as

2012See, e.g., Mason M., supra at 671 (although guidelines were not strictly applicable to calculation of support order, judge “was correct to consider the fact that the father had a responsibility to support his marital children”); Rosenberg v. Merida, 428 Mass. 182, 187 (1998) (determining whether and how to apply credit for noncustodial parent’s Social Security disability income dependency benefits where guidelines do not provide “a definitive answer”).

2010See Commonwealth v. Ferraro, 424 Mass. 87, 89-90 (1997); Commonwealth v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 594 (1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1058 (1998); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 345 (1998); Commonwealth v. Pillai, supra. “Offenses are related if ‘the evidence in its totality shows a common scheme and pattern of operation that tends to prove’ each of the complaints.” Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Feijoo, 419 Mass. 486, 494-495 (1995).

1988The rationale for the decision must appear in the judgment either explicitly or by clear implication, and the mere listing of findings, even if detailed, is not enough.” Bowring v. Reid, 399 Mass. 265, 267-268 (1987).

1988The rationale for the decision must appear in the judgment either explicitly or by clear implication, and the mere listing of findings, even if detailed, is not enough." Bowring v. Reid, 399 Mass. 265, 267-268 (1987).