bona fide claim in Maryland

2006In this case, we are concerned only with former Article 27, §§ 576(d) and 577(a)(2)(i) and (iii), which prohibited the "wanton" entry onto private property by a person who had been notified by the owner not to do so. [4] In addition, subsection (a)(2)(iii) expressly stated that the statute "may not be construed to apply to the entry on ... any land when the entry ... is done under a bona fide claim of right...." The current statute, § 6-403 of the Criminal Law Article, which the Revisor noted was without substantive change, specifically exempts entry "under a good faith claim of right...." The

2006In this case, we are concerned only with former Article 27, §§ 576(d) and 577(a)(2)(i) and (iii), which prohibited the "wanton" entry onto private property by a person who had been notified by the owner not to do so. [4] In addition, subsection (a)(2)(iii) expressly stated that the statute "may not be construed to apply to the entry on ... any land when the entry ... is done under a bona fide claim of right...." The current statute, § 6-403 of the Criminal Law Article, which the Revisor noted was without substantive change, specifically exempts entry "under a good faith claim of right...." The

2006In this case, we are concerned only with former Article 27, §§ 576(d) and 577(a)(2)(i) and (iii), which prohibited the "wanton" entry onto private property by a person who had been notified by the owner not to do so. [4] In addition, subsection (a)(2)(iii) expressly stated that the statute "may not be construed to apply to the entry on ... any land when the entry ... is done under a bona fide claim of right...." The current statute, § 6-403 of the Criminal Law Article, which the Revisor noted was without substantive change, specifically exempts entry "under a good faith claim of right...." The

2006In this case, we are concerned only with former Article 27, §§ 576(d) and 577(a)(2)(i) and (iii), which prohibited the "wanton" entry onto private property by a person who had been notified by the owner not to do so. [4] In addition, subsection (a)(2)(iii) expressly stated that the statute "may not be construed to apply to the entry on ... any land when the entry ... is done under a bona fide claim of right...." The current statute, § 6-403 of the Criminal Law Article, which the Revisor noted was without substantive change, specifically exempts entry "under a good faith claim of right...." The

1999Third, appellant posits that the State failed to prove that his presence at Sagner was “wanton”, because his activity on the premises was not “ ‘characterized by extreme recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of others.’ ” Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422 , 171 A.2d 717 (1961), rev’d on other grounds, 878 U.S. 130 , 84 S.Ct. 1770 , 12 L.Ed.2d 754 (1964)(quoting Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 616 , 56 A.2d 813 (1948)).

1999Third, appellant posits that the State failed to prove that his presence at Sagner was “wanton”, because his activity on the premises was not “ ‘characterized by extreme recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of others.’ ” Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422 , 171 A.2d 717 (1961), rev’d on other grounds, 878 U.S. 130 , 84 S.Ct. 1770 , 12 L.Ed.2d 754 (1964)(quoting Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 616 , 56 A.2d 813 (1948)).

2006Moreover, the term “bona fide” has been defined as “[i]n good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud.” Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 91 , 660 A.2d 447, 457 (1995), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 177 (6th Ed.1990).

2006Moreover, the term "bona fide" has been defined as "[i]n good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud." Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 91 , 660 A.2d 447, 457 (1995), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 177 (6th Ed.1990).

2006In this case, we are concerned only with former Article 27, §§ 576(d) and 577(a)(2)(i) and (iii), which prohibited the "wanton" entry onto private property by a person who had been notified by the owner not to do so. [4] In addition, subsection (a)(2)(iii) expressly stated that the statute "may not be construed to apply to the entry on ... any land when the entry ... is done under a bona fide claim of right...." The current statute, § 6-403 of the Criminal Law Article, which the Revisor noted was without substantive change, specifically exempts entry "under a good faith claim of right...." The

2006In this case, we are concerned only with former Article 27, §§ 576(d) and 577(a)(2)(i) and (iii), which prohibited the "wanton" entry onto private property by a person who had been notified by the owner not to do so. [4] In addition, subsection (a)(2)(iii) expressly stated that the statute "may not be construed to apply to the entry on ... any land when the entry ... is done under a bona fide claim of right...." The current statute, § 6-403 of the Criminal Law Article, which the Revisor noted was without substantive change, specifically exempts entry "under a good faith claim of right...." The

1999See, e.g., State v. McCormack, 517 So.2d 73, 75 (Fla.App.1987) (finding that officer had reason to stop and inquire purpose for being on property, and when defendant failed to offer explanation for his presence, officer had probable cause to arrest); State v. Little, 116 Wash.2d 488 , 806 P.2d 749, 754 (1991) (holding that "officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a criminal trespass was being committed and properly attempted to conduct an investigatory stop”); State v. Blair, 65 Wash.App. 64 , 827 P.2d 356, 359 (1992) (noting that officer’s prior admonishment not to return, coupled w

1999NOTES [1] It is well settled that a physician who "exercises the degree of care, skill and diligence required by the law ... is not liable for a bona fide error in judgment." Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567 , 265 A.2d 70, 74 (1969). [2] The circuit court also entered a judgment against appellant on her battery claim.

1999NOTES [1] It is well settled that a physician who "exercises the degree of care, skill and diligence required by the law ... is not liable for a bona fide error in judgment." Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567 , 265 A.2d 70, 74 (1969). [2] The circuit court also entered a judgment against appellant on her battery claim.

1999See, e.g., State v. McCormack, 517 So.2d 73, 75 (Fla.App.1987) (finding that officer had reason to stop and inquire purpose for being on property, and when defendant failed to offer explanation for his presence, officer had probable cause to arrest); State v. Little, 116 Wash.2d 488 , 806 P.2d 749, 754 (1991) (holding that "officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a criminal trespass was being committed and properly attempted to conduct an investigatory stop”); State v. Blair, 65 Wash.App. 64 , 827 P.2d 356, 359 (1992) (noting that officer’s prior admonishment not to return, coupled w

1999See, e.g., State v. McCormack, 517 So.2d 73, 75 (Fla.App.1987) (finding that officer had reason to stop and inquire purpose for being on property, and when defendant failed to offer explanation for his presence, officer had probable cause to arrest); State v. Little, 116 Wash.2d 488 , 806 P.2d 749, 754 (1991) (holding that "officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a criminal trespass was being committed and properly attempted to conduct an investigatory stop”); State v. Blair, 65 Wash.App. 64 , 827 P.2d 356, 359 (1992) (noting that officer’s prior admonishment not to return, coupled w

1999See, e.g., State v. McCormack, 517 So.2d 73, 75 (Fla.App.1987) (finding that officer had reason to stop and inquire purpose for being on property, and when defendant failed to offer explanation for his presence, officer had probable cause to arrest); State v. Little, 116 Wash.2d 488 , 806 P.2d 749, 754 (1991) (holding that "officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a criminal trespass was being committed and properly attempted to conduct an investigatory stop”); State v. Blair, 65 Wash.App. 64 , 827 P.2d 356, 359 (1992) (noting that officer’s prior admonishment not to return, coupled w

1999See, e.g., State v. McCormack, 517 So.2d 73, 75 (Fla.App.1987) (finding that officer had reason to stop and inquire purpose for being on property, and when defendant failed to offer explanation for his presence, officer had probable cause to arrest); State v. Little, 116 Wash.2d 488 , 806 P.2d 749, 754 (1991) (holding that "officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a criminal trespass was being committed and properly attempted to conduct an investigatory stop”); State v. Blair, 65 Wash.App. 64 , 827 P.2d 356, 359 (1992) (noting that officer’s prior admonishment not to return, coupled w

1999Cf. State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Minn.1981)(holding that a caretaker who visited patients in a nursing home on a daily basis for twenty-two months at the invitation of the patients or their guardians had a bona fide claim of right to enter the nursing home sufficient to negate the intent element of criminal trespass, despite having received a letter from nursing home authorities revoking her visiting privileges).

1955See also American Federation of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F. 2d 679 (C.

1955In the present state of the record we think that issue is not ripe for determination. *259 Despite the rather sweeping anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, paraphrased or adopted in the Maryland statute, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that where there is a bona fide claim that the Act is inapplicable, and the power to grant the ancillary relief depends in great part upon the resolution of the jurisdictional question, the trial court “unquestionably” has “the power to issue a restraining order for the purpose of preserving existing conditions pending a decisi