bona fide claim in Connecticut

2000To this end it provides a speedy, informal, and summary way of probing the conscience of the counsel for the defendant with respect to this matter, by compelling him to state orally to the court his belief that a bona fide defense exists, and will be made in good faith." Jennings v. Parsons , 71 Conn. 413 , 416-17 (1899).

1991Therein, this court considered the scope of a trial court’s review of an analogous Practice Book section which empowered the plaintiff in a civil action to require the defendant “ ‘to state to the court whether he has satisfactory reasons to believe, and does in truth believe, that there exists a bona fide defense to the plaintiff’s action, and whether such defense will be made, together with the nature or substance of it . . . .’” Id., 415 .

2014One who takes property in good faith, under fair color of claim or title, honestly believing that ... he has a right to take it, is not guilty of larceny even though he is mistaken in such belief, since in such case the felonious intent is lacking.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, 33 Conn. App. 368, 372-73 , 635 A.2d 816 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 921 , 636 A.2d 851 (1994); accord State v. Papandrea, 120 Conn. App. 224, 229-30 , 991 A.2d 617 (2010), aff'd, 302 Conn. 340 , 26 A.3d 75 (2011). “[T]he defendant’s claim of an innocent i

2014One who takes property in good faith, under fair color of claim or title, honestly believing that ... he has a right to take it, is not guilty of larceny even though he is mistaken in such belief, since in such case the felonious intent is lacking.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, 33 Conn. App. 368, 372-73 , 635 A.2d 816 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 921 , 636 A.2d 851 (1994); accord State v. Papandrea, 120 Conn. App. 224, 229-30 , 991 A.2d 617 (2010), aff'd, 302 Conn. 340 , 26 A.3d 75 (2011). “[T]he defendant’s claim of an innocent i

2014One who takes property in good faith, under fair color of claim or title, honestly believing that ... he has a right to take it, is not guilty of larceny even though he is mistaken in such belief, since in such case the felonious intent is lacking.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, 33 Conn. App. 368, 372-73 , 635 A.2d 816 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 921 , 636 A.2d 851 (1994); accord State v. Papandrea, 120 Conn. App. 224, 229-30 , 991 A.2d 617 (2010), aff'd, 302 Conn. 340 , 26 A.3d 75 (2011). “[T]he defendant’s claim of an innocent i

2014One who takes property in good faith, under fair color of claim or title, honestly believing that ... he has a right to take it, is not guilty of larceny even though he is mistaken in such belief, since in such case the felonious intent is lacking.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Varszegi, 33 Conn. App. 368, 372-73 , 635 A.2d 816 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 921 , 636 A.2d 851 (1994); accord State v. Papandrea, 120 Conn. App. 224, 229-30 , 991 A.2d 617 (2010), aff'd, 302 Conn. 340 , 26 A.3d 75 (2011). “[T]he defendant’s claim of an innocent i

1986A similar charge was also sustained in Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567, 576 , 265 A.2d 70 (1969), although it is not clear that the portion pertaining to a ‘bona fide error in judgment’ was under attack.” Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., supra, 298-99.

1986A similar charge was also sustained in Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567, 576 , 265 A.2d 70 (1969), although it is not clear that the portion pertaining to a ‘bona fide error in judgment’ was under attack.” Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., supra, 298-99.

1986In Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., supra, our Supreme Court faced a similar challenge to a trial court’s charge concerning errors in judgment. 2 In responding to the claim of error, our Supreme Court reviewed the history of the “bona fide error in judgment” charge: “The apparent source of the [errors in judgment] language was a passage in Green v. Stone, 121 Conn. 324, 330 , 185 A. 72 (1936), as follows: ‘The plaintiff complains of the failure of the court to charge in the language of this request and of its statement in a single sentence of the charge that a doctor is not liable for a bona

1986In Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., supra, our Supreme Court faced a similar challenge to a trial court’s charge concerning errors in judgment. 2 In responding to the claim of error, our Supreme Court reviewed the history of the “bona fide error in judgment” charge: “The apparent source of the [errors in judgment] language was a passage in Green v. Stone, 121 Conn. 324, 330 , 185 A. 72 (1936), as follows: ‘The plaintiff complains of the failure of the court to charge in the language of this request and of its statement in a single sentence of the charge that a doctor is not liable for a bona

2019The remand order was issued pursuant to Maris v. McGrath , 269 Conn. 834 , 845, 850 A.2d 133 (2004) (to award attorney's fees there must be clear evidence that challenged actions are entirely without color and taken for improper purposes), and Fattibene v. Kealey , 18 Conn. App. 344 , 359-60, 558 A.2d 677 (1989) (court's inherent authority to impose sanction of attorney's fees for bad faith pleading).

2019The remand order was issued pursuant to Maris v. McGrath , 269 Conn. 834 , 845, 850 A.2d 133 (2004) (to award attorney's fees there must be clear evidence that challenged actions are entirely without color and taken for improper purposes), and Fattibene v. Kealey , 18 Conn. App. 344 , 359-60, 558 A.2d 677 (1989) (court's inherent authority to impose sanction of attorney's fees for bad faith pleading).

2019The remand order was issued pursuant to Maris v. McGrath , 269 Conn. 834 , 845, 850 A.2d 133 (2004) (to award attorney's fees there must be clear evidence that challenged actions are entirely without color and taken for improper purposes), and Fattibene v. Kealey , 18 Conn. App. 344 , 359-60, 558 A.2d 677 (1989) (court's inherent authority to impose sanction of attorney's fees for bad faith pleading).

2019The remand order was issued pursuant to Maris v. McGrath , 269 Conn. 834 , 845, 850 A.2d 133 (2004) (to award attorney's fees there must be clear evidence that challenged actions are entirely without color and taken for improper purposes), and Fattibene v. Kealey , 18 Conn. App. 344 , 359-60, 558 A.2d 677 (1989) (court's inherent authority to impose sanction of attorney's fees for bad faith pleading).

2015See People v. Tufunga, 21 Cal. 4th 935, 948 , 987 P.2d 168 , 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143 (1999) (‘‘[a] conclusion . . . that a claim of right, for policy reasons, should no longer be recognized as a defense to robbery—even where the defendant can establish that he is taking back specific property to which he has lawful title or a bona fide claim of ownership—would mean such a defendant could be convicted of robbery based on theft of his own property, a proposition that would stand in patent conflict with both the commonsense notion that someone cannot steal his own property, and the corollary rule th

2015See People v. Tufunga, 21 Cal. 4th 935, 948 , 987 P.2d 168 , 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143 (1999) (‘‘[a] conclusion . . . that a claim of right, for policy reasons, should no longer be recognized as a defense to robbery—even where the defendant can establish that he is taking back specific property to which he has lawful title or a bona fide claim of ownership—would mean such a defendant could be convicted of robbery based on theft of his own property, a proposition that would stand in patent conflict with both the commonsense notion that someone cannot steal his own property, and the corollary rule th

2008Proc., Pt. 7, 2006 Sess., p. 2214. 5 The public hearing at issue in Roncari Industries, Inc., was scheduled for 2001, prior to Public Acts 2003, No. 03-177, which deleted the notice requirement in § 8-3 (a) and placed a substantially similar notice requirement in § 8-7d (a). 6 The defendant’s notice of cancellation and notice of special meeting were both dated January 27, 2004, as evidenced in exhibits N and O of the second supplemental return of record, filed December 9, 2004. 7 Our Supreme Court has reviewed land use body initiated zoning changes for spot zoning in Pierrepont v. Zoning Commi

2008Proc., Pt. 7, 2006 Sess., p. 2214. 5 The public hearing at issue in Roncari Industries, Inc., was scheduled for 2001, prior to Public Acts 2003, No. 03-177, which deleted the notice requirement in § 8-3 (a) and placed a substantially similar notice requirement in § 8-7d (a). 6 The defendant’s notice of cancellation and notice of special meeting were both dated January 27, 2004, as evidenced in exhibits N and O of the second supplemental return of record, filed December 9, 2004. 7 Our Supreme Court has reviewed land use body initiated zoning changes for spot zoning in Pierrepont v. Zoning Commi

2008Proc., Pt. 7, 2006 Sess., p. 2214. 5 The public hearing at issue in Roncari Industries, Inc., was scheduled for 2001, prior to Public Acts 2003, No. 03-177, which deleted the notice requirement in § 8-3 (a) and placed a substantially similar notice requirement in § 8-7d (a). 6 The defendant’s notice of cancellation and notice of special meeting were both dated January 27, 2004, as evidenced in exhibits N and O of the second supplemental return of record, filed December 9, 2004. 7 Our Supreme Court has reviewed land use body initiated zoning changes for spot zoning in Pierrepont v. Zoning Commi

2008Proc., Pt. 7, 2006 Sess., p. 2214. 5 The public hearing at issue in Roncari Industries, Inc., was scheduled for 2001, prior to Public Acts 2003, No. 03-177, which deleted the notice requirement in § 8-3 (a) and placed a substantially similar notice requirement in § 8-7d (a). 6 The defendant’s notice of cancellation and notice of special meeting were both dated January 27, 2004, as evidenced in exhibits N and O of the second supplemental return of record, filed December 9, 2004. 7 Our Supreme Court has reviewed land use body initiated zoning changes for spot zoning in Pierrepont v. Zoning Commi

2008Proc., Pt. 7, 2006 Sess., p. 2214. 5 The public hearing at issue in Roncari Industries, Inc., was scheduled for 2001, prior to Public Acts 2003, No. 03-177, which deleted the notice requirement in § 8-3 (a) and placed a substantially similar notice requirement in § 8-7d (a). 6 The defendant’s notice of cancellation and notice of special meeting were both dated January 27, 2004, as evidenced in exhibits N and O of the second supplemental return of record, filed December 9, 2004. 7 Our Supreme Court has reviewed land use body initiated zoning changes for spot zoning in Pierrepont v. Zoning Commi

2008Proc., Pt. 7, 2006 Sess., p. 2214. 5 The public hearing at issue in Roncari Industries, Inc., was scheduled for 2001, prior to Public Acts 2003, No. 03-177, which deleted the notice requirement in § 8-3 (a) and placed a substantially similar notice requirement in § 8-7d (a). 6 The defendant’s notice of cancellation and notice of special meeting were both dated January 27, 2004, as evidenced in exhibits N and O of the second supplemental return of record, filed December 9, 2004. 7 Our Supreme Court has reviewed land use body initiated zoning changes for spot zoning in Pierrepont v. Zoning Commi

2002"Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it." Cottman Transmission v. Hocap Corp. , 71 Conn. App. 632 , 637 (2002).

2001Id., 818-19 .

1997The disclosure of defense stated in relevant part that “there exists a bona fide defense to the plaintiff’s claim, to the extent that the defendants reserve their right to challenge the amount of the plaintiffs debt and calculation of said debt pursuant to Suffield Bank v. Berman, 25 Conn. App. 369 .” Practice Book § 236 provides in relevant part: “In any action to foreclose or discharge any mortgage or lien or to quiet title . . . the plaintiff may at any time file and serve in accordance with Sec. 120 a written demand that such attorney present to the court ... a writing signed by him statin

1994(Citations omitted.) Id., 21-22 .

1986We concur with the reasoning of Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 191 Conn. 282, 299 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983), that the giving of such a charge is error.

1986We concur with the reasoning of Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 191 Conn. 282, 299 , 465 A.2d 294 (1983), that the giving of such a charge is error.

1983Vita v. McLaughlin, 158 Conn. 75, 77 , 225 A.2d 848 (1969); Corrievau v. Associated Realty Corporation, 122 Conn. 253, 256-57 , 188 A. 436 (1936). c In response to an exception, taken by counsel for the defendant Bogdan, that a portion of his request to charge had been omitted, the court corrected the initial charge as follows: “The part I left out is that he is not liable for a bona fide error in judgment provided he concludes, as best he can, and does what he thinks best, after a careful examination, and acts in good faith subject to the rule of care, skill and diligence such as I have defin

1983Vita v. McLaughlin, 158 Conn. 75, 77 , 225 A.2d 848 (1969); Corrievau v. Associated Realty Corporation, 122 Conn. 253, 256-57 , 188 A. 436 (1936). c In response to an exception, taken by counsel for the defendant Bogdan, that a portion of his request to charge had been omitted, the court corrected the initial charge as follows: “The part I left out is that he is not liable for a bona fide error in judgment provided he concludes, as best he can, and does what he thinks best, after a careful examination, and acts in good faith subject to the rule of care, skill and diligence such as I have defin

1983Vita v. McLaughlin, 158 Conn. 75, 77 , 225 A.2d 848 (1969); Corrievau v. Associated Realty Corporation, 122 Conn. 253, 256-57 , 188 A. 436 (1936). c In response to an exception, taken by counsel for the defendant Bogdan, that a portion of his request to charge had been omitted, the court corrected the initial charge as follows: “The part I left out is that he is not liable for a bona fide error in judgment provided he concludes, as best he can, and does what he thinks best, after a careful examination, and acts in good faith subject to the rule of care, skill and diligence such as I have defin

1977The Court: All right, the court will find the plea was made voluntarily with full knowledge of the charge and of the possible penalties and after the advice of counsel, and the plea will be accepted.” We liave not overlooked the suggestion in State v. Barber, 173 Conn. 153, 154, 376 A.2d 1108 , that when a bona fide claim of the denial of adequate assistance of counsel is asserted good cause may be established for proceeding by way of habeas corpus rather than by direct appeal. “[Practice Book] See. 2122. advice to dependant The judicial authority shall not accept the plea without first addres

1977The Court: All right, the court will find the plea was made voluntarily with full knowledge of the charge and of the possible penalties and after the advice of counsel, and the plea will be accepted.” We liave not overlooked the suggestion in State v. Barber, 173 Conn. 153, 154, 376 A.2d 1108 , that when a bona fide claim of the denial of adequate assistance of counsel is asserted good cause may be established for proceeding by way of habeas corpus rather than by direct appeal. “[Practice Book] See. 2122. advice to dependant The judicial authority shall not accept the plea without first addres

1977The Court: All right, the court will find the plea was made voluntarily with full knowledge of the charge and of the possible penalties and after the advice of counsel, and the plea will be accepted.” We liave not overlooked the suggestion in State v. Barber, 173 Conn. 153, 154, 376 A.2d 1108 , that when a bona fide claim of the denial of adequate assistance of counsel is asserted good cause may be established for proceeding by way of habeas corpus rather than by direct appeal. “[Practice Book] See. 2122. advice to dependant The judicial authority shall not accept the plea without first addres

1977The Court: All right, the court will find the plea was made voluntarily with full knowledge of the charge and of the possible penalties and after the advice of counsel, and the plea will be accepted.” We liave not overlooked the suggestion in State v. Barber, 173 Conn. 153, 154, 376 A.2d 1108 , that when a bona fide claim of the denial of adequate assistance of counsel is asserted good cause may be established for proceeding by way of habeas corpus rather than by direct appeal. “[Practice Book] See. 2122. advice to dependant The judicial authority shall not accept the plea without first addres

1977Where, however, there has been an innocent mistake or a bona fide claim of right on the part of the defendant or laches on the part of the plaintiff, or where the conduct of the defendant was not wilful and inexcusable, and where the granting of the injunction would cause damage to the defendant greatly disproportionate to the injury of which plaintiff complains and it appears that damages will adequately compensate the latter, in such cases it has been held that it would be inequitable to grant a mandatory injunction and the plaintiff has been remitted to his remedy by way of damages [citatio

1977Where, however, there has been an innocent mistake or a bona fide claim of right on the part of the defendant or laches on the part of the plaintiff, or where the conduct of the defendant was not wilful and inexcusable, and where the granting of the injunction would cause damage to the defendant greatly disproportionate to the injury of which plaintiff complains and it appears that damages will adequately compensate the latter, in such cases it has been held that it would be inequitable to grant a mandatory injunction and the plaintiff has been remitted to his remedy by way of damages [citatio

1976See Baker v. Sard, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 139 , 420 F.2d 1342 (1969); Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528 (3 Cir. 1955)." [3] However, neither plaintiff in the cases before us claims any violation of his due process rights.

1976See Baker v. Sard, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 139 , 420 F.2d 1342 (1969); Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528 (3 Cir. 1955).” 3 However, neither plaintiff in the cases before us claims any violation of his due process rights.

1967Where defendant does not deny the allegation of the affidavit presented by plaintiff in support of his motion, the allegations of the affidavit are taken as true.” 49 C.J.S. 419, Judgments, § 225 (c); see Practice Book § 299; Warner v. Liimatainen, 25 Conn. Sup. 380, 382 ; Radio City Music Hall Corporation v. United States, 135 F.2d 715, 718 .