bona fide claim in Wyoming

2014See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81 , 98 P.3d 222 (Wyo.2004); Soami, 2004 WY 28 , 85 P.3d 1014 ; Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 18 (Wyo.1993). [128] The existence of a bona fide defense does not prevent the entry of an Alford plea.

2014See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81 , 98 P.3d 222 (Wyo.2004); Soami, 2004 WY 28 , 85 P.3d 1014 ; Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 18 (Wyo.1993). [128] The existence of a bona fide defense does not prevent the entry of an Alford plea.

2014See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81 , 98 P.3d 222 (Wyo.2004); Soami, 2004 WY 28 , 85 P.3d 1014 ; Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 18 (Wyo.1993). [128] The existence of a bona fide defense does not prevent the entry of an Alford plea.

2007Toltec, 717 P.2d at 814 ; Mudge, 748 P.2d at 716-17 . [128] This Court recognizes Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7783 (1979), which states that "one who interferes with a contract by asserting a bona fide claim in good faith is not Hable for tortious interference with contractual relations." Mudge, 748 P.2d at 717 .

2007Toltec, 717 P.2d at 814 ; Mudge, 748 P.2d at 716-17 . [128] This Court recognizes Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7783 (1979), which states that "one who interferes with a contract by asserting a bona fide claim in good faith is not Hable for tortious interference with contractual relations." Mudge, 748 P.2d at 717 .

1989A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” Baker, 677 F.2d 775 .

1986Martin v. Wing, supra. But one who interferes with a contract asserting a bona fide claim in good faith is not liable for tortious interference with a contract: “One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his own or threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, intentionally causes a third person not to perform an existing contract or enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with the other’s relation if the actor believes that his interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance

1986Martin v. Wing, supra. But one who interferes with a contract asserting a bona fide claim in good faith is not liable for tortious interference with a contract: "One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his own or threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, intentionally causes a third person not to perform an existing contract or enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with the other's relation if the actor believes that his interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance

1985The supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law fit into that which is condemned in Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary School District No. 9, County of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, 237 (1971): “ * * * Although such a hearing was conducted April 10, 1969, it is clear from the record as a whole, from the statement of counsel at the hearing, and even from the admission of appellee’s attorney in oral argument to us that Monahan did not have a bona fide hearing to determine whether there was just cause for his termination.

1985Instead, the hearing was nothing more than an exercise engaged in for the sole purpose of making a record which could make legal and justifiable the decision which the board had already made prior to the hearing.” That which is “good or just cause” was carefully analyzed in Powell v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, Crook County, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1112 (1976).

1936This court in Johnson v. Abbott, 25 Wyo. 133 , *Page 408 165 P. 991 , has heretofore said: "That a debtor may prefer one creditor to another, although the preferred creditor is his wife, we entertain no doubt, if the purpose is to pay or secure a bona fide claim." To the same effect is Quealy Land Live Stock Co. v. George, 36 Wyo. 268 , 254 P. 130 .

1936This court in Johnson v. Abbott, 25 Wyo. 133 , *Page 408 165 P. 991 , has heretofore said: "That a debtor may prefer one creditor to another, although the preferred creditor is his wife, we entertain no doubt, if the purpose is to pay or secure a bona fide claim." To the same effect is Quealy Land Live Stock Co. v. George, 36 Wyo. 268 , 254 P. 130 .

1936This court in Johnson v. Abbott, 25 Wyo. 133 , *Page 408 165 P. 991 , has heretofore said: "That a debtor may prefer one creditor to another, although the preferred creditor is his wife, we entertain no doubt, if the purpose is to pay or secure a bona fide claim." To the same effect is Quealy Land Live Stock Co. v. George, 36 Wyo. 268 , 254 P. 130 .

1936This court in Johnson v. Abbott, 25 Wyo. 133 , *Page 408 165 P. 991 , has heretofore said: "That a debtor may prefer one creditor to another, although the preferred creditor is his wife, we entertain no doubt, if the purpose is to pay or secure a bona fide claim." To the same effect is Quealy Land Live Stock Co. v. George, 36 Wyo. 268 , 254 P. 130 .

1896This is the doctrine of the Federal Supreme Court in Cameron v. United States, 148 U. S., 301 , that the provisions of the Act of Congress of 1885 do not operate upon persons who have taken possession of land under a bona fide claim or color of title.