in-depth analysis in Maryland

2017Cranford We conducted an in-depth analysis of a trial court’s responsibility to examine public records potentially exempted from MPIA disclosure in Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759 , 481 A.2d 221 (1984).

2017Cranford We conducted an in-depth analysis of a trial court’s responsibility to examine public records potentially exempted from MPIA disclosure in Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759 , 481 A.2d 221 (1984).

2010In Dixon v. State, 133 Md.App. 654 , 758 A.2d 1063 (2000) the Court of Special Appeals provided an in-depth analysis of our jurisprudence on the issue of confidential informants providing reasonable suspicion and probable cause.

2010In Dixon v. State, 133 Md.App. 654 , 758 A.2d 1063 (2000) the Court of Special Appeals provided an in-depth analysis of our jurisprudence on the issue of confidential informants providing reasonable suspicion and probable cause.

2010Id.

2008In support of her proposition, appellant places considerable emphasis on Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129 , 747 A.2d 625 (2000), in which Judge Wilner wrote: “In terms of their composition, jurisdiction, funding, and focus, [the county schools boards] clearly have a local flavor.” Appellant’s reliance on Chesapeake Charter, Inc., however, is misplaced as the case suggests to us that, under very limited circumstances, a county board of education in Maryland is to *601 be treated as a local agency rather than as an arm of the State.

2008In support of her proposition, appellant places considerable emphasis on Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 358 Md. 129 , 747 A.2d 625 (2000), in which Judge Wilner wrote: “In terms of their composition, jurisdiction, funding, and focus, [the county schools boards] clearly have a local flavor.” Appellant’s reliance on Chesapeake Charter, Inc., however, is misplaced as the case suggests to us that, under very limited circumstances, a county board of education in Maryland is to *601 be treated as a local agency rather than as an arm of the State.

2007The Skok Court explained that the original purpose behind the writ of error coram nobis was a narrow one; it served to “ ‘bring before the court facts which were not brought into issue at the trial of the case, and which were material to the validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which, if known by the court, would have prevented the judgment.’ ” 11 361 *615 Md. at 68, 760 A.2d 647 (quoting Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 432 , 109 A.2d 96 (1954)).

2007There, the Court of Appeals conducted an in-depth analysis of the history of the writ of error coram nobis and, following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954), expanded the scope of coram nobis relief in Maryland.

2007There, the Court of Appeals conducted an in-depth analysis of the history of the writ of error coram nobis and, following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954), expanded the scope of coram nobis relief in Maryland.

2007The Skok Court explained that the original purpose behind the writ of error coram nobis was a narrow one; it served to “ ‘bring before the court facts which were not brought into issue at the trial of the case, and which were material to the validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which, if known by the court, would have prevented the judgment.’ ” 11 361 *615 Md. at 68, 760 A.2d 647 (quoting Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 432 , 109 A.2d 96 (1954)).

2007The Skok Court explained that the original purpose behind the writ of error coram nobis was a narrow one; it served to “ ‘bring before the court facts which were not brought into issue at the trial of the case, and which were material to the validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which, if known by the court, would have prevented the judgment.’ ” 11 361 *615 Md. at 68, 760 A.2d 647 (quoting Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 432 , 109 A.2d 96 (1954)).

2001The State points out that the Howell Court considered the preservation issue in the context of Maryland Rule 1085, presently Maryland Rule 8-131, which provides that “[t]his Court will ordinarily not decide any point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the lower court.” Interestingly, Howell engages in an in-depth analysis of Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982), wherein the Court of Appeals reviewed our decision in Carbaugh v. State, 49 Md.App. 706 , 435 A.2d 116 (1981), where we held that failure to raise double jeopardy

2001The State points out that the Howell Court considered the preservation issue in the context of Maryland Rule 1085, presently Maryland Rule 8-131, which provides that “[t]his Court will ordinarily not decide any point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the lower court.” Interestingly, Howell engages in an in-depth analysis of Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982), wherein the Court of Appeals reviewed our decision in Carbaugh v. State, 49 Md.App. 706 , 435 A.2d 116 (1981), where we held that failure to raise double jeopardy

2001The State points out that the Howell Court considered the preservation issue in the context of Maryland Rule 1085, presently Maryland Rule 8-131, which provides that “[t]his Court will ordinarily not decide any point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the lower court.” Interestingly, Howell engages in an in-depth analysis of Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982), wherein the Court of Appeals reviewed our decision in Carbaugh v. State, 49 Md.App. 706 , 435 A.2d 116 (1981), where we held that failure to raise double jeopardy

2001The State points out that the Howell Court considered the preservation issue in the context of Maryland Rule 1085, presently Maryland Rule 8-131, which provides that “[t]his Court will ordinarily not decide any point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the lower court.” Interestingly, Howell engages in an in-depth analysis of Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982), wherein the Court of Appeals reviewed our decision in Carbaugh v. State, 49 Md.App. 706 , 435 A.2d 116 (1981), where we held that failure to raise double jeopardy

1974Any confusion or misunderstanding which might have resulted from the various opinions which have been rendered was certainly put asunder and hopefully ended with the in-depth analysis of the concept of alimony by Judge Powers in his opinion in Simpson v. Simpson, 18 Md.