in-depth analysis in District of Columbia

2024Id. (first quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925); and then citing 36 Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414 , 423 n.14 (D.C. 1988)). 53 case to constitute binding precedent.

2024In disputing that conclusion, the majority argues that “an in-depth analysis” of an issue or the text of a statute is not a requirement for a 34 Murphy, 650 A.2d at 205 (quoting Fletcher v. Scott, 277 N.W. 270, 272 (Minn. 1938)). 35 Id. (quoting In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1989)).

2024In disputing that conclusion, the majority argues that “an in-depth analysis” of an issue or the text of a statute is not a requirement for a 34 Murphy, 650 A.2d at 205 (quoting Fletcher v. Scott, 277 N.W. 270, 272 (Minn. 1938)). 35 Id. (quoting In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1989)).

2024In disputing that conclusion, the majority argues that “an in-depth analysis” of an issue or the text of a statute is not a requirement for a 34 Murphy, 650 A.2d at 205 (quoting Fletcher v. Scott, 277 N.W. 270, 272 (Minn. 1938)). 35 Id. (quoting In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir. 1989)).

2024Id. (first quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925); and then citing 36 Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414 , 423 n.14 (D.C. 1988)). 53 case to constitute binding precedent.

2009Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful, intentional- killing that would be second-degree murder but for the presence of mitigating circumstances, which “exist where [the] person acts in the heat of passion caused by adequate - provocation.” Lee v. United States, 959 A.2d 1141 , 1143 n. 5 (D.C.2008) (quoting Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.19 B (4th ed.1993)); accord, Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 42-47 (D.C.1990) (providing an in-depth analysis of the offense of voluntary manslaughter); United States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208, 214-15 (D.C.1975) (same).

2009Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful, intentional- killing that would be second-degree murder but for the presence of mitigating circumstances, which “exist where [the] person acts in the heat of passion caused by adequate - provocation.” Lee v. United States, 959 A.2d 1141 , 1143 n. 5 (D.C.2008) (quoting Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.19 B (4th ed.1993)); accord, Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 42-47 (D.C.1990) (providing an in-depth analysis of the offense of voluntary manslaughter); United States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208, 214-15 (D.C.1975) (same).

2007The trial court was therefore not required to perform an in-depth analysis of the billing records, and our review of the trial court’s decision must reflect that “it ‘is not for the [trial] court to justify each dollar or hour deducted from the total submitted by counsel ... [but] counsel’s burden to prove and establish the reasonableness of each dollar, each hour, above zero.” Bratcher, supra, 8 F.3d at 726 (quoting Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir.1986)) (alterations in Bratcher).

2000See Wingate v. United States, 669 A.2d 1275, 1279 (D.C.1995) (“If the judge in a § 23-110 motion hearing determine^] that trial counsel was in fact constitutionally prepared, the Monroe-Fan'ell issue ... effectively disappears] from the case, even if the inquiry actually made [was] insufficient.”) (citing Matthews v. United States, 459 A.2d 1068 , 1066 (D.C.1983)).

1991See Monroe, 540 A.2d at 739, 741-43 (statutory language and entire legislative scheme of No-Fault Act rebuts presumption that common law negligence action remains available in case of automobile accident); cf. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 , 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2455-56 , 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) ("[T]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action may be overcome by inferences of [legislative] intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.") B.

1991See Monroe, 540 A.2d at 739, 741-43 (statutory language and entire legislative scheme of No-Fault Act rebuts presumption that common law negligence action remains available in case of automobile accident); cf. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 , 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2455-56 , 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) (“[T]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action may be overcome by inferences of [legislative] intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.”) B.

1991See Monroe, 540 A.2d at 739, 741-43 (statutory language and entire legislative scheme of No-Fault Act rebuts presumption that common law negligence action remains available in case of automobile accident); cf. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 , 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2455-56 , 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) ("[T]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action may be overcome by inferences of [legislative] intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.") B.

1991See Monroe, 540 A.2d at 739, 741-43 (statutory language and entire legislative scheme of No-Fault Act rebuts presumption that common law negligence action remains available in case of automobile accident); cf. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 , 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2455-56 , 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) ("[T]he presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action may be overcome by inferences of [legislative] intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.") B.