order after hearing (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

order after hearing in California

67 California opinions name it 1 courts 1938–2026 50 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (27)

CaseFollowedCited
Harris v. Stampolisgreen
calctapp · 2016 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2025
2 sentences

2025A. Section 527.6 of the Civil Procedure Code allows “[a] person who has suffered harassment” to “seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.” An order shall issue “[i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists” (§ 527.6(i)) and “is likely to recur” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 499 ).

2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this

68
Parisi v. Mazzaferrogreen
calctapp · 2016 · cited in 13 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2025
2 sentences

2025A.C. timely appealed.6 DISCUSSION “ ‘Section 527.6 was enacted “to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.” [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.’ ” (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 , (Parisi); accord, Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 (Brekke).) “Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), ‘[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibit

2025DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A “[c]ourse of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a

513
Brekke v. Willsgreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 9 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2025
2 sentences

2025A.C. timely appealed.6 DISCUSSION “ ‘Section 527.6 was enacted “to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.” [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.’ ” (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 , (Parisi); accord, Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 (Brekke).) “Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), ‘[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibit

2024Online (2024) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dox> [as of Sept. 6, 2024], archived at: <https://perma.cc/D8XH-CT23>.) 8 so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1412 .) Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in” section 527.6.

39
Cooper v. Bettingergreen
calctapp · 2015 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2025
2 sentences

2025DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A “[c]ourse of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a

2022The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the June 29, 2021 hearing. 10 violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A course of conduct is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing corr

33
Duronslet v. Kampsgreen
calctapp · 2012 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2023
2 sentences

2023The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) As used in section 527.6, a “ ‘[c]redible threat of violence’ is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for the person’s safety or the safety of the person’s immediate family, and that serves no 7 legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2), italics added; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 725 .) The statute

2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this

33
Olson v. Doegreen
cal · 2022 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2025
2 sentences

2025A. Civil Harassment Restraining Order Under Section 527.6 Section 527.6 “enables a victim of ‘harassment’ to ‘seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.’ . . . [S]ection 527.6 provides ‘for the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice . . . on the same day that the petition is submitted to the court’ [citation] and generally requires the court to hold a hearing on the petition within 21 days [citation].” (Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 677 (Olson).) “At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may m

2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this

24
In Re Marriage of Woodgreen
calctapp · 1983 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2025
2 sentences

2025(Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1090‒1091 [minute order not appealable if the court directs preparation of a formal order]; In re Marriage of Wood (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 [where a formal order is required, an appeal does not lie from minute order].) We informed the parties we intended to take judicial notice of the formal order after hearing signed and filed on September 6, and construe mother’s notice of appeal as being taken from the order after hearing.

2025(Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1089‒ 1090 [minute order not appealable if the court directs preparation of a formal order]; In re Marriage of Wood (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 [where a formal order is required, an appeal does not lie from minute order].) We informed the parties we intended to construe Dennis’s notice of appeal as being taken from the order after hearing and to construe the order as an amended judgment.

23
Ensworth v. Mullvaingreen
calctapp · 1990 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2025
2 sentences

2025DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A “[c]ourse of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a

2022The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the June 29, 2021 hearing. 10 violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A course of conduct is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing corr

23
In Re Marriage of Padillagreen
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–2025
2 sentences

1998Where an order after hearing is neither interlocutory nor intermediate but a final determination, an injured party must timely appeal or lose the opportunity to do so. ( In re Marriage of Padilla (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 1212, 1215-1216 [ 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 555 ], citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(3); Code Civ.

1998Where an order after hearing is neither interlocutory nor intermediate but a final determination, an injured party must timely appeal or lose the opportunity to do so. ( In re Marriage of Padilla (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 1212, 1215-1216 [ 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 555 ], citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(3); Code Civ.

23
Vitkievicz v. Valverdegreen
calctapp · 2012 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d); see Vitkievicz v. Valverde (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310, fn. 2 .) We invited the parties to respond to our proposed course of action.

2025(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d); see Vitkievicz v. Valverde (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310, fn. 2 .) We invited the parties to respond to our proposed course of action, and told the parties if they did not respond we would construe the notice of appeal as being taken from the August 17, 2023 order, and treat it 10.

22
Scripps Health v. Maringreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022Section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides the same right to an employer: “Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from 3 any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer.” “[I]njunctive proceedings under section 527.8 are intended to p

2022Section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides the same right to an employer: “Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from 3 any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer.” “[I]njunctive proceedings under section 527.8 are intended to p

22
City of San Jose v. Garbettgreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022DISCUSSION “Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee.” (§ 527.8, subd. (a).) “ ‘Credible threat of violence’ is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).

2022Section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides the same right to an employer: “Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from 3 any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer.” “[I]njunctive proceedings under section 527.8 are intended to p

22
R.D. v. P.M.green
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2021–2023
2 sentences

2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this

2021(Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 .) “The appropriate test on appeal is whether the findings (express and implied) that support the trial court’s entry of the restraining order are justified by substantial evidence in the record.” (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 .) “[W]hether the facts, when construed most favorably in [the petitioner’s] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment under section 527.6, and whether the restraining order passes constitutional muster, are questions of law subject to de novo review.” (Ibid.) Civil harassment restrai

13
Krug v. Maschmeiergreen
calctapp · 2009 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
2 sentences

2026GOVERNING LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Section 527.6, subdivision (s), provides that “[t]he prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to this section may be awarded court costs and attorney's fees, if any.” The decision whether to award attorneys’ fees under section 527.6, subdivision (s), “is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court.” (Krug v. Maschmeier (2009) 172 Cal.App

2026(LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050 , 1081; see § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) [authorizing appeal of “order made after [appealable] judgment”].) The decision whether to award attorneys’ fees under section 527.6, subdivision (s), “is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court.” (Krug v. Maschmeier (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 796, 802 ; accord, Wash v. Banda-Wash (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 561 , 568.) The court likewise has discretion to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees.

12
Schild v. Rubingreen
calctapp · 1991 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2024
2 sentences

2024(See Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762 (Shild).) “If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) Saenz emphasizes that, when stating its oral ruling, the trial court told Martinez, “You were annoying.

2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this

12
People v. Hovartergreen
cal · 2008 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Because we have found no error, and certainly no prejudicial error, we find no cumulative error. {People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1030 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 189 P.3d 300 ].) DISPOSITION The trial court’s order after hearing, filed February 21, 2013, is affirmed.

2016Because we have found no error, and certainly no prejudicial error, we find no cumulative error. {People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1030 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 189 P.3d 300 ].) DISPOSITION The trial court’s order after hearing, filed February 21, 2013, is affirmed.

12
Jameson v. Destagreen
cal · 2018 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023We reject this argument because we “ ‘presume the court found every fact and drew every permissible inference necessary to support its judgment.’ ” (Engineers & Architects Assn. v. Community Development Dept., supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 653 ; see also Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [“ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court’ ”].) There is no contrary showing here.

11
FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrishgreen
calctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
USS-Posco Industries v. Edwardsgreen
calctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Ass'ngreen
calctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Nebel v. Sulakgreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Sacramento County Department of Health & Human Services v. T.C.green
calctapp · 2015 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
In Re Michael D.green
calctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Byers v. Cathcartgreen
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Gombos v. Ashegreen
calctapp · 1958 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
Taylor v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
Griffin v. Limagreen
calctapp · 1954 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1962–1962
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (41)

CaseCitedYears
Smith v. Smith green
calctapp · 2012
2 sentences

2025(Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1090‒1091 [minute order not appealable if the court directs preparation of a formal order]; In re Marriage of Wood (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 [where a formal order is required, an appeal does not lie from minute order].) We informed the parties we intended to take judicial notice of the formal order after hearing signed and filed on September 6, and construe mother’s notice of appeal as being taken from the order after hearing.

2025(Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1089‒ 1090 [minute order not appealable if the court directs preparation of a formal order]; In re Marriage of Wood (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 [where a formal order is required, an appeal does not lie from minute order].) We informed the parties we intended to construe Dennis’s notice of appeal as being taken from the order after hearing and to construe the order as an amended judgment.

22025–2025
In Re Marriage of Drake green
calctapp · 1997
2 sentences

2024Specifically, as we have explained, a box is checked indicating “Resp [Respondent, i.e., Terence] referred to the FLF [family law facilitator] for preparation of FOAH [a formal order after hearing] . . . and FLF to prepare and submit directly to the court.” (Capitalization omitted.) “A minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101 .) 10 “[W]hen the trial court’s minute order expressly indicates that a written order will be filed, only the written order is the effective order.” (In re Marriage of Drak

2020While “[c]onflicts between the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts are generally presumed to be clerical in nature and are resolved in favor of the reporter’s transcript unless the particular circumstances dictate otherwise” (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235 , 249), “a trial court’s oral ruling on a motion does not become effective until it is filed in writing with the clerk or entered in the minutes” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170 ).

22020–2024
Armuress Sapp v. Rogers green
calctapp5d · 2019
2 sentences

2024“A minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101 .) Cooley filed a second notice of appeal on July 5, 2022, timely appealing from the probate court’s June 21, 2022 Order Confirming Sale of Real Property, an appealable order.

2024Specifically, as we have explained, a box is checked indicating “Resp [Respondent, i.e., Terence] referred to the FLF [family law facilitator] for preparation of FOAH [a formal order after hearing] . . . and FLF to prepare and submit directly to the court.” (Capitalization omitted.) “A minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101 .) 10 “[W]hen the trial court’s minute order expressly indicates that a written order will be filed, only the written order is the effective order.” (In re Marriage of Drak

22024–2024
Haraguchi v. Superior Court green
cal · 2008
2 sentences

2023The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712 , fn. omitted (Haraguchi).) Hartman’s appeal presents a pure question of law—whether the trial court continued to retain jurisdiction at the time it ruled on the requests for a civil harassment restraining order and attorney fees, beyond 25 days from the issuance of the temporary 3 restraining order.

2023The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712 , fn. omitted (Haraguchi).) Hartman’s appeal presents a pure question of law—whether the trial court continued to retain jurisdiction at the time it ruled on the requests for a civil harassment restraining order and attorney fees, beyond 25 days from the issuance of the temporary 3 restraining order.

22023–2023
Russell v. Douvan green
calctapp · 2003
2 sentences

2023If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) Because an injunction “serves to prevent future injury and is not applicable to wrongs that have been completed,” the petitioner must also show a high probability of future harm. ( Russell, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 402–404; see also Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 499 [“An injunction restraining future conduct is only authorized when it appears that harassment is likely to recur in the future.”]).

2022(Id. at pp. 732–733.) “At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i), italics added.) Then, if the court “finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” “ ‘ “Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability.’ ” (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399 , 401 quoting In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919 .) This threshold is nonetheless subject to the general rule that the testimony of a single witness, inclu

22022–2023
In Re Marriage of Lusby green
calctapp · 1998
1 sentence

2025“Where an order after hearing is neither interlocutory nor intermediate but a final determination, an injured party must timely appeal or lose the opportunity to do so.” (In re Marriage of Lusby (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 459 , 473.) “A temporary support order is operative from the time of pronouncement, and it is directly appealable.” (In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 637 .) Consequently, if a party does not timely appeal from a support order, the order cannot be reviewed in a later appeal from the judgment.

12025–2025
Gruen v. Gruen green
calctapp · 2011
1 sentence

2025“Where an order after hearing is neither interlocutory nor intermediate but a final determination, an injured party must timely appeal or lose the opportunity to do so.” (In re Marriage of Lusby (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 459 , 473.) “A temporary support order is operative from the time of pronouncement, and it is directly appealable.” (In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 637 .) Consequently, if a party does not timely appeal from a support order, the order cannot be reviewed in a later appeal from the judgment.

12025–2025
Faunce v. Cate green
calctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2025An appellate court’s “ ‘jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.’ [Citation.] We have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 .) Because Mirabella’s notices of appeal did not identify the August 23 order, we lack jurisdiction to consider her arguments concerning it. 25 DISPOSITION We affirm the orders denying the move-away request, the motion for reconsideration, and the request to renew the DVRO, and we dismiss the appeal regarding the August 7, 2023

12025–2025
Smith v. Silvey green
calctapp · 1983
1 sentence

2024The purpose of the [statute] is to provide quick relief to harassed persons.’ ” (Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 400, 405 .) To provide such quick relief, “[a] request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice under this section shall be granted or denied on the same day that the petition is submitted to the court.” (§ 527.6, subd. (e).) Subject to the provisions governing continuances, a hearing on the petition shall be held “[w]ithin 21 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days from the date that a petition for a temporary [restraining] order is grant

12024–2024
Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern green
calctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2024Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ ” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) A person who has suffered harassment as defined by section 527.6 may “seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (a)(1).) “At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) “This provision has been interpreted to mean hearsay evidence, such as a declaration or police report, is admissible during hearings conducted pursuant to section

12024–2024
Eng. & Architects Assn. v. Community Dev. Dept. of City of Los Angeles green
calctapp · 1994
12023–2023
Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron green
calctapp · 2009
1 sentence

2023(See Dietz, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 779–801 [several contentions on appeal “forfeited” because appellant failed to provide a single record citation demonstrating it raised those contentions at trial]; Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691 , 699–700 [issue not supported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument may be deemed abandoned].) DISPOSITION The court’s order after hearing is affirmed.

12023–2023
Landry v. Berryessa Union School District green
calctapp · 1995
1 sentence

2023(See Dietz, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 779–801 [several contentions on appeal “forfeited” because appellant failed to provide a single record citation demonstrating it raised those contentions at trial]; Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691 , 699–700 [issue not supported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument may be deemed abandoned].) DISPOSITION The court’s order after hearing is affirmed.

12023–2023
In Re Marriage of Ackerman green
calctapp · 2006
1 sentence

2023While the court’s order after hearing does not set forth a specific amount of expected arbitration fees, there is substantial evidence of the anticipated fees in the record and “[f]indings will be normally implied to support . . . orders if supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 197 .)9 9 Plaintiffs also argue the trial court failed to consider that, even if they were able to pay their share of the fee for initiating the arbitration, they did not have enough money to pay for the arbitrator’s fees.

12023–2023
Salazar v. Eastin green
cal · 1995
12023–2023
Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine green
calctapp · 2013
12023–2023
In Re Zeth S. green
cal · 2003
12022–2022
Department of Social Services v. Ronald P. red
cal · 1981
12022–2022
Montenegro v. Diaz green
cal · 2001
12022–2022
Nakamura v. Parker green
calctapp · 2007
12022–2022
Rodriguez v. Menjivar CA2/7 green
calctapp · 2015
12022–2022
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Wilson green
calctapp · 2011
12022–2022
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California green
cal · 2012
12022–2022
Marr. of Fregoso & Hernandez green
calctapp · 2016
12022–2022
Perez v. Torres-Hernandez CA1/4 green
calctapp · 2016
12022–2022
Burquet v. Brumbaugh CA2/5 green
calctapp · 2014
12022–2022
In Re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke green
calctapp · 2008
12021–2021
Rappleyea v. Campbell green
cal · 1994
12021–2021
Gutierrez v. Mofid green
cal · 1985
12021–2021
Elster v. Friedman green
calctapp · 1989
12020–2020
In Re Merrick green
calctapp · 2004
12020–2020
R.R. v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 2009
12016–2016
Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance green
cal · 1937
12016–2016
People v. Bauer green
calctapp · 1989
12013–2013
Gonzalez v. Munoz green
calctapp · 2007
12013–2013
Kinoshita v. Horio green
calctapp · 1986
11998–1998
Lewin v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange green
calctapp · 1978
11996–1996
Fortenbury v. Superior Court green
cal · 1940
11980–1980
Neumann v. Moretti green
cal · 1905
11962–1962
Haynes v. MacFarlane green
cal · 1929
11938–1938

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 452 (4) CA § Cal. Family Code § 6200 (3) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 653.2 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 67 (1938–2026) NY 4 (1988–2015) PA 4 (1998–2026) WA 3 (1996–2006) TX 3 (1935–2023) WV 2 (2018–2021) UT 2 (1998–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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