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67 California opinions name it 1 courts 1938–2026 50 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Stampolisgreen2 sentences2025A. Section 527.6 of the Civil Procedure Code allows “[a] person who has suffered harassment” to “seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.” An order shall issue “[i]f the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists” (§ 527.6(i)) and “is likely to recur” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 499 ). 2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this | 6 | 8 |
Parisi v. Mazzaferrogreen2 sentences2025A.C. timely appealed.6 DISCUSSION “ ‘Section 527.6 was enacted “to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.” [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.’ ” (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 , (Parisi); accord, Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 (Brekke).) “Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), ‘[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibit 2025DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A “[c]ourse of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a | 5 | 13 |
Brekke v. Willsgreen2 sentences2025A.C. timely appealed.6 DISCUSSION “ ‘Section 527.6 was enacted “to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.” [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.’ ” (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 , (Parisi); accord, Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 (Brekke).) “Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), ‘[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibit 2024Online (2024) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dox> [as of Sept. 6, 2024], archived at: <https://perma.cc/D8XH-CT23>.) 8 so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1412 .) Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in” section 527.6. | 3 | 9 |
Cooper v. Bettingergreen2 sentences2025DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A “[c]ourse of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a 2022The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the June 29, 2021 hearing. 10 violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A course of conduct is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing corr | 3 | 3 |
Duronslet v. Kampsgreen2 sentences2023The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) As used in section 527.6, a “ ‘[c]redible threat of violence’ is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for the person’s safety or the safety of the person’s immediate family, and that serves no 7 legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2), italics added; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 725 .) The statute 2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this | 3 | 3 |
Olson v. Doegreen2 sentences2025A. Civil Harassment Restraining Order Under Section 527.6 Section 527.6 “enables a victim of ‘harassment’ to ‘seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.’ . . . [S]ection 527.6 provides ‘for the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice . . . on the same day that the petition is submitted to the court’ [citation] and generally requires the court to hold a hearing on the petition within 21 days [citation].” (Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 677 (Olson).) “At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may m 2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this | 2 | 4 |
In Re Marriage of Woodgreen2 sentences2025(Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1090‒1091 [minute order not appealable if the court directs preparation of a formal order]; In re Marriage of Wood (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 [where a formal order is required, an appeal does not lie from minute order].) We informed the parties we intended to take judicial notice of the formal order after hearing signed and filed on September 6, and construe mother’s notice of appeal as being taken from the order after hearing. 2025(Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1089‒ 1090 [minute order not appealable if the court directs preparation of a formal order]; In re Marriage of Wood (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 [where a formal order is required, an appeal does not lie from minute order].) We informed the parties we intended to construe Dennis’s notice of appeal as being taken from the order after hearing and to construe the order as an amended judgment. | 2 | 3 |
Ensworth v. Mullvaingreen2 sentences2025DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A “[c]ourse of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a 2022The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the June 29, 2021 hearing. 10 violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A course of conduct is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing corr | 2 | 3 |
In Re Marriage of Padillagreen2 sentences1998Where an order after hearing is neither interlocutory nor intermediate but a final determination, an injured party must timely appeal or lose the opportunity to do so. ( In re Marriage of Padilla (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 1212, 1215-1216 [ 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 555 ], citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(3); Code Civ. 1998Where an order after hearing is neither interlocutory nor intermediate but a final determination, an injured party must timely appeal or lose the opportunity to do so. ( In re Marriage of Padilla (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 1212, 1215-1216 [ 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 555 ], citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(3); Code Civ. | 2 | 3 |
Vitkievicz v. Valverdegreen2 sentences2025(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d); see Vitkievicz v. Valverde (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310, fn. 2 .) We invited the parties to respond to our proposed course of action. 2025(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d); see Vitkievicz v. Valverde (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310, fn. 2 .) We invited the parties to respond to our proposed course of action, and told the parties if they did not respond we would construe the notice of appeal as being taken from the August 17, 2023 order, and treat it 10. | 2 | 2 |
Scripps Health v. Maringreen2 sentences2022Section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides the same right to an employer: “Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from 3 any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer.” “[I]njunctive proceedings under section 527.8 are intended to p 2022Section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides the same right to an employer: “Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from 3 any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer.” “[I]njunctive proceedings under section 527.8 are intended to p | 2 | 2 |
City of San Jose v. Garbettgreen2 sentences2022DISCUSSION “Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee.” (§ 527.8, subd. (a).) “ ‘Credible threat of violence’ is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id., subd. (b)(2). 2022Section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides the same right to an employer: “Any employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from 3 any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer.” “[I]njunctive proceedings under section 527.8 are intended to p | 2 | 2 |
R.D. v. P.M.green2 sentences2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this 2021(Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 .) “The appropriate test on appeal is whether the findings (express and implied) that support the trial court’s entry of the restraining order are justified by substantial evidence in the record.” (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 .) “[W]hether the facts, when construed most favorably in [the petitioner’s] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment under section 527.6, and whether the restraining order passes constitutional muster, are questions of law subject to de novo review.” (Ibid.) Civil harassment restrai | 1 | 3 |
Krug v. Maschmeiergreen2 sentences2026GOVERNING LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” Section 527.6, subdivision (s), provides that “[t]he prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to this section may be awarded court costs and attorney's fees, if any.” The decision whether to award attorneys’ fees under section 527.6, subdivision (s), “is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court.” (Krug v. Maschmeier (2009) 172 Cal.App 2026(LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050 , 1081; see § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) [authorizing appeal of “order made after [appealable] judgment”].) The decision whether to award attorneys’ fees under section 527.6, subdivision (s), “is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court.” (Krug v. Maschmeier (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 796, 802 ; accord, Wash v. Banda-Wash (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 561 , 568.) The court likewise has discretion to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees. | 1 | 2 |
Schild v. Rubingreen2 sentences2024(See Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762 (Shild).) “If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) Saenz emphasizes that, when stating its oral ruling, the trial court told Martinez, “You were annoying. 2022DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Section 527.6 was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ [Citations.] It does so by providing expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 ; see Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 .) Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides a “person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hovartergreen2 sentences2016Because we have found no error, and certainly no prejudicial error, we find no cumulative error. {People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1030 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 189 P.3d 300 ].) DISPOSITION The trial court’s order after hearing, filed February 21, 2013, is affirmed. 2016Because we have found no error, and certainly no prejudicial error, we find no cumulative error. {People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1030 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 189 P.3d 300 ].) DISPOSITION The trial court’s order after hearing, filed February 21, 2013, is affirmed. | 1 | 2 |
Jameson v. Destagreen1 sentence2023We reject this argument because we “ ‘presume the court found every fact and drew every permissible inference necessary to support its judgment.’ ” (Engineers & Architects Assn. v. Community Development Dept., supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 653 ; see also Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [“ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court’ ”].) There is no contrary showing here. | 1 | 1 |
| FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrishgreen | 1 | 1 |
| USS-Posco Industries v. Edwardsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nebel v. Sulakgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sacramento County Department of Health & Human Services v. T.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Michael D.green | 1 | 1 |
| Byers v. Cathcartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gombos v. Ashegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Griffin v. Limagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Smith
green
2 sentences2025(Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1090‒1091 [minute order not appealable if the court directs preparation of a formal order]; In re Marriage of Wood (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 [where a formal order is required, an appeal does not lie from minute order].) We informed the parties we intended to take judicial notice of the formal order after hearing signed and filed on September 6, and construe mother’s notice of appeal as being taken from the order after hearing. 2025(Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1089‒ 1090 [minute order not appealable if the court directs preparation of a formal order]; In re Marriage of Wood (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 [where a formal order is required, an appeal does not lie from minute order].) We informed the parties we intended to construe Dennis’s notice of appeal as being taken from the order after hearing and to construe the order as an amended judgment. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Marriage of Drake
green
2 sentences2024Specifically, as we have explained, a box is checked indicating “Resp [Respondent, i.e., Terence] referred to the FLF [family law facilitator] for preparation of FOAH [a formal order after hearing] . . . and FLF to prepare and submit directly to the court.” (Capitalization omitted.) “A minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101 .) 10 “[W]hen the trial court’s minute order expressly indicates that a written order will be filed, only the written order is the effective order.” (In re Marriage of Drak 2020While “[c]onflicts between the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts are generally presumed to be clerical in nature and are resolved in favor of the reporter’s transcript unless the particular circumstances dictate otherwise” (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235 , 249), “a trial court’s oral ruling on a motion does not become effective until it is filed in writing with the clerk or entered in the minutes” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170 ). | 2 | 2020–2024 |
Armuress Sapp v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2024“A minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101 .) Cooley filed a second notice of appeal on July 5, 2022, timely appealing from the probate court’s June 21, 2022 Order Confirming Sale of Real Property, an appealable order. 2024Specifically, as we have explained, a box is checked indicating “Resp [Respondent, i.e., Terence] referred to the FLF [family law facilitator] for preparation of FOAH [a formal order after hearing] . . . and FLF to prepare and submit directly to the court.” (Capitalization omitted.) “A minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101 .) 10 “[W]hen the trial court’s minute order expressly indicates that a written order will be filed, only the written order is the effective order.” (In re Marriage of Drak | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Haraguchi v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712 , fn. omitted (Haraguchi).) Hartman’s appeal presents a pure question of law—whether the trial court continued to retain jurisdiction at the time it ruled on the requests for a civil harassment restraining order and attorney fees, beyond 25 days from the issuance of the temporary 3 restraining order. 2023The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712 , fn. omitted (Haraguchi).) Hartman’s appeal presents a pure question of law—whether the trial court continued to retain jurisdiction at the time it ruled on the requests for a civil harassment restraining order and attorney fees, beyond 25 days from the issuance of the temporary 3 restraining order. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Russell v. Douvan
green
2 sentences2023If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) Because an injunction “serves to prevent future injury and is not applicable to wrongs that have been completed,” the petitioner must also show a high probability of future harm. ( Russell, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 402–404; see also Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 499 [“An injunction restraining future conduct is only authorized when it appears that harassment is likely to recur in the future.”]). 2022(Id. at pp. 732–733.) “At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i), italics added.) Then, if the court “finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” “ ‘ “Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability.’ ” (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399 , 401 quoting In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919 .) This threshold is nonetheless subject to the general rule that the testimony of a single witness, inclu | 2 | 2022–2023 |
In Re Marriage of Lusby
green
1 sentence2025“Where an order after hearing is neither interlocutory nor intermediate but a final determination, an injured party must timely appeal or lose the opportunity to do so.” (In re Marriage of Lusby (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 459 , 473.) “A temporary support order is operative from the time of pronouncement, and it is directly appealable.” (In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 637 .) Consequently, if a party does not timely appeal from a support order, the order cannot be reviewed in a later appeal from the judgment. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gruen v. Gruen
green
1 sentence2025“Where an order after hearing is neither interlocutory nor intermediate but a final determination, an injured party must timely appeal or lose the opportunity to do so.” (In re Marriage of Lusby (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 459 , 473.) “A temporary support order is operative from the time of pronouncement, and it is directly appealable.” (In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 637 .) Consequently, if a party does not timely appeal from a support order, the order cannot be reviewed in a later appeal from the judgment. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Faunce v. Cate
green
1 sentence2025An appellate court’s “ ‘jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.’ [Citation.] We have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 .) Because Mirabella’s notices of appeal did not identify the August 23 order, we lack jurisdiction to consider her arguments concerning it. 25 DISPOSITION We affirm the orders denying the move-away request, the motion for reconsideration, and the request to renew the DVRO, and we dismiss the appeal regarding the August 7, 2023 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Smith v. Silvey
green
1 sentence2024The purpose of the [statute] is to provide quick relief to harassed persons.’ ” (Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 400, 405 .) To provide such quick relief, “[a] request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order without notice under this section shall be granted or denied on the same day that the petition is submitted to the court.” (§ 527.6, subd. (e).) Subject to the provisions governing continuances, a hearing on the petition shall be held “[w]ithin 21 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days from the date that a petition for a temporary [restraining] order is grant | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern
green
1 sentence2024Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ ” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) A person who has suffered harassment as defined by section 527.6 may “seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (a)(1).) “At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) “This provision has been interpreted to mean hearsay evidence, such as a declaration or police report, is admissible during hearings conducted pursuant to section | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Eng. & Architects Assn. v. Community Dev. Dept. of City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron
green
1 sentence2023(See Dietz, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 779–801 [several contentions on appeal “forfeited” because appellant failed to provide a single record citation demonstrating it raised those contentions at trial]; Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691 , 699–700 [issue not supported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument may be deemed abandoned].) DISPOSITION The court’s order after hearing is affirmed. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Landry v. Berryessa Union School District
green
1 sentence2023(See Dietz, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 779–801 [several contentions on appeal “forfeited” because appellant failed to provide a single record citation demonstrating it raised those contentions at trial]; Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691 , 699–700 [issue not supported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument may be deemed abandoned].) DISPOSITION The court’s order after hearing is affirmed. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Marriage of Ackerman
green
1 sentence2023While the court’s order after hearing does not set forth a specific amount of expected arbitration fees, there is substantial evidence of the anticipated fees in the record and “[f]indings will be normally implied to support . . . orders if supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 197 .)9 9 Plaintiffs also argue the trial court failed to consider that, even if they were able to pay their share of the fee for initiating the arbitration, they did not have enough money to pay for the arbitrator’s fees. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Salazar v. Eastin green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In Re Zeth S. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Department of Social Services v. Ronald P. red | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Montenegro v. Diaz green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Nakamura v. Parker green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Rodriguez v. Menjivar CA2/7 green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Wilson green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Marr. of Fregoso & Hernandez green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Perez v. Torres-Hernandez CA1/4 green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Burquet v. Brumbaugh CA2/5 green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Rappleyea v. Campbell green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Gutierrez v. Mofid green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Elster v. Friedman green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In Re Merrick green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| R.R. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Bauer green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Gonzalez v. Munoz green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Kinoshita v. Horio green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Lewin v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Fortenbury v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Neumann v. Moretti green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Haynes v. MacFarlane green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.