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9 Michigan opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Grand/Sakwa of Northfield, LLC v. Northfield Townshipgreen2 sentences2023“The factual determination that must control is whether the predominant motivation for the ordinance change was improvement of the municipality’s litigation position.” Grand/Sakawa, 304 Mich App at 143-144 . 2020“The second exception applies if the trial court finds that the newer classification was enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiff’s suit.” Id. at 142 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Klyman v. City of Troygreen2 sentences2020As illustrated in this Court’s caselaw, determining the applicability of an amended ordinance is a fact-intensive inquiry that involves weighing numerous factors and considerations: In Klyman, [ 40 Mich App at 279 ], this Court identified several factors to be considered when exercising discretion to admit or deny evidence of an amended ordinance: (a) whether the plaintiff had an unquestionable right to issuance of a permit before the amendment, (b) whether the municipality had not forbidden the type of construction the plaintiff proposed before the amendment, (c) whether the ordinance was ame 2014In Klyman , we defined the exception more narrowly, stating that a change in an ordinance shall be applied unless it “was ... enacted simply to manufacture a defense.” Klyman, 40 Mich App at 279 (emphasis added). | 1 | 3 |
MacDonald Advertising Co. v. McIntyregreen2 sentences2008See McDonald Advertising Co v McIntyre, 211 Mich App 406, 411 ; 536 NW2d 249 (1995) (“After reviewing the facts in this case, it is clear that the amendment was not enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs suit.”). 2008See McDonald Advertising Co v McIntyre, 211 Mich App 406, 411 ; 536 NW2d 249 (1995) (“After reviewing the facts in this case, it is clear that the amendment was not enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs suit.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Landon Holdings, Inc v. Grattan Township
green
2 sentences2023An exception to this rule exists when “the amendment was enacted in bad faith and with unjustified delay.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he test to determine bad faith is whether the amendment was enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiff’s suit.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2023An exception to this rule exists when “the amendment was enacted in bad faith and with unjustified delay.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he test to determine bad faith is whether the amendment was enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiff’s suit.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 4 | 2014–2023 |
Lockwood v. City of Southfield
green
2 sentences2020Similarly, in [Rodney Lockwood & Co v Southfield, 93 Mich App 206, 211 ; 286 NW2d 87 (1979)], this Court reiterated the general rule that the law to be applied is that in effect at the time of the zoning decision, subject to the exception that a court will not apply an amendment of a zoning ordinance if the amendment was “enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs’ suit.” The Court noted that, in the case before it, there was evidence indicating that the amendment was intended to clarify an ambiguous ordinance and that the amendment did not apply only to the plaintiffs’ p 2020Similarly, in [Rodney Lockwood & Co v Southfield, 93 Mich App 206, 211 ; 286 NW2d 87 (1979)], this Court reiterated the general rule that the law to be applied is that in effect at the time of the zoning decision, subject to the exception that a court will not apply an amendment of a zoning ordinance if the amendment was “enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs’ suit.” The Court noted that, in the case before it, there was evidence indicating that the amendment was intended to clarify an ambiguous ordinance and that the amendment did not apply only to the plaintiffs’ p | 3 | 1995–2020 |
Keating International Corp. v. Orion Township
green
2 sentences2008There are two exceptions to the general rule: (1) “A court will not apply an amendment to a zoning ordinance where ... the amendment would destroy a vested property interest acquired before its enactment...”; and (2) a court will not apply the amendment where “the amendment was enacted in bad faith and with unjustified delay.” Lockwood, supra at 211 , citing City of Lansing v Dawley, 247 Mich 394, 396 ; 225 NW 500 (1929), and Keating [Int’l Corp v Orion Twp, 395 Mich 539, 549 ; 236 NW2d 409 (1975)].... “[T]he test to determine bad faith is whether the amendment was enacted for the purpose of m 2008There are two exceptions to the general rule: (1) “A court will not apply an amendment to a zoning ordinance where ... the amendment would destroy a vested property interest acquired before its enactment...”; and (2) a court will not apply the amendment where “the amendment was enacted in bad faith and with unjustified delay.” Lockwood, supra at 211 , citing City of Lansing v Dawley, 247 Mich 394, 396 ; 225 NW 500 (1929), and Keating [Int’l Corp v Orion Twp, 395 Mich 539, 549 ; 236 NW2d 409 (1975)].... “[T]he test to determine bad faith is whether the amendment was enacted for the purpose of m | 3 | 1979–2008 |
Great Lakes Society v. Georgetown Charter Township
green
2 sentences2020Similarly, in [Rodney Lockwood & Co v Southfield, 93 Mich App 206, 211 ; 286 NW2d 87 (1979)], this Court reiterated the general rule that the law to be applied is that in effect at the time of the zoning decision, subject to the exception that a court will not apply an amendment of a zoning ordinance if the amendment was “enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs’ suit.” The Court noted that, in the case before it, there was evidence indicating that the amendment was intended to clarify an ambiguous ordinance and that the amendment did not apply only to the plaintiffs’ p 2020Similarly, in [Rodney Lockwood & Co v Southfield, 93 Mich App 206, 211 ; 286 NW2d 87 (1979)], this Court reiterated the general rule that the law to be applied is that in effect at the time of the zoning decision, subject to the exception that a court will not apply an amendment of a zoning ordinance if the amendment was “enacted for the purpose of manufacturing a defense to plaintiffs’ suit.” The Court noted that, in the case before it, there was evidence indicating that the amendment was intended to clarify an ambiguous ordinance and that the amendment did not apply only to the plaintiffs’ p | 1 | 2020–2020 |
City of Lansing v. Dawley
green
2 sentences2008There are two exceptions to the general rule: (1) “A court will not apply an amendment to a zoning ordinance where ... the amendment would destroy a vested property interest acquired before its enactment...”; and (2) a court will not apply the amendment where “the amendment was enacted in bad faith and with unjustified delay.” Lockwood, supra at 211 , citing City of Lansing v Dawley, 247 Mich 394, 396 ; 225 NW 500 (1929), and Keating [Int’l Corp v Orion Twp, 395 Mich 539, 549 ; 236 NW2d 409 (1975)].... “[T]he test to determine bad faith is whether the amendment was enacted for the purpose of m 2008There are two exceptions to the general rule: (1) “A court will not apply an amendment to a zoning ordinance where ... the amendment would destroy a vested property interest acquired before its enactment...”; and (2) a court will not apply the amendment where “the amendment was enacted in bad faith and with unjustified delay.” Lockwood, supra at 211 , citing City of Lansing v Dawley, 247 Mich 394, 396 ; 225 NW 500 (1929), and Keating [Int’l Corp v Orion Twp, 395 Mich 539, 549 ; 236 NW2d 409 (1975)].... “[T]he test to determine bad faith is whether the amendment was enacted for the purpose of m | 1 | 2008–2008 |