deed clause in Missouri

1929Eq. 316 .] "The deed at bar, unconditional in its terms and beyond the control of the grantor upon its delivery to the bank, although not conferring an immediate right of present possession, constituted such an investiture of title as to give the grantee a present fixed right of future enjoyment, although the use of the premises was retained by the grantor during his life. [O'Day v. Meadows, 194 Mo. 588 ; Headington v. Woodward, 214 S.W. 963 .] "The manual delivery of the deed to the grantee by the depositary upon the death of the grantor and its acceptance by the grantee, leaves no room for c

1921The deed at bar, unconditional in its terms and beyond the control of the grantor upon its delivery to the bank, although not conferring an immediate right of present possession, constituted such an investiture of title as to give the grantee a present fixed right of future enjoyment although the use of the premises was retained by the grant- or during his life. [O’Day v. Meadows, 194 Mo. 588 ; Headington v. Woodward, 214 S. W. 963 .] Acceptance.

1987Baugh v. Grigsby, 58 A.L.R.2d 607 , 286 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.1956); Richards v. Northwestern Coal & Mining Co., 221 Mo. 149 , 119 S.W. 953 (1909).

1987Baugh v. Grigsby, 58 A.L.R.2d 607 , 286 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.1956); Richards v. Northwestern Coal & Mining Co., 221 Mo. 149 , 119 S.W. 953 (1909).

1987Baugh v. Grigsby, 58 A.L.R.2d 607 , 286 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.1956); Richards v. Northwestern Coal & Mining Co., 221 Mo. 149 , 119 S.W. 953 (1909).

1987Baugh v. Grigsby, 58 A.L.R.2d 607 , 286 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.1956); Richards v. Northwestern Coal & Mining Co., 221 Mo. 149 , 119 S.W. 953 (1909).

1973The general rule is that the person seeking to invalidate a deed has the burden (Galloway v. Galloway, 169 S.W.2d 883 (Mo.1943) [16, 17]) but there is also case law that when the grantor fails to record the conveyance and retains possession of the deed there is a presumption of non-delivery (Shroyer v. Shroyer, 425 S.W.2d 214 (Mo.1968) [12]).

1929The time of *Page 977 the acceptance will not effect the validity of the transfer. [Burkey v. Burkey, 175 S.W. l.c. 624.] Acceptance after the death of the grantor dates back to the time of the delivery of the deed to the bank and renders it a transfer as of that date. [Williams v. Latham, 113 Mo. 165 ; Sneathen v. Sneathen, 104 Mo. l.c. 209.]" The foregoing is applicable to the facts and the situation of the parties, in the case at bar.

1926In Doerr v. Cobbs, 146 Mo. App. l.c. 351, the rule is thus stated by Judge GOODE: "That such a plaintiff cannot maintain a suit to restrain the violation of a covenant in a later deed conveying land in the vicinity of that first conveyed simply because there is a restrictive covenant in the later deed and its violation will affect the enjoyment of the plaintiff's property, has been declared in cases which are directly in point. [Mulligan v. Jordan, 50 N.J.

1916There are cited a number of cases in behalf of plaintiff (among them Priddy v. Bank, 132 Mo. App. 279 , 111 S. W. 865 ; Pratt v. Conway, 148 Mo. 291 , 49 S. W. 1028 and Nelson v. Brown, 140 Mo. 580 , 41 S. W. 960 ) to sustain the assertion that the mere acceptance of the deed with the clause assuming and agreeing to pay the note is sufficient to bind the grantee, but in those cases there was no question as to the consideration or the agreement, the very foundation of the liability, and the expressions therein contained must be considered in the light of the issues involved and under review.

1916There are cited a number of cases in behalf of plaintiff (among them Priddy v. Bank, 132 Mo. App. 279 , 111 S. W. 865 ; Pratt v. Conway, 148 Mo. 291 , 49 S. W. 1028 and Nelson v. Brown, 140 Mo. 580 , 41 S. W. 960 ) to sustain the assertion that the mere acceptance of the deed with the clause assuming and agreeing to pay the note is sufficient to bind the grantee, but in those cases there was no question as to the consideration or the agreement, the very foundation of the liability, and the expressions therein contained must be considered in the light of the issues involved and under review.

1916There are cited a number of cases in behalf of plaintiff (among them Priddy v. Bank, 132 Mo. App. 279 , 111 S. W. 865 ; Pratt v. Conway, 148 Mo. 291 , 49 S. W. 1028 and Nelson v. Brown, 140 Mo. 580 , 41 S. W. 960 ) to sustain the assertion that the mere acceptance of the deed with the clause assuming and agreeing to pay the note is sufficient to bind the grantee, but in those cases there was no question as to the consideration or the agreement, the very foundation of the liability, and the expressions therein contained must be considered in the light of the issues involved and under review.

1916There are cited a number of cases in behalf of plaintiff (among them Priddy v. Bank, 132 Mo. App. 279 , 111 S. W. 865 ; Pratt v. Conway, 148 Mo. 291 , 49 S. W. 1028 and Nelson v. Brown, 140 Mo. 580 , 41 S. W. 960 ) to sustain the assertion that the mere acceptance of the deed with the clause assuming and agreeing to pay the note is sufficient to bind the grantee, but in those cases there was no question as to the consideration or the agreement, the very foundation of the liability, and the expressions therein contained must be considered in the light of the issues involved and under review.

1916There are cited a number of cases in behalf of plaintiff (among them Priddy v. Bank, 132 Mo. App. 279 , 111 S. W. 865 ; Pratt v. Conway, 148 Mo. 291 , 49 S. W. 1028 and Nelson v. Brown, 140 Mo. 580 , 41 S. W. 960 ) to sustain the assertion that the mere acceptance of the deed with the clause assuming and agreeing to pay the note is sufficient to bind the grantee, but in those cases there was no question as to the consideration or the agreement, the very foundation of the liability, and the expressions therein contained must be considered in the light of the issues involved and under review.

1916There are cited a number of cases in behalf of plaintiff (among them Priddy v. Bank, 132 Mo. App. 279 , 111 S. W. 865 ; Pratt v. Conway, 148 Mo. 291 , 49 S. W. 1028 and Nelson v. Brown, 140 Mo. 580 , 41 S. W. 960 ) to sustain the assertion that the mere acceptance of the deed with the clause assuming and agreeing to pay the note is sufficient to bind the grantee, but in those cases there was no question as to the consideration or the agreement, the very foundation of the liability, and the expressions therein contained must be considered in the light of the issues involved and under review.

1888What is said in the case of Hamilton v. Boggess, supra, in reference to the inadmissibility of a sheriff’s deed, when the copy, though not showing a seal, states that the sheriff did sign and affix his seal, is overruled.

1888It is held in State ex rel. v. Cooper, 79 Mo. 464 , that such a provision in a deed of trust did not vitiate it.

1888The learned counsel for defendant have not cited us to an authority where it is held, that when the copy of a sheriff’s deed which states in the attestation clause, that the sheriff affixed his name and seal, that it could not be presumed that the original was sealed ; on the contrary in the case of Flowery Mining Co. v. Mining Co., 16 Nev. 302 , it is expressly held that in case of a sheriff’s deed such presumption can be indulged.

1859For the purpose of applying to the deed the principle decided by this court in the cases of Brooks v. Wimer, 20 Mo. 503 , Walter v. Wimer, 24 Mo. 62 , and Stanley v. Bunce, 27 Mo. 269 , a witness called by the plaintiffs was allowed to repeat, against the defendants’ objections, a conversation he had had, in the defendants’ absence, with Mr. Boyle, in which the latter had stated that the defendants had the right to sell the goods in the ordinary course of business.

1859For the purpose of applying to the deed the principle decided by this court in the cases of Brooks v. Wimer, 20 Mo. 503 , Walter v. Wimer, 24 Mo. 62 , and Stanley v. Bunce, 27 Mo. 269 , a witness called by the plaintiffs was allowed to repeat, against the defendants’ objections, a conversation he had had, in the defendants’ absence, with Mr. Boyle, in which the latter had stated that the defendants had the right to sell the goods in the ordinary course of business.