deed bar in North Carolina

1919"Where less than the whole number of tenants join in a proceeding (143) to sell the common estate for partition, and the same is sold, a deed made under order of the court to the purchaser is color of title, and seven years adverse possession thereafter by him under the deed will bar the cotenants who were not parties." Amis v. Stephens , 111 N.C. 172 ; McCulloh v. Daniel , 102 N.C. 529 ; Johnson v. Parker , 79 N.C. 475 .

1919“Where less than the whole number of tenants join in a proceeding to sell the common estate for partition, and the same is sold, a deed made under order of the court to the purchaser is color of title, and seven years adverse possession thereafter by him under the deed will bar the cotenants who were not parties.” Amis v. Stephens, 111 N. C., 172 ; McCulloh v. Daniel, 102 N. C., 529 ; Johnson v. Parker, 79 N. C., 475 .

1919"Where less than the whole number of tenants join in a proceeding (143) to sell the common estate for partition, and the same is sold, a deed made under order of the court to the purchaser is color of title, and seven years adverse possession thereafter by him under the deed will bar the cotenants who were not parties." Amis v. Stephens , 111 N.C. 172 ; McCulloh v. Daniel , 102 N.C. 529 ; Johnson v. Parker , 79 N.C. 475 .

1919“Where less than the whole number of tenants join in a proceeding to sell the common estate for partition, and the same is sold, a deed made under order of the court to the purchaser is color of title, and seven years adverse possession thereafter by him under the deed will bar the cotenants who were not parties.” Amis v. Stephens, 111 N. C., 172 ; McCulloh v. Daniel, 102 N. C., 529 ; Johnson v. Parker, 79 N. C., 475 .

1919"Where less than the whole number of tenants join in a proceeding (143) to sell the common estate for partition, and the same is sold, a deed made under order of the court to the purchaser is color of title, and seven years adverse possession thereafter by him under the deed will bar the cotenants who were not parties." Amis v. Stephens , 111 N.C. 172 ; McCulloh v. Daniel , 102 N.C. 529 ; Johnson v. Parker , 79 N.C. 475 .

1919“Where less than the whole number of tenants join in a proceeding to sell the common estate for partition, and the same is sold, a deed made under order of the court to the purchaser is color of title, and seven years adverse possession thereafter by him under the deed will bar the cotenants who were not parties.” Amis v. Stephens, 111 N. C., 172 ; McCulloh v. Daniel, 102 N. C., 529 ; Johnson v. Parker, 79 N. C., 475 .

2015Id. at 468 , 230 S.E.2d at 163 .

2015Id. at 468 , 230 S.E.2d at 163 .

1976McCallum v. Insurance Co., 262 N.C. 375 , 137 S.E. 2d 164 (1964).

1976McCallum v. Insurance Co., 262 N.C. 375 , 137 S.E. 2d 164 (1964).

1967In Blass v. Terry, 156 N.Y. 122 , 50 N.E. 953 , it was contended that the defendant was obligated to pay the mortgage debt of one Howell to the plaintiffs because “Howell, in conveying a part of the land covered by the mortgage to the defendant, inserted in the deed a clause binding her to assume and pay the mortgage, and that this promise inured to the benefit of the plaintiffs.” The plaintiffs offered in evidence the recorded deed containing such assumption clause.

1967In Blass v. Terry, 156 N.Y. 122 , 50 N.E. 953 , it was contended that the defendant was obligated to pay the mortgage debt of one Howell to the plaintiffs because “Howell, in conveying a part of the land covered by the mortgage to the defendant, inserted in the deed a clause binding her to assume and pay the mortgage, and that this promise inured to the benefit of the plaintiffs.” The plaintiffs offered in evidence the recorded deed containing such assumption clause.

1926In the ease of Lumber Co. v. Cedar Works, supra, Justice Walker says: “It has been held that where less than the whole number of tenants join in a proceeding to sell the common estate for partition, and the same is sold, a deed made under order of the court to the purchaser is color of title, and seven years’ adverse possession thereafter by him'under the deed will bar the cotenants who were not parties.” There are other cases to the same effect.

1921Janney v. Robbins , 141 N.C. 406 ; Gore v. McPherson , 161 N.C. 638 ; King v. McRackan , 168 N.C. 621 ." The headnote to that case sums up the proposition correctly thus: "An unregistered deed is not color of title when the parties to an action for the recovery of land are claiming under the same source." The only request to charge was, as above set out, that the defendant claiming title under a possession, beginning with the mortgage in 1910 by one tenant in common for 7 years had acquired title to the entire tract which was refused.

1921Janney v. Robbins, 141 N. C., 406 ; Gore v. McPherson, 161 N. C., 638 ; King v. McRackan, 168 N. C., 621 .” The headnote to that case sums up the proposition correctly thus: “An unregistered deed is not color of title when the parties to an action for the recovery of land are claiming under the same source.” The only request to charge was, as above set out, that the defendant claiming title under a possession, beginning with the mortgage in 1910 by one tenant in common for 7 years had acquired title to the entire tract which was refused.

1921Janney v. Robbins , 141 N.C. 406 ; Gore v. McPherson , 161 N.C. 638 ; King v. McRackan , 168 N.C. 621 ." The headnote to that case sums up the proposition correctly thus: "An unregistered deed is not color of title when the parties to an action for the recovery of land are claiming under the same source." The only request to charge was, as above set out, that the defendant claiming title under a possession, beginning with the mortgage in 1910 by one tenant in common for 7 years had acquired title to the entire tract which was refused.

1921Janney v. Robbins, 141 N. C., 406 ; Gore v. McPherson, 161 N. C., 638 ; King v. McRackan, 168 N. C., 621 .” The headnote to that case sums up the proposition correctly thus: “An unregistered deed is not color of title when the parties to an action for the recovery of land are claiming under the same source.” The only request to charge was, as above set out, that the defendant claiming title under a possession, beginning with the mortgage in 1910 by one tenant in common for 7 years had acquired title to the entire tract which was refused.

1921As to these deeds it is sufficient to quote from Buchanan v. Hedden , 169 N.C. 224 : "The defendants did not contend that they had been in adverse possession (229) long enough to ripen their title without color and as the deed under which they claim title was not registered, and as both parties derived title from the same source, there was no color of title.

1921As to these deeds it is sufficient to quote from Buchanan v. Hedden, 169 N. C., 224 : “The defendants did not contend that they bad been in adverse possession long enough to ripen tbeir title without color and as the deed under which they claim title was not registered, and as both parties derived title from the same source, there was no color of title.

1892Hancock v. Wooten, supra.