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9 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mississippi Transp. Comm'n v. McLemoregreen2 sentences2005This Court, in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 35 (Miss.2003), adopted the rule in Daubert , as modified by Kumho Tire, holding that the general acceptance test set forth in Frye no longer governed the admissibility *723 of expert witness testimony in Mississippi. 2004This Court, in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 35 (Miss. 2003), adopted the rule in Daubert, as modified by Kumho Tire, holding that the general acceptance test set forth in Frye no longer governed the admissibility of expert witness testimony in Mississippi. | 4 | 5 |
Frye v. United Statesred2 sentences2005Mississippi used to follow the general acceptance standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923), to determine the admissibility of the results of forensic DNA testing. 2003The MTC argues that we should abandon the general acceptance test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923), for determining the admissibility of expert witness testimony in favor of the rule stated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), as modified in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). | 3 | 3 |
Gleeton v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1087 (¶ 12) (Miss.1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the United States Supreme Court rejected the general-acceptance test. 2016In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the United States Supreme Court rejected the general-acceptance test. | 3 | 2001–2016 |
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
green
2 sentences2003The MTC argues that we should abandon the general acceptance test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923), for determining the admissibility of expert witness testimony in favor of the rule stated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), as modified in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). 2003The MTC argues that we should abandon the general acceptance test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923), for determining the admissibility of expert witness testimony in favor of the rule stated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), as modified in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). | 2 | 2001–2003 |
Rock v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences2003Moreover, the Court in Daubert determined that abandoning the general acceptance test does not result in jury confusion from "absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions," since "[v]igorous cross examination, presentations of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Id. at 595-96 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 , 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2714 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)). 2003Moreover, the Court in Daubert determined that abandoning the general acceptance test does not result in jury confusion from "absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions," since "[v]igorous cross examination, presentations of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Id. at 595-96 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 , 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2714 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)). | 2 | 2001–2003 |
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey
green
1 sentence2001Moreover, the Court in Daubert determined that abandoning the general acceptance test does not result in jury confusion from “absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions,” since “[v]igorous cross examination, presentations of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Id. at 595-96 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 , 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2714 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.