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9 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Victor v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Instead, the prima facie elements of a claim vary depending upon the particular employment discrimination claim being made ." Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 409-10 (2010). 2021Instead, the prima facie elements of a claim vary depending upon the particular employment discrimination claim being made." A-3504-19 10 Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 409-10 (2010). | 2 | 3 |
Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc.green1 sentence2021To state a prima facie case for disability discrimination under the LAD, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a disability or the employer's perception that the employee was disabled; (2) the employee remains qualified to perform the essential functions of the job and was performing at a level that met the employer's expectations; (3) an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability; and (4) the employer thereafter sought a similarly qualified individual. [Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc., 458 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Schering Corp.green2 sentences2017Young, supra, 141 N.J. at 26 (describing the remedial nature of CEPA). 2017Young, supra, 141 N.J. at 26 (describing the remedial nature of CEPA). | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. Rutgers, the State University of NJgreen2 sentences2010Under that burden-shifting procedure: (1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the defendant then must show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision; and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity to show that defendant's stated reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its application. [ Dixon v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 442 , 541 A. 2d 1046 (1988) (citations omitted).] The first step in the McDonnell-Douglas methodology requires that the plaintiff establish a prim 2010Under that burden-shifting procedure: (1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the defendant then must show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision; and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity to show that defendant's stated reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its application. [ Dixon v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 442 , 541 A. 2d 1046 (1988) (citations omitted).] The first step in the McDonnell-Douglas methodology requires that the plaintiff establish a prim | 1 | 1 |
Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trusteesgreen1 sentence1990See Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 80-83 (1978) (although employee bore ultimate burden of proof, once she presented prima facie evidence of sex discrimination, burden shifted to employer to come forward with legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote her). | 1 | 1 |
Gemmell v. Meesegreen1 sentence1988Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346 , 1354 (9th Cir.1984) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-3); see also Gemmell v. Meese, 655 F.Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.Pa.1986) ("To prove her retaliation claim, plaintiff has the burden of proving (1) that she engaged in protected activity, which was known by the alleged retaliator; (2) that an adverse action was taken against her; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the retaliation, (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010In the context of a claim *889 alleging discrimination in hiring and placement, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) that she is a member of a class protected by the anti-discrimination law; (2) that she was qualified for the position or rank sought; (3) that she was denied promotion, reappointment, or tenure; and (4) that others ... with similar or lesser qualifications achieved the rank or position. [ Dixon, supra, 110 N.J. at 443, 541 A. 2d 1046 .] The evidentiary burden at the prima facie stage is "`rather modest: it is to demonstrate to the court that plaintiff's 2010In the context of a claim *889 alleging discrimination in hiring and placement, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) that she is a member of a class protected by the anti-discrimination law; (2) that she was qualified for the position or rank sought; (3) that she was denied promotion, reappointment, or tenure; and (4) that others ... with similar or lesser qualifications achieved the rank or position. [ Dixon, supra, 110 N.J. at 443, 541 A. 2d 1046 .] The evidentiary burden at the prima facie stage is "`rather modest: it is to demonstrate to the court that plaintiff's | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Cedeno v. Montclair State University
green
1 sentence2008Although we have held that one who was statutorily barred from public employment, but who was hired by concealing that disqualification, *567 is generally precluded from pursuing a claim for wrongful termination, see Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ., 168 N.J. 473, 479 , 750 A.2d 73 (2000), we have not previously considered whether an employee who conceals requested but not disqualifying information when applying for a job is also precluded from pursuing an employment discrimination claim. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
green
2 sentences1995Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2742 , 125 L.Ed. 2d at 416 , articulated the ultimate standard of proof on an employment discrimination claim at trial. 1995Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2742 , 125 L.Ed. 2d at 416 , articulated the ultimate standard of proof on an employment discrimination claim at trial. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Thelma DAVIS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES STEEL SUPPLY, DIVISION OF UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION
green
1 sentence1991In doing so, the court analogized the NJLAD claim to a claim brought under its federal counterpart, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and cited as authority for its holding the case of Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F. 2d 335 (3rd Cir.1978). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Morgan v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1988We granted certification, 108 N.J. 569 (1987), primarily to consider whether a retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee for pressing an employment discrimination claim constitutes a discharge that violates clearly mandated public policy interests of the State of New Jersey. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
cluster 430934
green
1 sentence1988Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346 , 1354 (9th Cir.1984) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-3); see also Gemmell v. Meese, 655 F.Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.Pa.1986) ("To prove her retaliation claim, plaintiff has the burden of proving (1) that she engaged in protected activity, which was known by the alleged retaliator; (2) that an adverse action was taken against her; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the retaliation, (citation omitted). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.