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9 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1954–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Claim of Illaqua v. Barr-Llewellyn Buick Co.green2 sentences2013It is well settled that “the fundamental principle of the compensation law is to protect the worker, not the employer, and the law should be construed liberally in favor of the employee” (Matter of Illaqua v Barr-Llewellyn Buick Co., 81 AD2d 708, 708 [1981] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). 2013It is well settled that “the fundamental principle of the compensation law is to protect the worker, not the employer, and the law should be construed liberally in favor of the employee” (Matter of Illaqua v Barr-Llewellyn Buick Co., 81 AD2d 708, 708 [1981] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). | 2 | 2 |
Lombardi v. Stoutgreen2 sentences2000The decision in Lombardi v Stout (supra) also supports the conclusion that when an owner moves out of a one or two-family dwelling and thereafter rents the property to a third party or parties, the benefit of the statutory exception is lost (see, id., at 297 ; cf., Pigott v Church of the Holy Infancy, supra, at 163 [on the issue of commercial use, “the relevant focus is upon the objective use to which the dwelling is put, not upon how the use is characterized from the owner’s perspective”] [emphasis in original]). 2000The decision in Lombardi v Stout (supra) also supports the conclusion that when an owner moves out of a one or two-family dwelling and thereafter rents the property to a third party or parties, the benefit of the statutory exception is lost (see, id., at 297 ; cf., Pigott v Church of the Holy Infancy, supra, at 163 [on the issue of commercial use, “the relevant focus is upon the objective use to which the dwelling is put, not upon how the use is characterized from the owner’s perspective”] [emphasis in original]). | 1 | 3 |
Pigott v. Church of Holy Infancygreen1 sentence2000The decision in Lombardi v Stout (supra) also supports the conclusion that when an owner moves out of a one or two-family dwelling and thereafter rents the property to a third party or parties, the benefit of the statutory exception is lost (see, id., at 297 ; cf., Pigott v Church of the Holy Infancy, supra, at 163 [on the issue of commercial use, “the relevant focus is upon the objective use to which the dwelling is put, not upon how the use is characterized from the owner’s perspective”] [emphasis in original]). | 1 | 1 |
Amerogen v. Donninigreen1 sentence1993Although Olisa maintains that the exception is applicable as a matter of law because the premises were vacant at the time of the accident and was not being used for commercial purposes, the homeowner’s exception would not be applicable "if his purpose in making renovations was to prepare the house for commercial rental” (Lombardi v Stout, supra, at 297), or for another exclusively commercial use (see, Van Amerogen v Donnini, supra, at 882). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re the Estate of Timoshevich
green
2 sentences2015Although Daigle indeed testified that decedent indicated that all three individuals — decedent, McGinnis and petitioner — were to be owners on the Citizens account, given decedent’s history of establishing convenience accounts, Daigle’s testimony on this *1265 point, “[a]t best, . . . invites conjecture as to decedent’s intent” in opening the account (Matter of Timoshevich, 133 AD2d at 1012 ) — particularly when viewed in the context of decedent’s overall estate planning scheme. 2002In any event, the issue of whether survivorship language on the signature card is the exclusive means by which the statutory presumption arises is only a question of the quantum of proof that the survivor is required to adduce to prevail because it is well established that the surviving tenant will prevail, without the benefit of the statutory presumption, by establishing a common-law joint account with right of survivorship (Matter of Antoinette, 291 AD2d 733 , lv denied 98 NY2d 604 ; Matter of Coon, supra; Matter of Timoshevich, supra; Matter of Thomas, 43 AD2d 446 ; Lombardi v First Natl. | 2 | 2002–2015 |
Jandreau v. La Vigne
green
1 sentence2008Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find, without the benefit of the statutory presumption, that the defendant was unable to correct a problem that “substantially impaired” the value of the vehicle after a reasonable number of attempts (General Business Law § 198-a [c] [1]), and the defendant failed to meet its burden of proving its affirmative defense that the stalling problem did not substantially impair the value of the vehicle to the plaintiff (see General Business Law § 198-a [c] [3] [ii]; Jandreau v La Vigne, 170 AD2d 861 [1991]). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In re the Estate of Thomas
neutral
1 sentence2002In any event, the issue of whether survivorship language on the signature card is the exclusive means by which the statutory presumption arises is only a question of the quantum of proof that the survivor is required to adduce to prevail because it is well established that the surviving tenant will prevail, without the benefit of the statutory presumption, by establishing a common-law joint account with right of survivorship (Matter of Antoinette, 291 AD2d 733 , lv denied 98 NY2d 604 ; Matter of Coon, supra; Matter of Timoshevich, supra; Matter of Thomas, 43 AD2d 446 ; Lombardi v First Natl. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re the Accounting of Fenelon
green
1 sentence2002This court, based upon the statutory language (Matter of Fenelon, supra; Sutton v Bank of N.Y., supra), holds that while survivorship language on the signature card itself is the best evidence to give rise to the statutory presumption, and, perhaps, in most cases the only practical way, it is not the exclusive way. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In re the Estate of Coon
green
1 sentence2002In any event, the issue of whether survivorship language on the signature card is the exclusive means by which the statutory presumption arises is only a question of the quantum of proof that the survivor is required to adduce to prevail because it is well established that the surviving tenant will prevail, without the benefit of the statutory presumption, by establishing a common-law joint account with right of survivorship (Matter of Antoinette, 291 AD2d 733 , lv denied 98 NY2d 604 ; Matter of Coon, supra; Matter of Timoshevich, supra; Matter of Thomas, 43 AD2d 446 ; Lombardi v First Natl. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Lombardi v. First National Bank
neutral
1 sentence2002Bank of Hancock, supra). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sutton v. Bank of New York
green
1 sentence2002This court, based upon the statutory language (Matter of Fenelon, supra; Sutton v Bank of N.Y., supra), holds that while survivorship language on the signature card itself is the best evidence to give rise to the statutory presumption, and, perhaps, in most cases the only practical way, it is not the exclusive way. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In re the Estate of Antoinette
green
1 sentence2002In any event, the issue of whether survivorship language on the signature card is the exclusive means by which the statutory presumption arises is only a question of the quantum of proof that the survivor is required to adduce to prevail because it is well established that the surviving tenant will prevail, without the benefit of the statutory presumption, by establishing a common-law joint account with right of survivorship (Matter of Antoinette, 291 AD2d 733 , lv denied 98 NY2d 604 ; Matter of Coon, supra; Matter of Timoshevich, supra; Matter of Thomas, 43 AD2d 446 ; Lombardi v First Natl. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Rees v. Teachers' Retirement Board
neutral
1 sentence1954In the court’s opinion the provisions of the Administrative Code were not intended to produce any such result and thus to deprive the teacher-members of the board of the benefit of the statutory requirement that the concurrence of at least one teacher-member of the board shall be necessary for any decision of the board (Administrative Code, § B20-11.0), which includes the election of a chairman (Rees v. Teachers’ Retirement Bd. of City of N. Y., 247 N. Y. 372 , supra). | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.