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9 New York opinions name it 1 courts 2008–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hillgreen2 sentences2022Nonetheless, "[i]n considering a challenge to a jury instruction, the crucial question is whether the charge, in its entirety, conveys an appropriate legal standard and does not engender any possible confusion" for the jury ( People v Hill , 52 AD3d 380, 382 [1st Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks omitted] [reversing conviction because of potentially confusing jury instructions that, inter alia, failed to distinguish between ordinary and deadly force on justification defense and duty to retreat]). 2022Nonetheless, "[i]n considering a challenge to a jury instruction, the crucial question is whether the charge, in its entirety, conveys an appropriate legal standard and does not engender any possible confusion" for the jury ( People v Hill , 52 AD3d 380, 382 [1st Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks omitted] [reversing conviction because of potentially confusing jury instructions that, inter alia, failed to distinguish between ordinary and deadly force on justification defense and duty to retreat]). | 7 | 8 |
People v. Wisegreen2 sentences2017“In considering a challenge to a jury instruction, the ‘crucial question is whether the charge, in its entirety, conveys an appropriate legal standard and does not engender any possible confusion’ ” (People v Hill, 52 AD3d 380 , 382 [1st Dept 2008], quoting People v Wise, 204 AD2d 133, 135 [1st Dept 1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 973 [1994]; see also People v Medina, 18 NY3d 98, 104 [2011] [“In evaluating a challenged jury instruction, we view the charge as a whole in order to determine whether a claimed deficiency in the jury charge requires reversal”]). 2016“In considering a challenge to a jury instruction, the ‘crucial question is whether the charge, in its entirety, conveys an appropriate legal standard and does not engender any possible confusion’ ” (People v Hill, 52 AD3d 380 , 382 [1st Dept 2008], quoting People v Wise, 204 AD2d 133, 135 [1st Dept 1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 973 [1994]). | 7 | 7 |
People v. Medinagreen1 sentence2017“In considering a challenge to a jury instruction, the ‘crucial question is whether the charge, in its entirety, conveys an appropriate legal standard and does not engender any possible confusion’ ” (People v Hill, 52 AD3d 380 , 382 [1st Dept 2008], quoting People v Wise, 204 AD2d 133, 135 [1st Dept 1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 973 [1994]; see also People v Medina, 18 NY3d 98, 104 [2011] [“In evaluating a challenged jury instruction, we view the charge as a whole in order to determine whether a claimed deficiency in the jury charge requires reversal”]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Almodovargreen1 sentence2017Further, a trial court “must respond meaningfully” to inquiries from a deliberating jury (People v Almodovar, 62 NY2d 126, 131 [1984]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Apontegreen1 sentence2008Although a trial judge is not obligated to use the standard jury instructions, this Court has stated “each time a judge declines to employ the carefully thought-out measured tone of the standard jury charge in favor of improvised language, an additional risk of reversal and a new trial is created” (People v Fong, 16 AD3d 179, 180 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 886 [2005]; see also People v Aponte, 2 NY3d 304, 307 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fonggreen1 sentence2008Although a trial judge is not obligated to use the standard jury instructions, this Court has stated “each time a judge declines to employ the carefully thought-out measured tone of the standard jury charge in favor of improvised language, an additional risk of reversal and a new trial is created” (People v Fong, 16 AD3d 179, 180 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 886 [2005]; see also People v Aponte, 2 NY3d 304, 307 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2016Where the court’s charge creates undue confusion in the minds of the jurors, reversal is warranted (Hill, 52 AD3d at 382; People v Rogers, 166 AD2d 23 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 1129 [1991]). 2016Where the court’s charge creates undue confusion in the minds of the jurors, reversal is warranted (Hill, 52 AD3d at 382; People v Rogers, 166 AD2d 23 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 1129 [1991]). | 5 | 2013–2016 |
People v. Fields
green
1 sentence2008Although a trial judge is not obligated to use the standard jury instructions, this Court has stated “each time a judge declines to employ the carefully thought-out measured tone of the standard jury charge in favor of improvised language, an additional risk of reversal and a new trial is created” (People v Fong, 16 AD3d 179, 180 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 886 [2005]; see also People v Aponte, 2 NY3d 304, 307 [2004]). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.