five-day requirement in New York

2008Inc. v Bonnemere (supra), where the court declined to apply Landaverde (supra), to a Golub notice stating that “[a]ny action taken by the tenant immediate or otherwise will not negate the landlord’s intent not to renew the lease” (NYLJ, Jan. 5, 2005, at 19, col 1).

1997The defendant’s five-day rule is also inconsistent with Goss (supra), in which the statements of readiness were made in the identical manner as in this case — by filing a written notice with the court and mailing a copy of that notice to counsel.

1995In Stevens (supra, at 704 ), the Court, contra to the apparent mandate of CPL 190.50 (5) (c) which required that certain motions must be made not more than five days after the defendant has been arraigned upon the indictment, stated, "[although the defendant’s motion was made more than five days after his arraignment on the indictment, the circumstances of this case rmilitate against a strict application of the five-day requirement’ ” (emphasis supplied).

1989In view of the fact that the defendant was without legal representation at the time the pro se dismissal motion was made, we conclude that strict application of the five-day rule set forth in CPL 190.50 (5) (c) was inappropriate (see, People v Prest, supra; People v Lincoln, 80 AD2d 877 ).

1989Moreover, although a defendant, by pleading guilty, as a general rule, forfeits appellate review of any claim that his right to testify before a Grand Jury was violated (see, People v Ferrara, 99 AD2d 257 ), under the circumstances of this case, in which the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel at the Grand Jury proceedings, the forfeiture rule does not apply (see, People v Ferrara, supra; People v Lincoln, supra).

1989Moreover, although a defendant, by pleading guilty, as a general rule, forfeits appellate review of any claim that his right to testify before a Grand Jury was violated (see, People v Ferrara, 99 AD2d 257 ), under the circumstances of this case, in which the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel at the Grand Jury proceedings, the forfeiture rule does not apply (see, People v Ferrara, supra; People v Lincoln, supra).

1989Moreover, although a defendant, by pleading guilty, as a general rule, forfeits appellate review of any claim that his right to testify before a Grand Jury was violated (see, People v Ferrara, 99 AD2d 257 ), under the circumstances of this case, in which the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel at the Grand Jury proceedings, the forfeiture rule does not apply (see, People v Ferrara, supra; People v Lincoln, supra).

1989Although the defendant’s motion was made more than five days after his arraignment on the indictment, the circumstances of this case "militate against a strict application of the five-day requirement” (People v Prest, 105 AD2d 1078, 1079 ).

1989In view of the fact that the defendant was without legal representation at the time the pro se dismissal motion was made, we conclude that strict application of the five-day rule set forth in CPL 190.50 (5) (c) was inappropriate (see, People v Prest, supra; People v Lincoln, 80 AD2d 877 ).

1988That does not serve as a disqualification, the challenge on that basis. "defense counsel: My challenge remains on his state of mind, Judge, and the inability of the oath to wipe out that state of mind.” In our view, defense counsel’s response to County Court’s ruling was not sufficient to put the court on notice that its interpretation was being called into question (see, People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947, 948 ).

1982A literal application of the five-day requirement would of course preclude this defendant from testifying before the Grand Jury (see People v Washington, 42 AD2d 677 ).

1975A five-day hearing was conducted before me on April 11, 14, 15, 16,. 17, 1975, on the search warrant motion (CPL 710.60, subd. 4) and the dismissal motion (CPL 210.45, subd. 6; People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204 ).

1935(Buckley v. Citizens’ Insurance Co., 188 N. Y. 399.) Where, also, an insured did business through an agency representing many fire insurance companies, and that agency received a cancellation from one of the insurers and upon receipt of such notice, and before the five-day period had run, marked the policy canceled and caused another policy to be issued in its place, the court has held that the action of such agency was a waiver of such five-day period.