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10 California opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Escobedogreen2 sentences1988There a challenge filed on the day of trial of a case assigned more than 10 days earlier to trial in a designated department was held untimely; the court explicitly rejected the contention that assignment to a particular department does not constitute an assignment to a judge. 3 Numerous other cases, spanning nearly the entire lifetime of section 170.6, have stated, in dictum, that the five-day rule applies in comparable circumstances. 4 (Ea gle Maintenance & Supply Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 692, 695 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 745 ]; Sambrano v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 416, 4 1988There a challenge filed on the day of trial of a case assigned more than 10 days earlier to trial in a designated department was held untimely; the court explicitly rejected the contention that assignment to a particular department does not constitute an assignment to a judge. 3 Numerous other cases, spanning nearly the entire lifetime of section 170.6, have stated, in dictum, that the five-day rule applies in comparable circumstances. 4 (Ea gle Maintenance & Supply Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 692, 695 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 745 ]; Sambrano v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 416, 4 | 2 | 2 |
In Re Robert P.green2 sentences1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi 1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi | 2 | 2 |
Sambrano v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988There a challenge filed on the day of trial of a case assigned more than 10 days earlier to trial in a designated department was held untimely; the court explicitly rejected the contention that assignment to a particular department does not constitute an assignment to a judge. 3 Numerous other cases, spanning nearly the entire lifetime of section 170.6, have stated, in dictum, that the five-day rule applies in comparable circumstances. 4 (Ea gle Maintenance & Supply Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 692, 695 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 745 ]; Sambrano v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 416, 4 1988There a challenge filed on the day of trial of a case assigned more than 10 days earlier to trial in a designated department was held untimely; the court explicitly rejected the contention that assignment to a particular department does not constitute an assignment to a judge. 3 Numerous other cases, spanning nearly the entire lifetime of section 170.6, have stated, in dictum, that the five-day rule applies in comparable circumstances. 4 (Ea gle Maintenance & Supply Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 692, 695 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 745 ]; Sambrano v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 416, 4 | 2 | 2 |
Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi 1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi | 2 | 2 |
Forbes v. Jose S.green2 sentences1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi 1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi | 2 | 2 |
People v. Superior Court (Hall)green2 sentences1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi 1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi | 2 | 2 |
LA CTY. DEPT. OF PUB. SOC. SERV. v. Superior Ct.green2 sentences1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi 1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hallgreen2 sentences1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi 1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hall) (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra, a pair of Fi | 2 | 2 |
Eagle Maintenance & Supply Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988There a challenge filed on the day of trial of a case assigned more than 10 days earlier to trial in a designated department was held untimely; the court explicitly rejected the contention that assignment to a particular department does not constitute an assignment to a judge. 3 Numerous other cases, spanning nearly the entire lifetime of section 170.6, have stated, in dictum, that the five-day rule applies in comparable circumstances. 4 (Ea gle Maintenance & Supply Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 692, 695 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 745 ]; Sambrano v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 416, 4 1988There a challenge filed on the day of trial of a case assigned more than 10 days earlier to trial in a designated department was held untimely; the court explicitly rejected the contention that assignment to a particular department does not constitute an assignment to a judge. 3 Numerous other cases, spanning nearly the entire lifetime of section 170.6, have stated, in dictum, that the five-day rule applies in comparable circumstances. 4 (Ea gle Maintenance & Supply Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 692, 695 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 745 ]; Sambrano v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 416, 4 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Davisgreen1 sentence2021(See § 290, subd. (b); People v. Davis (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 377, 382 [“A sex offender who enters the City of Los Angeles in January and remains there for five consecutive working days must register with the LAPD no later than the fifth consecutive working day”].) Jury Instructions The trial court gave CALCRIM No. 1170 on the elements of a violation of section 290. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Burgessgreen2 sentences2016(Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 37 [after initial custody determination noncustodial parent must show there has been substantial change of circumstances affecting child’s welfare and requiring modification].) It cannot be said the court abused its discretion in awarding Grandmother custody of Michael after holding a five-day hearing to consider Father’s OSC. 2016“In an initial custody determination, the trial court has ‘the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.” (§ 3040, subd. (b).) It must look to all the circumstances bearing on the best interest of the minor child. [Citation.] [S]ection 3011 lists specific factors, “among others,” that the trial court must consider in determining the “best interest” of the child in a proceeding to determine custody and visitation: ‘(a) The health, safety, and welfare of the child. [¶] (b) Any history of abuse by one parent against the child or against the other pare | 1 | 1 |
Andrews v. Joint Clerks Port Labor Relations Committeegreen2 sentences1989(Andrews v. Joint Clerks etc. Committee (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 285, 294 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 646 ].) A disqualification motion is timely if filed at least five days before the date set for trial or hearing where the judge is known at least ten days before that date. (§ 170.6, subd. (2).) Further, because the motion must be made before trial, “it cannot be entertained as to subsequent hearings which are a part or a continuation of the original proceedings.” (Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ].) At the hearing below, GWF did not challenge the motion as unt 1989(Andrews v. Joint Clerks etc. Committee (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 285, 294 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 646 ].) A disqualification motion is timely if filed at least five days before the date set for trial or hearing where the judge is known at least ten days before that date. (§ 170.6, subd. (2).) Further, because the motion must be made before trial, “it cannot be entertained as to subsequent hearings which are a part or a continuation of the original proceedings.” (Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ].) At the hearing below, GWF did not challenge the motion as unt | 1 | 1 |
McClenny v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989A subsequent proceeding is a continuation of an earlier action rather than a separate and independent action if it involves “ ‘substantially the same issues’ ” and “ ‘matters necessarily relevant and material to the issues involved in the [original] action.’ ” (McClenny v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 677, 684 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 459 , 388 P.2d 691 ].) *590 The continued proceeding rule is premised on the belief that if disqualification were permitted in subsequent proceedings, the original judge, ordinarily in the best position to pass upon questions involved, would be disqualified from hearing 1989A subsequent proceeding is a continuation of an earlier action rather than a separate and independent action if it involves “ ‘substantially the same issues’ ” and “ ‘matters necessarily relevant and material to the issues involved in the [original] action.’ ” (McClenny v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 677, 684 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 459 , 388 P.2d 691 ].) *590 The continued proceeding rule is premised on the belief that if disqualification were permitted in subsequent proceedings, the original judge, ordinarily in the best position to pass upon questions involved, would be disqualified from hearing | 1 | 1 |
Jacobs v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989(Andrews v. Joint Clerks etc. Committee (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 285, 294 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 646 ].) A disqualification motion is timely if filed at least five days before the date set for trial or hearing where the judge is known at least ten days before that date. (§ 170.6, subd. (2).) Further, because the motion must be made before trial, “it cannot be entertained as to subsequent hearings which are a part or a continuation of the original proceedings.” (Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ].) At the hearing below, GWF did not challenge the motion as unt 1989(Andrews v. Joint Clerks etc. Committee (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 285, 294 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 646 ].) A disqualification motion is timely if filed at least five days before the date set for trial or hearing where the judge is known at least ten days before that date. (§ 170.6, subd. (2).) Further, because the motion must be made before trial, “it cannot be entertained as to subsequent hearings which are a part or a continuation of the original proceedings.” (Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 347 P.2d 9 ].) At the hearing below, GWF did not challenge the motion as unt | 1 | 1 |
Sheldon v. Landwehrgreen2 sentences1963(Sheldon v. Landwehr, 159 Cal. 778, 782 [ 116 P. 44 ]; Estate of Wempe, 185 Cal. 557, 563 [197 P.949].) The five-day requirement therein provided may, however, be shortened by waiver or consent of the parties. 1963(Sheldon v. Landwehr, 159 Cal. 778, 782 [ 116 P. 44 ]; Estate of Wempe, 185 Cal. 557, 563 [197 P.949].) The five-day requirement therein provided may, however, be shortened by waiver or consent of the parties. | 1 | 1 |
Taliaferro v. Taliaferrogreen2 sentences1963(Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 179 Cal.App.2d 787, 793 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 689 ]; Cahill v. Verdier, 54 Cal.App. 465, 468 [ 202 P. 154 ].) Thus, the requirement does not apply where both parties are present at the trial or are represented at the time the case is called for trial, or participate therein. 1963(Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 179 Cal.App.2d 787, 793 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 689 ]; Cahill v. Verdier, 54 Cal.App. 465, 468 [ 202 P. 154 ].) Thus, the requirement does not apply where both parties are present at the trial or are represented at the time the case is called for trial, or participate therein. | 1 | 1 |
Cahill v. Verdiergreen2 sentences1963(Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 179 Cal.App.2d 787, 793 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 689 ]; Cahill v. Verdier, 54 Cal.App. 465, 468 [ 202 P. 154 ].) Thus, the requirement does not apply where both parties are present at the trial or are represented at the time the case is called for trial, or participate therein. 1963(Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 179 Cal.App.2d 787, 793 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 689 ]; Cahill v. Verdier, 54 Cal.App. 465, 468 [ 202 P. 154 ].) Thus, the requirement does not apply where both parties are present at the trial or are represented at the time the case is called for trial, or participate therein. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Wempegreen1 sentence1963(Sheldon v. Landwehr, 159 Cal. 778, 782 [ 116 P. 44 ]; Estate of Wempe, 185 Cal. 557, 563 [197 P.949].) The five-day requirement therein provided may, however, be shortened by waiver or consent of the parties. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Villarruel v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1988There a challenge filed on the day of trial of a case assigned more than 10 days earlier to trial in a designated department was held untimely; the court explicitly rejected the contention that assignment to a particular department does not constitute an assignment to a judge. 3 Numerous other cases, spanning nearly the entire lifetime of section 170.6, have stated, in dictum, that the five-day rule applies in comparable circumstances. 4 (Ea gle Maintenance & Supply Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 692, 695 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 745 ]; Sambrano v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 416, 4 1988There a challenge filed on the day of trial of a case assigned more than 10 days earlier to trial in a designated department was held untimely; the court explicitly rejected the contention that assignment to a particular department does not constitute an assignment to a judge. 3 Numerous other cases, spanning nearly the entire lifetime of section 170.6, have stated, in dictum, that the five-day rule applies in comparable circumstances. 4 (Ea gle Maintenance & Supply Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 692, 695 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 745 ]; Sambrano v. Superior Court (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 416, 4 | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Grant v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2022Finally, the city argues, in the alternative, that the peremptory challenge was untimely under the five-day rule because as of December 8, 2021, petitioner knew Judge Apaloo—who was not yet assigned to the second lawsuit for all purposes—would hear the motion to consolidate yet he did not file his peremptory challenge at least five days before the hearing. (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) But, as petitioner asserts in his reply, the city’s argument fails for the simple reason that the hearing on the city’s motion to consolidate did not “involve[] a contested issue of law or fact.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)( 2022(See ibid. [“Presiding at a case management conference does not involve ruling on contested issues of law or fact.”].) Although Judge Apaloo was required to determine whether the first and second lawsuits “involv[ed] a common question of law or fact” when deciding whether to consolidate the lawsuits (§ 1048, subd. (a), italics added), neither the city’s motion to consolidate nor the opposition to it presented any contested issues of law or fact that had to be resolved at that time. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Entente Design, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2022There are, however, three exceptions to the general rule: the all-purpose assignment rule, the 10-day/5-day rule, and the master calendar rule. [Citation.] For any given factual scenario, a court must determine whether any of the exceptions apply, or whether the general rule applies. [Citation.] ‘“‘As a remedial statute, section 170.6 is to be liberally construed in favor of allowing a peremptory challenge, and a challenge should be denied only if the statute absolutely forbids it.’”’” (Entente Design, Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 385, 389-390 .) The five-day rule provides: “I | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Axell
green
1 sentence1998On the same day the trial court made its ruling (Oct. 13, 1992), the present Court of Appeal filed its decision in another DNA case—People v. Pizarro (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 57 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 ] (Pizarro)—wherein it required the prosecution to demonstrate general scientific acceptance of the FBI’s particular DNA methodology through impartial expert testimony, notwithstanding that Axell, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 836 , had already confirmed the general scientific acceptance of the highly similar Cellmark RFLP methodology. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Pizarro
green
2 sentences1998On the same day the trial court made its ruling (Oct. 13, 1992), the present Court of Appeal filed its decision in another DNA case—People v. Pizarro (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 57 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 ] (Pizarro)—wherein it required the prosecution to demonstrate general scientific acceptance of the FBI’s particular DNA methodology through impartial expert testimony, notwithstanding that Axell, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 836 , had already confirmed the general scientific acceptance of the highly similar Cellmark RFLP methodology. 1998On the same day the trial court made its ruling (Oct. 13, 1992), the present Court of Appeal filed its decision in another DNA case—People v. Pizarro (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 57 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 436 ] (Pizarro)—wherein it required the prosecution to demonstrate general scientific acceptance of the FBI’s particular DNA methodology through impartial expert testimony, notwithstanding that Axell, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 836 , had already confirmed the general scientific acceptance of the highly similar Cellmark RFLP methodology. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Retes v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal. Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal. Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal. Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court ( Hall ) (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra 1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal. Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal. Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal. Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court ( Hall ) (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bouchard v. Insona
green
2 sentences1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal. Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal. Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal. Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court ( Hall ) (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra 1988Social Services v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 407, 414 [ 138 Cal. Rptr. 43 ]; In re Jose S. (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 619, 627 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 309 ]; People v. Hall (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 753, 758 [ 150 Cal. Rptr. 412 ]; In re Robert P. (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 36, 40-42 [ 175 Cal. Rptr. 252 ]; People v. Superior Court ( Hall ) (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 1081, 1086 [ 207 Cal. Rptr. 131 ]; Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 525, 529 [ 238 Cal. Rptr. 475 ] [review den.].) Despite this extensive authority, however, and without mentioning People v. Roerman, supra | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Buswell v. Babbitt
neutral
2 sentences1962This contention turns on the meaning of the word “pending.” But “pending,” as used with respect to court procedure, means “remaining undecided.” (Buswell v. Babbitt, 65 N.H. 168 [ 18 A. 748 ].) Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1957) thus defines “pending” : “Begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusion of; prior to the completion of; unsettled; undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment.” It is clear that once the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was decided by the court it was no longer pending and therefore, even without the authority of Kroiss v. Butle 1962This contention turns on the meaning of the word “pending.” But “pending,” as used with respect to court procedure, means “remaining undecided.” (Buswell v. Babbitt, 65 N.H. 168 [ 18 A. 748 ].) Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1957) thus defines “pending” : “Begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusion of; prior to the completion of; unsettled; undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment.” It is clear that once the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was decided by the court it was no longer pending and therefore, even without the authority of Kroiss v. Butle | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Kroiss v. Butler
green
1 sentence1962This contention turns on the meaning of the word “pending.” But “pending,” as used with respect to court procedure, means “remaining undecided.” (Buswell v. Babbitt, 65 N.H. 168 [ 18 A. 748 ].) Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1957) thus defines “pending” : “Begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusion of; prior to the completion of; unsettled; undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment.” It is clear that once the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was decided by the court it was no longer pending and therefore, even without the authority of Kroiss v. Butle | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Pelaggi Co. v. Orient Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1961Co., 102 Vt. 384 [ 148 A. 869, at p. 873 ], the court said: “But where such agent is authorized by the assured, not only to place the insurance, but also to keep the property covered, he has implied authority to do whatever is reasonably necessary to accomplish that object, and he may waive the five-day clause, accept cancellation and substitution—all without notice to or consent by the insured.” (See also Warren v. Franklin Fire Ins. 1961Co., 102 Vt. 384 [ 148 A. 869, at p. 873 ], the court said: “But where such agent is authorized by the assured, not only to place the insurance, but also to keep the property covered, he has implied authority to do whatever is reasonably necessary to accomplish that object, and he may waive the five-day clause, accept cancellation and substitution—all without notice to or consent by the insured.” (See also Warren v. Franklin Fire Ins. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Warren v. Franklin Fire Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1961Co., 161 Iowa 440 [ 143 N.W. 554, 555 ] ; note, 83 A.L.R 298, 311.) National contends that the evidence affirmatively establishes that the Yorkshire insurance coverage was acquired to take the place of the National policy, that there was no intent thereby to acquire additional insurance, that all parties so understood, and that Apparel’s agent informed National that it was “off the risk” as of the date of the oral binder with Yorkshire. 1961Co., 161 Iowa 440 [ 143 N.W. 554, 555 ] ; note, 83 A.L.R 298, 311.) National contends that the evidence affirmatively establishes that the Yorkshire insurance coverage was acquired to take the place of the National policy, that there was no intent thereby to acquire additional insurance, that all parties so understood, and that Apparel’s agent informed National that it was “off the risk” as of the date of the oral binder with Yorkshire. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.