infant claim in New York

1995Union Free School Dist., 51 NY2d 256, 266 ; Matter of Bischert v County of Westchester, 212 AD2d 529 ; Matter of Goldstein v Clarkstown Cent.

1994Union Free School Dist., 51 NY2d 256, 266 ).

1995Union Free School Dist., 51 NY2d 256, 266 ; Matter of Bischert v County of Westchester, 212 AD2d 529 ; Matter of Goldstein v Clarkstown Cent.

1993In view of the evidence which demonstrated that the mother had abused drugs throughout her pregnancy, it is clear the mother failed to exercise proper judgment so as to protect the infant from physical harm or impairment (see, Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]; Matter of Cruz, 121 AD2d 901 ).

1983Unlike the infants in Becker and its companion case of Park v Chessin ( 46 NY2d 401 , supra), who would assertedly have chosen never to have been born at all rather than to have been born with Down’s Syndrome or polycystic kidney disease, the infant at bar would presumably have been born normal and healthy but for the appellants’ wrongful act.

1983Thus, this case would appear to fall squarely within the general rule that a surviving child has a right to recover for tortiously inflicted prenatal injuries (Woods v Lancet, 303 NY 349 ; Kelly v Gregory, 282 App Div 542).

1983Thus, this case would appear to fall squarely within the general rule that a surviving child has a right to recover for tortiously inflicted prenatal injuries (Woods v Lancet, 303 NY 349 ; Kelly v Gregory, 282 App Div 542).

1979Liability in vicious propensity or dog bite cases is "absolute” (People v Sandgren, 302 NY 331, 339 ) and is not dependent upon proof of negligence in the manner of keeping the animal (Molloy v Starin, 191 NY 21, 25 ; Lynch v McNally, 73 NY 347, 349 ; Muller v McKesson, 73 NY 195, 199 ).

1979Liability in vicious propensity or dog bite cases is "absolute” (People v Sandgren, 302 NY 331, 339 ) and is not dependent upon proof of negligence in the manner of keeping the animal (Molloy v Starin, 191 NY 21, 25 ; Lynch v McNally, 73 NY 347, 349 ; Muller v McKesson, 73 NY 195, 199 ).

1979Liability in vicious propensity or dog bite cases is "absolute” (People v Sandgren, 302 NY 331, 339 ) and is not dependent upon proof of negligence in the manner of keeping the animal (Molloy v Starin, 191 NY 21, 25 ; Lynch v McNally, 73 NY 347, 349 ; Muller v McKesson, 73 NY 195, 199 ).

1979Liability in vicious propensity or dog bite cases is "absolute” (People v Sandgren, 302 NY 331, 339 ) and is not dependent upon proof of negligence in the manner of keeping the animal (Molloy v Starin, 191 NY 21, 25 ; Lynch v McNally, 73 NY 347, 349 ; Muller v McKesson, 73 NY 195, 199 ).

1976It makes no difference whether the infant be viewed as an employee or an independent contractor, or whether the employment is casual or intermittent, as long as the hiring is in connection with a trade or business (cf. Ludwig v Lowe, 29 AD2d 267 , affd 25 NY2d 853 ).

1976Statutory liability may be imposed upon a person who hires an infant in violation of section 130 of the Labor Law if the infant is injured (Vincent v Riggi & Sons, 30 NY2d 406 ).

1976It makes no difference whether the infant be viewed as an employee or an independent contractor, or whether the employment is casual or intermittent, as long as the hiring is in connection with a trade or business (cf. Ludwig v Lowe, 29 AD2d 267 , affd 25 NY2d 853 ).

1969No. 5 of Town of Irondequoit, 290 N. Y. 329 ; Lee v. Sterling Silk Mfg.

1931(Falk v. MacMasters, 197 App. Div. 357 .) Motion denied, with ten dollars costs.

1904In Marino v. Lehmaier ( 62 App. Div. 43 ; affd., 173 N. Y. 530 ) the question was as to the liability of the defendant, who had employed an infant in violation of section 70 of the Labor Law; and it was there held that the fact that the infant requested or consented to such an employment was not contributory negligence that would interfere with his recovery.

1904In Marino v. Lehmaier ( 62 App. Div. 43 ; affd., 173 N. Y. 530 ) the question was as to the liability of the defendant, who had employed an infant in violation of section 70 of the Labor Law; and it was there held that the fact that the infant requested or consented to such an employment was not contributory negligence that would interfere with his recovery.