scope of absolute privilege in New York

1928It is not applied ‘ to proceedings which, though official and public, are not in substance judicial,’ and it is ‘ the tendency of courts to restrict the scope of absolute privilege in libel ’ ” (citing Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440 ).

1922It is not applied “ to proceedings which, though official and public, are not in substance judicial,” and it is “ the tendency of courts to restrict the scope of absolute privilege in libel.” (Andrews v. Gardiner, supra.) In our opinion it should not be held that the rule of absolute privilege is applicable to the circumstances before us.

1982Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727, 730 ; but see Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64 , 76-77 * * *) While inquiry into motivation is within the scope of absolute privilege, outright charges of illegal conduct, if false, are protected solely by the actual malice test.

1977Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727, 730 ; but see Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64, 76-77 , supra.) While inquiry into motivation is within the scope of absolute privilege, outright charges of illegal conduct, if false, are protected solely by the actual malice test.

1992However, "[w]hile inquiry into motivation is within the scope of absolute privilege, outright charges of illegal conduct, if false, are protected solely by the actual malice test” (Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 382 , rearg denied 42 NY2d 1015 , cert denied 434 US 969 ).

1992However, "[w]hile inquiry into motivation is within the scope of absolute privilege, outright charges of illegal conduct, if false, are protected solely by the actual malice test” (Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 382 , rearg denied 42 NY2d 1015 , cert denied 434 US 969 ).

1977The public interest considerations stated by the Court of Appeals in favor of extending absolute privilege to statements made to grievance committees of bar associations (Weiner v Weintraub, 22 NY2d 330 , supra) seem to be largely applicable to the Mayor’s Committee on Judiciary.

1951So also in Leganowics v. Rone ( 240 App. Div. 731 ) the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a hearing before the Division of Licenses of the State of New York was not a judicial proceeding and that the charges, therefore, were not protected by an absolute privilege.

1950(Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 321 ; Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 448 .) In support of its position that the privilege attaches in the case at bar, defendant relies on Campbell v. New York Evening Post ( 245 N. Y. 320 ).

1950(Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 321 ; Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 448 .) In support of its position that the privilege attaches in the case at bar, defendant relies on Campbell v. New York Evening Post ( 245 N. Y. 320 ).

1918Our ruling is- in harmony with the tendency of courts to restrict the scope of absolute privilege in libel (Blakeslee v. Carroll, supra, at p. 235 ; Odgers on Libel and Slander, pp. 230, 231).

1918It is in harmony with rulings made where petitions have been submitted to the governor or the legislature for relief against oppression or the redress of other wrongs (Wright v. Lothrop, supra, at p. 390 ; Proctor v. Webster, supra; Woods v. Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445 ; Cook v. Hill, 3 Sandf.

1918It is in harmony with rulings made where petitions have been submitted to the governor or the legislature for relief against oppression or the redress of other wrongs (Wright v. Lothrop, supra, at p. 390 ; Proctor v. Webster, supra; Woods v. Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445 ; Cook v. Hill, 3 Sandf.