9 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Continental Hydraulics Inc. v. Department of Employment & Economic Developmentgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Continental Hydraulics, Inc. v. Dept. of Emp. & Economic Dev., 832 N.W.2d 298, 301 (C.A.Minn.2013) (“Use of the present tense suggests a temporal requirement—that the common management or control must be concurrent”). 10 January Term, 2020 {¶ 27} The evidence is undisputed that at the time of the transfer (October 6, 2009), Old Delphi was a wholly owned subsidiary of Delphi Corporation, while New Delphi was owned, managed, and controlled entirely by the hedge funds. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barrett v. Franklin
green
2 sentences2016In so finding, we acknowledge language from Stegman indicating that “the ultimate burden of complying with the temporal requirement of Civ.R. 25(A) rests with the party who brings the action.” (Emphasis added.) Stegman at ¶ 33 , quoting Barrett v. Franklin, 32 Ohio App.3d 51, 54 , 513 N.E.2d 1361 (1st Dist.1986), overruled on other grounds by Perry v. Eagle-Picher Indus, Inc., 52 Ohio St.3d 168 , 556 N.E.2d 484 (1990). 2016In so finding, we acknowledge language from Stegman indicating that “the ultimate burden of complying with the temporal requirement of Civ.R. 25(A) rests with the party who brings the action.” (Emphasis added.) Stegman at ¶ 33 , quoting Barrett v. Franklin, 32 Ohio App.3d 51, 54 , 513 N.E.2d 1361 (1st Dist.1986), overruled on other grounds by Perry v. Eagle-Picher Indus, Inc., 52 Ohio St.3d 168 , 556 N.E.2d 484 (1990). | 3 | 2006–2016 |
Perry v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016In so finding, we acknowledge language from Stegman indicating that “the ultimate burden of complying with the temporal requirement of Civ.R. 25(A) rests with the party who brings the action.” (Emphasis added.) Stegman at ¶ 33 , quoting Barrett v. Franklin, 32 Ohio App.3d 51, 54 , 513 N.E.2d 1361 (1st Dist.1986), overruled on other grounds by Perry v. Eagle-Picher Indus, Inc., 52 Ohio St.3d 168 , 556 N.E.2d 484 (1990). 2016In so finding, we acknowledge language from Stegman indicating that “the ultimate burden of complying with the temporal requirement of Civ.R. 25(A) rests with the party who brings the action.” (Emphasis added.) Stegman at ¶ 33 , quoting Barrett v. Franklin, 32 Ohio App.3d 51, 54 , 513 N.E.2d 1361 (1st Dist.1986), overruled on other grounds by Perry v. Eagle-Picher Indus, Inc., 52 Ohio St.3d 168 , 556 N.E.2d 484 (1990). | 3 | 2006–2016 |
State v. Russell
green
1 sentence2022The United States Supreme Court has generally interpreted this provision to mean a criminal [Cite as State v. Russell, 2022-Ohio-1746 .] defendant is entitled to the “reasonably effective assistance” of counsel. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cicco v. Stockmaster
green
2 sentences2020Construing R.C. 2721.12(A) as requiring service on the attorney general at the inception of a case would create a temporal requirement that simply does not exist in the statute. 4 January Term, 2020 {¶ 11} Cincinnati argues that in Cicco v. Stockmaster, 89 Ohio St.3d 95 , 728 N.E.2d 1066 (2000), we held that R.C. 2721.12 requires service on the attorney general at the inception of a declaratory judgment action. 2020Construing R.C. 2721.12(A) as requiring service on the attorney general at the inception of a case would create a temporal requirement that simply does not exist in the statute. 4 January Term, 2020 {¶ 11} Cincinnati argues that in Cicco v. Stockmaster, 89 Ohio St.3d 95 , 728 N.E.2d 1066 (2000), we held that R.C. 2721.12 requires service on the attorney general at the inception of a declaratory judgment action. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2016State v. Thomas, 106 Ohio St.3d 133 , 2005-Ohio-4106 , 832 N.E.2d 1190 , ¶ 13. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2016Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative means.” ’ ” Gardner at ¶ 49, quoting State v. Jones, 96 Haw. 161, 170 , 29 P.3d 351 (2001). {¶ 54} The elements of robbery permitted the jury to consider alternate methods to satisfy the physical harm requirement (i.e, inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict) and the temporal requirement (i.e., during or in fleeing immediately after). 2016Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative means.” ’ ” Gardner at ¶ 49, quoting State v. Jones, 96 Haw. 161, 170 , 29 P.3d 351 (2001). {¶ 54} The elements of robbery permitted the jury to consider alternate methods to satisfy the physical harm requirement (i.e, inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict) and the temporal requirement (i.e., during or in fleeing immediately after). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Lowe
green
1 sentence2008Id. {¶ 9} R.C. 2151.413(E) states that “[a]ny agency that files a motion for permanent custody under this section shall include in the case plan of the child who is the subject of the motion, a specific plan of the agency’s actions to seek an adoptive family for the child and to prepare the child for adoption.” (Emphasis added.) As the emphasized language reveals, the statute plainly requires a children-services agency that files a motion for permanent custody to include an adoption plan in the child’s case plan. {¶ 10} R.C. 2151.413(E) does not state a temporal requirement, though; it does no | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Insurance
green
2 sentences1998Co., Ltd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 657 , 597 N.E.2d 1096 , the migration of PAHs into the soil does not meet the temporal requirement. 1998Co., Ltd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 657 , 597 N.E.2d 1096 , the migration of PAHs into the soil does not meet the temporal requirement. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.