13 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Ramirezgreen2 sentences2020The temporal requirement on a trial court to rule on a pending motion is only that the judge rule within a “reasonable time.” In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). 2019The temporal requirement on a trial court to rule on a pending motion is only that the judge rule within a “reasonable time.” In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). | 7 | 7 |
In Re Chavezgreen2 sentences2020The temporal requirement on a trial court to rule on a pending motion is only that the judge rule within a “reasonable time.” In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). 2019The temporal requirement on a trial court to rule on a pending motion is only that the judge rule within a “reasonable time.” In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). | 6 | 6 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reecegreen2 sentences2019See id. 2019Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 815 . | 2 | 2 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rosagreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rosa, 52 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (en banc) (evidence that banana on floor was “brown” only supports the “possibility” that the dangerous condition existed long enough to establish constructive notice; possibility is no more than speculation and is treated as no evidence); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Harkless, 601 S.W.2d 534 , 537–39 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (evidence that brown liquid was on floral department floor held inadequate to establish constructive knowledge); Robledo v. Kroger Co., 597 S.W.2d 560 , 560– | 1 | 1 |
Barnes v. Stategreen1 sentence2014The temporal requirement on a judge to rule on a pending motion for default judgment is only that the judge rule within a “reasonable time.” Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding); In re Martinez Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Xellergreen1 sentence2008See id. (basing lach-es finding exclusively on the fact of a sixteen-month delay, and specifically referencing the length of delay in citing numerous mandamus cases in which laches was held to apply). *888 Boehme sought to dismiss the Texas litigation only eighteen days after HCN filed suit. | 1 | 1 |
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2000Co., 154 Ill.2d 90 , 180 Ill.Dec. 691 , 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1218 (1992). 4 Walter Oil argues that this *907 Court, by applying a temporal requirement to the St. 2000Co., 154 Ill.2d 90 , 180 Ill.Dec. 691 , 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1218 (1992). 4 Walter Oil argues that this *907 Court, by applying a temporal requirement to the St. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Harkless
green
1 sentence2014See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rosa, 52 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (en banc) (evidence that banana on floor was “brown” only supports the “possibility” that the dangerous condition existed long enough to establish constructive notice; possibility is no more than speculation and is treated as no evidence); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Harkless, 601 S.W.2d 534 , 537–39 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (evidence that brown liquid was on floral department floor held inadequate to establish constructive knowledge); Robledo v. Kroger Co., 597 S.W.2d 560 , 560– | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Robledo v. Kroger Company
green
1 sentence2014See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rosa, 52 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (en banc) (evidence that banana on floor was “brown” only supports the “possibility” that the dangerous condition existed long enough to establish constructive notice; possibility is no more than speculation and is treated as no evidence); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Harkless, 601 S.W.2d 534 , 537–39 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (evidence that brown liquid was on floral department floor held inadequate to establish constructive knowledge); Robledo v. Kroger Co., 597 S.W.2d 560 , 560– | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Campbell v. State
green
1 sentence1991Campbell, 718 S.W.2d at 716 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.