temporal requirement (New York) · Go Syfert
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temporal requirement in New York

13 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2025 8 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Sinistajgreen
ny · 1986 · cited in 4 New York opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025The statute was "enacted to serve the narrow purpose of insuring prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial," while giving "both parties the means to determine prospectively the time period within which the People must be ready to proceed with the prosecution by providing a temporal framework for the action." People v. Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 (1986); People v. Cooper , 98 NY2d 541,547 (2002).

2025The statute was "enacted to serve the narrow purpose of insuring prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial," while giving "both parties the means to determine prospectively the time period within which the People must be ready to proceed with the prosecution by providing a temporal framework for the action." People v. Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 (1986); People v. Cooper , 98 NY2d 541,547 (2002).

44
People v. Coopergreen
ny · 2002 · cited in 4 New York opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025The statute was "enacted to serve the narrow purpose of insuring prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial," while giving "both parties the means to determine prospectively the time period within which the People must be ready to proceed with the prosecution by providing a temporal framework for the action." People v. Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 (1986); People v. Cooper , 98 NY2d 541,547 (2002).

2025The statute was "enacted to serve the narrow purpose of insuring prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial," while giving "both parties the means to determine prospectively the time period within which the People must be ready to proceed with the prosecution by providing a temporal framework for the action." People v. Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 (1986); People v. Cooper , 98 NY2d 541,547 (2002).

44
People v. Ellisgreen
nyappdiv · 2022 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023Significantly, and as noted by defendant on appeal, a colorable argument exists, but was not raised by counsel at the SORA hearing, regarding the People's failure to establish the temporal requirement substantiating the assessment of points under risk factor 4 ( see People v Echols , 207 AD3d at 480; People v Ellis , 204 AD3d 1388, 1389-1390 [4th Dept 2022]; People v Jarama , 178 AD3d 970 , 971 [2d Dept 2019]; People v Edmonds , 133 AD3d 1332 , 1332 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 918 [2016]).

11
Fruchthandler v. Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co.green
nyappdiv · 2019 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023In our view, the better reading of Fruchthandler is that the Second Department simply used the fact that the fire occurred two years after the improper work, which was particular to that case, to emphasize that the claimed loss (fire damage to the house), which was covered under the all-risk policy, was wholly separate from the defect in the property that was created by the faulty workmanship (junction box), which was excluded from coverage ( see Fruchthandler , 171 AD3d at 706-707).

11
People v. Echolsgreen
nyappdiv · 2022 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023Significantly, and as noted by defendant on appeal, a colorable argument exists, but was not raised by counsel at the SORA hearing, regarding the People's failure to establish the temporal requirement substantiating the assessment of points under risk factor 4 ( see People v Echols , 207 AD3d at 480; People v Ellis , 204 AD3d 1388, 1389-1390 [4th Dept 2022]; People v Jarama , 178 AD3d 970 , 971 [2d Dept 2019]; People v Edmonds , 133 AD3d 1332 , 1332 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 918 [2016]).

11
Malchow v. Board of Education for North Tonawanda Central School Districtgreen
nyappdiv · 1998 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020School Dist. , 254 AD2d 608, 609 [1998]; see Matter of Scanlan v Buffalo Pub.

11
People v. Pagegreen
ny · 1988 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Rather, the Court of Appeals has explained that the statute "invests a trial court with latitude to make a balanced determination affecting the administration of justice based on the facts required to be adduced, recognizing that criminal proceedings should not be unnecessarily or unfairly delayed against the interests of either the defense or the prosecution, especially when the trial is under way and so many other participants are involved" ( People v Page , 72 NY2d 69, 73 [1988]).

11
People v. Tetreaultgreen
nyappdiv · 2004 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Similarly, defendant’s use of force to overcome resistance to his retention of the property “immediately after the taking” satisfied the element of forcible stealing (Penal Law § 160.00 [1]; see People v Tetreault, 12 AD3d 722, 723 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 749 [2004]; People v Safon, 166 AD2d 892, 893 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 990 [1990]); force used as the victim chased defendant following the taking of her purse met the temporal requirement of the statute (see People v Johnstone, 131 AD2d 782, 782-783 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 800 [1987]; People v Brock, 125 AD2d 401, 401 [1986], lv denied 6

11
People v. Tetreaultgreen
ny · 2004 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Similarly, defendant’s use of force to overcome resistance to his retention of the property “immediately after the taking” satisfied the element of forcible stealing (Penal Law § 160.00 [1]; see People v Tetreault, 12 AD3d 722, 723 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 749 [2004]; People v Safon, 166 AD2d 892, 893 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 990 [1990]); force used as the victim chased defendant following the taking of her purse met the temporal requirement of the statute (see People v Johnstone, 131 AD2d 782, 782-783 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 800 [1987]; People v Brock, 125 AD2d 401, 401 [1986], lv denied 6

11
People v. Brockgreen
nyappdiv · 1986 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Similarly, defendant’s use of force to overcome resistance to his retention of the property “immediately after the taking” satisfied the element of forcible stealing (Penal Law § 160.00 [1]; see People v Tetreault, 12 AD3d 722, 723 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 749 [2004]; People v Safon, 166 AD2d 892, 893 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 990 [1990]); force used as the victim chased defendant following the taking of her purse met the temporal requirement of the statute (see People v Johnstone, 131 AD2d 782, 782-783 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 800 [1987]; People v Brock, 125 AD2d 401, 401 [1986], lv denied 6

11
People v. Johnstonegreen
nyappdiv · 1987 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Similarly, defendant’s use of force to overcome resistance to his retention of the property “immediately after the taking” satisfied the element of forcible stealing (Penal Law § 160.00 [1]; see People v Tetreault, 12 AD3d 722, 723 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 749 [2004]; People v Safon, 166 AD2d 892, 893 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 990 [1990]); force used as the victim chased defendant following the taking of her purse met the temporal requirement of the statute (see People v Johnstone, 131 AD2d 782, 782-783 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 800 [1987]; People v Brock, 125 AD2d 401, 401 [1986], lv denied 6

11
People v. Safongreen
nyappdiv · 1990 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Similarly, defendant’s use of force to overcome resistance to his retention of the property “immediately after the taking” satisfied the element of forcible stealing (Penal Law § 160.00 [1]; see People v Tetreault, 12 AD3d 722, 723 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 749 [2004]; People v Safon, 166 AD2d 892, 893 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 990 [1990]); force used as the victim chased defendant following the taking of her purse met the temporal requirement of the statute (see People v Johnstone, 131 AD2d 782, 782-783 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 800 [1987]; People v Brock, 125 AD2d 401, 401 [1986], lv denied 6

11
Scott v. United Statesgreen
tnmd · 1983 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
1 sentence

1984(Cf. Scott v United States, 573 F Supp 622, 627 [five Circuit Courts of Appeals apply Giordano standard circumstantially].) Upon the present facts, it does appear that the exigency of the unavailability of the issuing Justice (on vacation in Europe) and of the designated supervising Justice for three days (due to religious observances) prior to expiration of the August 11 extension, and the intervention of a Sunday on the day following expiration effectively precluded prosecutors from complying with the specific temporal requirement of the statute (CPL 700.40).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Wyatt green
nyappdiv · 2011
2 sentences

2025A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of "(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" ( People v Wyatt , 89 AD3d 112, 128 ; see Guidelines at 4; People v Gillotti , 23 NY3d 841, 861 ).

2024"As a general matter, a defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of (1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" ( People v Fernandez , 219 AD3d 762 , 762 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Guidelines at 4-5; People

22024–2025
People v. Lyons green
nyappdiv · 2021
2 sentences

2025The People established by clear and convincing evidence multiple occurrences of sexual misconduct within the temporal requirement ( see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 10 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]; People v Tewel , 229 AD3d 648 , 649; People v Torres , 217 AD3d 976 , 976-977; People v Lyons , 199 AD3d 722 , 723).

2024The People established by clear and convincing evidence multiple occurrences of sexual misconduct within the temporal requirement ( see Guidelines at 10; People v Lyons , 199 AD3d 722, 723 ; People v Brown , 194 AD3d 861 ).

22024–2025
People v. Gillotti green
ny · 2014
2 sentences

2025A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of "(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" ( People v Wyatt , 89 AD3d 112, 128 ; see Guidelines at 4; People v Gillotti , 23 NY3d 841, 861 ).

2024"As a general matter, a defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of (1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" ( People v Fernandez , 219 AD3d 762 , 762 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Guidelines at 4-5; People

22024–2025
People v. Torres green
nyappdiv · 2023
1 sentence

2025The People established by clear and convincing evidence multiple occurrences of sexual misconduct within the temporal requirement ( see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 10 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]; People v Tewel , 229 AD3d 648 , 649; People v Torres , 217 AD3d 976 , 976-977; People v Lyons , 199 AD3d 722 , 723).

12025–2025
People v. Tewel neutral
nyappdiv · 2024
1 sentence

2025The People established by clear and convincing evidence multiple occurrences of sexual misconduct within the temporal requirement ( see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 10 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]; People v Tewel , 229 AD3d 648 , 649; People v Torres , 217 AD3d 976 , 976-977; People v Lyons , 199 AD3d 722 , 723).

12025–2025
People v. Brown green
nyappdiv · 2021
1 sentence

2024The People established by clear and convincing evidence multiple occurrences of sexual misconduct within the temporal requirement ( see Guidelines at 10; People v Lyons , 199 AD3d 722, 723 ; People v Brown , 194 AD3d 861 ).

12024–2024
People v. Edmonds green
nyappdiv · 2015
1 sentence

2023Significantly, and as noted by defendant on appeal, a colorable argument exists, but was not raised by counsel at the SORA hearing, regarding the People's failure to establish the temporal requirement substantiating the assessment of points under risk factor 4 ( see People v Echols , 207 AD3d at 480; People v Ellis , 204 AD3d 1388, 1389-1390 [4th Dept 2022]; People v Jarama , 178 AD3d 970 , 971 [2d Dept 2019]; People v Edmonds , 133 AD3d 1332 , 1332 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 918 [2016]).

12023–2023
People v. Jarama green
nyappdiv · 2019
1 sentence

2023Significantly, and as noted by defendant on appeal, a colorable argument exists, but was not raised by counsel at the SORA hearing, regarding the People's failure to establish the temporal requirement substantiating the assessment of points under risk factor 4 ( see People v Echols , 207 AD3d at 480; People v Ellis , 204 AD3d 1388, 1389-1390 [4th Dept 2022]; People v Jarama , 178 AD3d 970 , 971 [2d Dept 2019]; People v Edmonds , 133 AD3d 1332 , 1332 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 918 [2016]).

12023–2023
Matter of Granica v. Town of Hamburg green
nyappdiv · 2020
1 sentence

2020"Although the Board has consistently found that listing the hearing date at which the objection or exception was made constitutes a complete response to [the temporal requirement of] question number 15" ( Matter of Granica v Town of Hamburg , 2020 NY Slip Op 01542 at *2 ), the regulation in effect at the time that the carrier submitted its application for review in June 2018 only required the applicant to state, as pertinent here, " when " the objection or exception was interposed; it did not then require that a date be specified (12 NYCRR 300.13 [b] [2] [ii] [emphasis added]). [FN1] In review

12020–2020
People v. Dekle green
ny · 1982
1 sentence

1987Upon these facts, the jury was clearly entitled to find that the temporal requirement of the statute was satisfied (see, People v Dekle, 83 AD2d 522 , affd 56 NY2d 835 ).

11987–1987
People v. Dekle green
nyappdiv · 1981
1 sentence

1987Upon these facts, the jury was clearly entitled to find that the temporal requirement of the statute was satisfied (see, People v Dekle, 83 AD2d 522 , affd 56 NY2d 835 ).

11987–1987

Where else courts name it

MI 14 (2007–2026) LA 14 (1996–2026) TX 13 (1991–2020) NY 13 (1984–2025) CA 13 (1991–2026) NJ 12 (1997–2025) PA 9 (2006–2024) IN 9 (2001–2020) WA 9 (2007–2021) IL 9 (2009–2026) OH 8 (1998–2020) RI 7 (2005–2025) VA 7 (1994–2026) CT 7 (1997–2025) DE 7 (1995–2024) ID 6 (1987–2020) OR 5 (2001–2025) FL 5 (1981–2010) NC 4 (2007–2025) AZ 4 (2013–2024) MD 4 (1998–2026) MA 4 (2005–2024) NM 3 (1996–2023) IA 3 (1997–2005) WY 3 (2003–2016) MN 3 (2007–2025) WI 3 (1994–2019) UT 2 (2006–2017) KS 2 (2016–2026) SC 2 (2002–2021) NH 2 (2004–2011) ND 2 (2023–2025) NV 2 (2013–2014) GA 2 (1985–1995)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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