trust motion in Ohio

2025Lycan v. Cleveland, 2016-Ohio-422 , ¶ 21 (reversing the Eighth Appellate District's decision addressing res judicata on the merits for the first time on appeal); Tree of Life Church v. Agnew, 2014-Ohio-878, ¶ 27-28 (7th Dist.) (declining to consider the merits of summary judgment arguments not raised to the trial court); Gonzales v. Perez, 2015-Ohio-1282 , ¶ 17 (7th Dist.) (declining to address argument raised for the first time on appeal.) Despite the likely lack of compliance with the seven- day notice requirement, this argument does not support the Trust’s first assigned error, which seeks

2012As the court stated in In re Estate of Ternansky, 141 N.E.2d 189 , 1957 Ohio App. LEXIS 1088 (9th Dist.1957): Courts are not powerless to enforce this trust.

2012As the court stated in In re Estate of Ternansky, 141 N.E.2d 189 , 1957 Ohio App. LEXIS 1088 (9th Dist.1957): Courts are not powerless to enforce this trust.

2008R.C. 2505.02 (B)(4) provides: "An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it *** grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply: "(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. "(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the

2007Cincinnati City School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 305 , 312 (citations omitted); Cuyahoga County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Ford (1987), 35 Ohio App.3d 88 , 92 (citations omitted). {¶ 31} Here, Berneice first argues that, under the plain language of the trust rule, the homestead property becomes an available resource upon placement into a category two trust, but it does not become a countable resource. 7 Upon looking first to the plain language of the trust rule, we find that the language clearly and unambiguously retains the homestead property exemption.

2007Cincinnati City School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 305 , 312 (citations omitted); Cuyahoga County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Ford (1987), 35 Ohio App.3d 88 , 92 (citations omitted). {¶ 31} Here, Berneice first argues that, under the plain language of the trust rule, the homestead property becomes an available resource upon placement into a category two trust, but it does not become a countable resource. 7 Upon looking first to the plain language of the trust rule, we find that the language clearly and unambiguously retains the homestead property exemption.

2000Trust also averred that he paid for "the majority of the down-payment" on the property, and that Miller "has improperly taken items belonging to me that exceed any interest she may have in the home." 1 Trust noted that pursuant to the standards for determining a Civ.R. 60(B) motion outlined in GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146 , he had a meritorious defense to Miller's original request for one-half partition of the property, and that, given lack of service of the complaint or any later pleadings, the Civ.R. 60(B) motion was made within a reasonable time.

1996Blackburn, supra. Although the Trust’s motion to intervene was filed after the scheduled trial date and after difficult negotiations between the parties, we hold that the motion to intervene based upon the settlement of the claims was timely. 7 The Trust has satisfied the next two requirements for intervention as of right.

1990Corp. (1982), 5 Ohio App. 3d 236 , a case in which the proceeds of a life insurance policy were placed in a trust in violation of the divorce decree, the court held: "Where a divorce decree orders the husband to maintain an insurance policy in a specific amount on his life payable 'to or for the benefit of his two named children, and the husband subsequently places the policy together with some additional property in trust, thereby reducing the interests of his two named children, the husband's actions violate the divorce decree and will not be given effect." See, also, Studley v. Studley (198

1990Corp. (1982), 5 Ohio App. 3d 236 , a case in which the proceeds of a life insurance policy were placed in a trust in violation of the divorce decree, the court held: "Where a divorce decree orders the husband to maintain an insurance policy in a specific amount on his life payable 'to or for the benefit of his two named children, and the husband subsequently places the policy together with some additional property in trust, thereby reducing the interests of his two named children, the husband's actions violate the divorce decree and will not be given effect." See, also, Studley v. Studley (198

1974See, e. g., State v. Hanlon (1907), 77 Ohio St. 19 ; Salesnak Fisheries v. Cashner (1967), 9 Ohio App. 2d 233 .

1897In short, no administration is to be made upon the fund by the trustee, naught but a plain and simple paying over of one part and a retention in personal ownership of the other part; as trustee the claimant has but a bare and naked legal title, as beneficiary she has a clear proprietary interest aad ownership. 91 N. C., 308 , supra. She who is parading as trustee is such only in name, and in fact is herself liable to repay to Mr. Merrell the same sum which as trustee she seeks now to have from him ; her distributive shate of the total fund is more than ample to meet her individual obligation t