14 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.green1 sentence2022Consistent with this, the supreme court has held that “[b]y the terms of [r]ule 54(b)” itself, “a ruling must meet three requirements in order to be appealable.” Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, L.L.C.green2 sentences2022As noted, the district court below certified its ruling on the Trust issue as being final, thereby invoking rule 54(b) as the putative basis for our ability to review this decision. ¶15 When rule 54(b) is properly invoked, an appellate court can “weigh in on a matter even though not all of the causes of action for all of the parties have been adjudicated,” Copper Hills, 2018 UT 56 , ¶ 15, and even if the ruling in question did not “end the controversy between [all] the litigants,” Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., LLC, 2005 UT 59, ¶ 9 , 123 P.3d 393 (quotation simplified). 20200545-CA 5 2022 UT App 2022As noted, the district court below certified its ruling on the Trust issue as being final, thereby invoking rule 54(b) as the putative basis for our ability to review this decision. ¶15 When rule 54(b) is properly invoked, an appellate court can “weigh in on a matter even though not all of the causes of action for all of the parties have been adjudicated,” Copper Hills, 2018 UT 56 , ¶ 15, and even if the ruling in question did not “end the controversy between [all] the litigants,” Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., LLC, 2005 UT 59, ¶ 9 , 123 P.3d 393 (quotation simplified). 20200545-CA 5 2022 UT App | 1 | 1 |
Gregory v. Shurtleffgreen2 sentences2017See Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 9 , 299 P.3d 1098 . 2017See Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 9 , 299 P.3d 1098 . | 1 | 1 |
J.M.W. v. T.I.Z.green2 sentences2014But "[the concept of subject matter jurisdiction does not embrace all cases where the court's competence is at issue." Johnson, 2010 UT 28, 19 , 234 P.3d 1100 ; see also In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶31 , 266 P.3d 702 ("[Tlhe concept of subject matter jurisdiction [is limited] to those cases in which the court lacks authority to hear a class of cases, rather than when it simply lacks the authority to grant relief in an individual case."). 2014But "[the concept of subject matter jurisdiction does not embrace all cases where the court's competence is at issue." Johnson, 2010 UT 28, 19 , 234 P.3d 1100 ; see also In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶31 , 266 P.3d 702 ("[Tlhe concept of subject matter jurisdiction [is limited] to those cases in which the court lacks authority to hear a class of cases, rather than when it simply lacks the authority to grant relief in an individual case."). | 1 | 1 |
REPUBLIC OUTDOOR ADVER. v. Dept. of Transp.green2 sentences2013Corp., 2013 UT App 30, ¶ 28 , 297 P.3d 38 ; see also Republic Outdoor Adver., LC v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2011 UT App 198 , ¶ 32, 258 P.3d 619 (declining to consider a challenge to an alternative basis for the court's grant of summary judgment where appellant failed to adequately challenge an independent basis for the court's ruling). 2013Corp., 2013 UT App 30, ¶ 28 , 297 P.3d 38 ; see also Republic Outdoor Adver., LC v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2011 UT App 198 , ¶ 32, 258 P.3d 619 (declining to consider a challenge to an alternative basis for the court's grant of summary judgment where appellant failed to adequately challenge an independent basis for the court's ruling). | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. Pattersongreen2 sentences2012See Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78 , ¶ 11 n. 2, 169 P.3d 750 ; Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17 , ¶ 17 n. 2, 71 P.3d 589 ; see also Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68 , 266 P.3d 828 . 6 Rather, such language was routinely included by attorneys in trust documents in an apparent attempt "to save the Trust from the doctrine of merger and to prove that the Trust is not illusory." Flake, 2003 UT 17, ¶ 17 , 71 P.3d 589 . 2012See Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78 , ¶ 11 n. 2, 169 P.3d 750 ; Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17 , ¶ 17 n. 2, 71 P.3d 589 ; see also Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68 , 266 P.3d 828 . 6 Rather, such language was routinely included by attorneys in trust documents in an apparent attempt "to save the Trust from the doctrine of merger and to prove that the Trust is not illusory." Flake, 2003 UT 17, ¶ 17 , 71 P.3d 589 . | 1 | 1 |
Hoggan v. Hoggangreen2 sentences2012See Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78 , ¶ 11 n. 2, 169 P.3d 750 ; Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17 , ¶ 17 n. 2, 71 P.3d 589 ; see also Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68 , 266 P.3d 828 . 6 Rather, such language was routinely included by attorneys in trust documents in an apparent attempt "to save the Trust from the doctrine of merger and to prove that the Trust is not illusory." Flake, 2003 UT 17, ¶ 17 , 71 P.3d 589 . 2012See Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78 , ¶ 11 n. 2, 169 P.3d 750 ; Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17 , ¶ 17 n. 2, 71 P.3d 589 ; see also Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68 , 266 P.3d 828 . 6 Rather, such language was routinely included by attorneys in trust documents in an apparent attempt "to save the Trust from the doctrine of merger and to prove that the Trust is not illusory." Flake, 2003 UT 17, ¶ 17 , 71 P.3d 589 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Flakegreen2 sentences2012See Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78 , ¶ 11 n. 2, 169 P.3d 750 ; Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17 , ¶ 17 n. 2, 71 P.3d 589 ; see also Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68 , 266 P.3d 828 . 6 Rather, such language was routinely included by attorneys in trust documents in an apparent attempt "to save the Trust from the doctrine of merger and to prove that the Trust is not illusory." Flake, 2003 UT 17, ¶ 17 , 71 P.3d 589 . 2012See Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78 , ¶ 11 n. 2, 169 P.3d 750 ; Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17 , ¶ 17 n. 2, 71 P.3d 589 ; see also Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68 , 266 P.3d 828 . 6 Rather, such language was routinely included by attorneys in trust documents in an apparent attempt "to save the Trust from the doctrine of merger and to prove that the Trust is not illusory." Flake, 2003 UT 17, ¶ 17 , 71 P.3d 589 . | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Estate of Groesbeckgreen1 sentence2011And we recognized that the use of that language was a product of our holding in Groesbeck v. Groesbeck (In re Estate of Groesbeck), 935 P.2d 1255, 1257-58 (Utah 1997), where we concluded that a revocable trust would be deemed illusory unless it purported to create "vested interests" in the beneficiaries. | 1 | 1 |
NAT. PARKS & CONS. ASS'N v. Bd. of St. Landsgreen2 sentences2010Although the section on appraiser bias was concerned primarily with the potential injury to the trust and our analysis elsewhere in NPCA I focused primarily on whether non-economic factors should be given preference over the goal of maximizing trust income, we did acknowledge that part of our inquiry in the case was "whether the Division properly administered the school land trust." Id. at 916. 2010Although the section on appraiser bias was concerned primarily with the potential injury to the trust and our analysis elsewhere in NPCA I focused primarily on whether noneconomic factors should be given preference over the goal of maximizing trust income, we did acknowledge that part of our inquiry in the case was "whether the Division properly administered the school land trust." Id. at 916. | 1 | 1 |
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensengreen2 sentences2008The supreme court disagreed, “concluding] that plaintiff was under no duty to notify defendants of the default,” id., and subsequently explained that the Central Bank & Trust defendants “never made an appearance pri- or to having default judgment entered against [them],” Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 27 , 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust); see also Central Bank & Trust, 656 P.2d at 1011 -12 & n. 2 (emphasizing that “[n]o service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear” (emphasis omitted)). ¶ 15 In Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 , 11 P.3d 277 , the plaintiffs filed a comp 2008The supreme court disagreed, “concluding] that plaintiff was under no duty to notify defendants of the default,” id., and subsequently explained that the Central Bank & Trust defendants “never made an appearance pri- or to having default judgment entered against [them],” Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 27 , 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust); see also Central Bank & Trust, 656 P.2d at 1011 -12 & n. 2 (emphasizing that “[n]o service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear” (emphasis omitted)). ¶ 15 In Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 , 11 P.3d 277 , the plaintiffs filed a comp | 1 | 1 |
Lund v. Browngreen2 sentences2008The supreme court disagreed, “concluding] that plaintiff was under no duty to notify defendants of the default,” id., and subsequently explained that the Central Bank & Trust defendants “never made an appearance pri- or to having default judgment entered against [them],” Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 27 , 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust); see also Central Bank & Trust, 656 P.2d at 1011 -12 & n. 2 (emphasizing that “[n]o service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear” (emphasis omitted)). ¶ 15 In Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 , 11 P.3d 277 , the plaintiffs filed a comp 2008The supreme court disagreed, “concluding] that plaintiff was under no duty to notify defendants of the default,” id., and subsequently explained that the Central Bank & Trust defendants “never made an appearance pri- or to having default judgment entered against [them],” Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 27 , 11 P.3d 277 (discussing Central Bank & Trust); see also Central Bank & Trust, 656 P.2d at 1011 -12 & n. 2 (emphasizing that “[n]o service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear” (emphasis omitted)). ¶ 15 In Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 , 11 P.3d 277 , the plaintiffs filed a comp | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 10851783
green
1 sentence2026The Stevenses asserted that “because the border at issue was not one by ‘adjoining landowners,’” the Trust’s claim “for boundary by acquiescence could not succeed.” Pointing to rule 60(b)(3), the Stevenses argued that the Trust’s failure “to disclose the true boundary line and [the Trust’s] purchase of the East Parcel after litigation began, despite agreeing in the mediation agreement to honestly disclose all relevant facts,” constituted “fraud—or at a minimum—a misrepresentation.” They also argued that the Trust’s “failure to adhere to the Honesty Provision” warranted relief under rule 60(b)( | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Copper Hills Custom Homes, LLC v. Countrywide Bank, FSB
green
1 sentence2022ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶11 The parties have briefed and argued the question of whether the district court could divide the stock options that are within the Trust as part of its division of John and Tara’s marital estate. ¶12 But “we may not act on an appeal, including an appeal of a putative final order under rule 54(b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure], unless we are satisfied that we have appellate jurisdiction.” Copper Hills Custom Homes, LLC v. Countrywide Bank, FSB, 2018 UT 56 , ¶ 1, 428 P.3d 1133 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Fritsche v. Deer Valley Ridge
green
2 sentences2022First, it held that the terms “of the settlement agreement[] reached between the 20200411-CA 9 2022 UT App 11 Fritsche v. Deer Valley Ridge parties via email . . . did not include a prevailing party attorneys’ fee provision.” Second, it held that the settlement agreement reached by email was “separate and apart from” the Declaration and that the Declaration should not “be imported” into the parties’ settlement agreement. 2022As noted, the crux of the Trust’s claim is that its prior counsel was not authorized in writing to agree that the Trust could no longer (continued…) 20200411-CA 13 2022 UT App 11 Fritsche v. Deer Valley Ridge ¶43 In the Trust’s opposition to the motion to enforce—which is where the Trust first raised the statute of frauds defense—the Trust alleged that Trust Counsel “was never given written authority to enter into” the Management Provision. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hillam v. Hillam
green
2 sentences2022As noted, the district court below certified its ruling on the Trust issue as being final, thereby invoking rule 54(b) as the putative basis for our ability to review this decision. ¶15 When rule 54(b) is properly invoked, an appellate court can “weigh in on a matter even though not all of the causes of action for all of the parties have been adjudicated,” Copper Hills, 2018 UT 56 , ¶ 15, and even if the ruling in question did not “end the controversy between [all] the litigants,” Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., LLC, 2005 UT 59, ¶ 9 , 123 P.3d 393 (quotation simplified). 20200545-CA 5 2022 UT App 2022In her brief, Tara asks us to adopt a test under which a court may equitably divide marital property contained in an irrevocable trust “if the evidence shows that the spouse created the irrevocable trust in contemplation of divorce or with the aim of 20200545-CA 7 2022 UT App 24 Hillam v. Hancock frustrating the equitable distribution of property in the event of a divorce.” (Emphases added, quotation simplified.) Thus, her proposed test largely turns on the transferring spouse’s intent. ¶23 But in the bench trial that occurred while this appeal was pending, Tara made a dissipation of marital a | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board
green
2 sentences2017Trust’s claim of title” rather than leaving the claims to be resolved in a subsequent proceeding. ¶14 The Brands’ contentions — that the district court’s dismissal of the Trust’s claims against them should have been with prejudice, as opposed to without, and that the district court should have rendered judgment on the merits of those claims — are the types of assertions the Brands plainly have standing to assert on appeal, demonstrating both aggrievement by the district court’s judgment for purposes of appellate standing, see Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 50 , 123 P.3d 416 , as well as the tr 2017Trust’s claim of title” rather than leaving the claims to be resolved in a subsequent proceeding. ¶14 The Brands’ contentions — that the district court’s dismissal of the Trust’s claims against them should have been with prejudice, as opposed to without, and that the district court should have rendered judgment on the merits of those claims — are the types of assertions the Brands plainly have standing to assert on appeal, demonstrating both aggrievement by the district court’s judgment for purposes of appellate standing, see Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 50 , 123 P.3d 416 , as well as the tr | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Bresee v. Barton
green
1 sentence2017Cf. Bresee v. Barton, 2016 UT App 220, ¶ 61 , 387 P,3d 536 (affirming the district court’s bad-faith finding where, when they initiated the lawsuit, the appellants “could not have had an honest belief’ that they had a legal basis for pursuing litigation (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Jau-Fei Chen v. Stewart
green
2 sentences2017Trust’s claim of title” rather than leaving the claims to be resolved in a subsequent proceeding. ¶14 The Brands’ contentions — that the district court’s dismissal of the Trust’s claims against them should have been with prejudice, as opposed to without, and that the district court should have rendered judgment on the merits of those claims — are the types of assertions the Brands plainly have standing to assert on appeal, demonstrating both aggrievement by the district court’s judgment for purposes of appellate standing, see Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 50 , 123 P.3d 416 , as well as the tr 2017Trust’s claim of title” rather than leaving the claims to be resolved in a subsequent proceeding. ¶14 The Brands’ contentions — that the district court’s dismissal of the Trust’s claims against them should have been with prejudice, as opposed to without, and that the district court should have rendered judgment on the merits of those claims — are the types of assertions the Brands plainly have standing to assert on appeal, demonstrating both aggrievement by the district court’s judgment for purposes of appellate standing, see Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 50 , 123 P.3d 416 , as well as the tr | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Johnson v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2014But "[the concept of subject matter jurisdiction does not embrace all cases where the court's competence is at issue." Johnson, 2010 UT 28, 19 , 234 P.3d 1100 ; see also In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶31 , 266 P.3d 702 ("[Tlhe concept of subject matter jurisdiction [is limited] to those cases in which the court lacks authority to hear a class of cases, rather than when it simply lacks the authority to grant relief in an individual case."). 2014But "[the concept of subject matter jurisdiction does not embrace all cases where the court's competence is at issue." Johnson, 2010 UT 28, 19 , 234 P.3d 1100 ; see also In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶31 , 266 P.3d 702 ("[Tlhe concept of subject matter jurisdiction [is limited] to those cases in which the court lacks authority to hear a class of cases, rather than when it simply lacks the authority to grant relief in an individual case."). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Salt Lake County v. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Development Corp.
green
2 sentences2013Corp., 2013 UT App 30, ¶ 28 , 297 P.3d 38 ; see also Republic Outdoor Adver., LC v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2011 UT App 198 , ¶ 32, 258 P.3d 619 (declining to consider a challenge to an alternative basis for the court's grant of summary judgment where appellant failed to adequately challenge an independent basis for the court's ruling). 2013Corp., 2013 UT App 30, ¶ 28 , 297 P.3d 38 ; see also Republic Outdoor Adver., LC v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2011 UT App 198 , ¶ 32, 258 P.3d 619 (declining to consider a challenge to an alternative basis for the court's grant of summary judgment where appellant failed to adequately challenge an independent basis for the court's ruling). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg
green
1 sentence2013EVID. 504(c) (emphasis added). 9 UTAH CODE § 75-7-704(5). 22 Cite as: 2013 UT 15 CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT: concurring in part, dissenting in part disclosure must belong to the person presently acting as trustee, because that person has the duty to conduct all pending trust business.”10 Before modification, the special fiduciary, like the trustee in Moeller, was the person who had “the duty to conduct all pending trust business.” Because access to attorney-client communications and the privilege to prevent their disclosure are vital to conducting trust business and managing the trust’s legal affai | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., Inc.
green
1 sentence2006In Difty v. CheckRite, Ltd., 973 F.Supp. 1320 (D.Utah 1997), a federal district court determined that under Utah law the corporate veil piercing doctrine equally applies to Utah liability companies. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Barrett
green
2 sentences2006We disagree that section 502 prohibited the Writ in this ease. ¶24 “When interpreting statutes, this court first looks to the [statute’s] plain language.” State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,¶ 29 , 127 P.3d 682 . 2006We disagree that section 502 prohibited the Writ in this ease. ¶24 “When interpreting statutes, this court first looks to the [statute’s] plain language.” State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,¶ 29 , 127 P.3d 682 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.