trust violation in California

1941The position of the agent is that of a trustee, and claims against him are governed by a rule similar to that controlling trustees. ’ ’ In the case of San Pedro Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 121 Cal. 74 [ 53 Pac. 410 ], the court said, at page 91: “The statute of limitations cannot be successfully invoked.

1941The position of the agent is that of a trustee, and claims against him are governed by a rule similar to that controlling trustees. ’ ’ In the case of San Pedro Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 121 Cal. 74 [ 53 Pac. 410 ], the court said, at page 91: “The statute of limitations cannot be successfully invoked.

2025Specifically, the Trustees sought an order “confirming that Bill’s interest in” specified assets “titled in Bill’s individual name[ ] are assets of the Trust.” 4 Among these assets was Bill’s “100% membership interest in WDL Enterprises LLC, a Montana limited liability company.”3 In a supplement to their petition, the Trustees indicated WDL “was a single member LLC (a disregarded entity for tax purposes), and the accountant ha[d] confirmed that all income and deductions relating to the LLC were reported on [Bill’s] individual tax returns.” The Trustees argued “[t]he [s]ubject [a]ssets [a]re [a

2025In the dissolution context where ATRO’s have been violated, court orders (1) requiring the violating party to pay restitution (see, e.g., In re Marriage of McTiernan & Dubrow (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1103 ) and (2) voiding a property conveyance to a trust in violation of the ATRO’s (see, e.g., Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311, 317, 330 ) have been affirmed.

2025(See, e.g., Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010 .) Section 850, subdivision (a)(3)(B) does not define a “claim.” The Trustees do not argue subdivision (a)(3)(B) requires any specific type of claim, but they contend the ruling on their Heggstad petition conclusively establishes the Trust has no claim to WDL or the Bentley.

2024(California Forestry Assn. v. California Fish & Game Commission (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1544 .) “We seek to determine the Legislature’s intent and ‘ “first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.” [Citation.] We do not consider statutory language in isolation; instead, we examine the entire statute to construe the words in context. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” [Citation.] “If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable

2023(See Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 39 ; Hanson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 604 ; Birschtein, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 999 .) Having determined that a triable issue of fact exists as to causation, we conclude the superior court erred in granting the Trust’s motion for summary judgment.

2023(See Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 39 ; Hanson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 604 ; Birschtein, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 999 .) Having determined that a triable issue of fact exists as to causation, we conclude the superior court erred in granting the Trust’s motion for summary judgment.

2023(See Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 39 ; Hanson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 604 ; Birschtein, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 999 .) Having determined that a triable issue of fact exists as to causation, we conclude the superior court erred in granting the Trust’s motion for summary judgment.

2023(See Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 39 ; Hanson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 604 ; Birschtein, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 999 .) Having determined that a triable issue of fact exists as to causation, we conclude the superior court erred in granting the Trust’s motion for summary judgment.

2023However, because a property owner’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of the property’s dangerous condition is an additional element of premises liability (see Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206 ), we also address the Trust’s claim that it is undisputed that “No one has ever reported or complained of the subject driveway being dangerous.” In support of this 10 assertion, the Trust relies on Chasan’s declaration wherein he states: “To the best of my knowledge, prior to this lawsuit, no one has ever complained of or reported the driveway at [the Property] being dangerous.” However, Peterson

2023However, because a property owner’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of the property’s dangerous condition is an additional element of premises liability (see Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206 ), we also address the Trust’s claim that it is undisputed that “No one has ever reported or complained of the subject driveway being dangerous.” In support of this 10 assertion, the Trust relies on Chasan’s declaration wherein he states: “To the best of my knowledge, prior to this lawsuit, no one has ever complained of or reported the driveway at [the Property] being dangerous.” However, Peterson

2023(See Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 39 ; Hanson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 604 ; Birschtein, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 999 .) Having determined that a triable issue of fact exists as to causation, we conclude the superior court erred in granting the Trust’s motion for summary judgment.

2021(Horning v. Shilberg (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 197, 208 [ruling on motion to reopen the evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1035 , 1052–1053.) It is well-established that such a motion may be properly denied when the decision to not present the evidence was the product of trial tactics.

2020(Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632 .) DISCUSSION I At the outset, we consider Ribeiro and the Trust’s claim that the trial court erred in finding they waived their argument that liability should have been limited to RDI alone.

2016We deem any such challenge waived. ( Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.) III.

2015N.A., supra, 941 F.Supp.2d at pp. 766–767, italics added.) The Glaski, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th 1079 court, in contrast, cited only two cases in support of its determination that acts by a trustee in contravention of a trust were void.

2015N.A., supra, 941 F.Supp.2d at pp. 766–767, italics added.) The Glaski, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th 1079 court, in contrast, cited only two cases in support of its determination that acts by a trustee in contravention of a trust were void.

2015(Boone, supra, 206 Cal. at p. 193 .) Indeed, the National Audubon court described Boone as “[ajpplying the principles of Illinois Central” to uphold the statute in that case “on the ground that the [oil] derricks would not substantially interfere with the trust.” (National Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 439.) Thus, our conclusion that a private use of public trust property triggers affirmative obligations under the trust doctrine is consistent with both National Audubon and Boone .

2014Section 16200 provides: “A trustee has the following powers without the need to obtain court authorization: [¶] (a) The powers conferred by the trust instrument. [¶] (b) Except as limited in the trust instrument, the powers conferred by statute. [¶] (c) Except as limited in the trust instrument, the power to perform any act that a trustee would perform for the purposes of the trust under the standard of care provided in Section 16040 or 16047.” (Italics added.) 3 this division [i.e., the ‘Trust Law,’ Division 9 of the Probate Code (see § 15000)].” (Italics added.) Accordingly, “[a] trustee is

2013(Fazzi v. Klein (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285 .) Whether there is a contest within the meaning of a specific no contest clause depends upon the factual circumstances of the case and the language of the trust clause.

2008Despite finding provisions of the will were incorporated into the decree of distribution at issue in that case, the Court of Appeal in Estate of Cooper, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d 70 , 78 Cal.Rptr. 740 , recognized that "the better, and certainly the more customary, practice is to have the order of distribution recite in haec verba those provisions of the will deemed pertinent by the probate court or to incorporate provisions into the order by more specific reference." ( Id. at p. 77, 78 Cal.Rptr. 740 .) In the instant advised by Estate of Cooper, all of the distribution orders do "recite in haec v

2008Despite finding provisions of the will were incorporated into the decree of distribution at issue in that case, the Court of Appeal in Estate of Cooper, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d 70 , 78 Cal.Rptr. 740 , recognized that "the better, and certainly the more customary, practice is to have the order of distribution recite in haec verba those provisions of the will deemed pertinent by the probate court or to incorporate provisions into the order by more specific reference." ( Id. at p. 77, 78 Cal.Rptr. 740 .) In the instant advised by Estate of Cooper, all of the distribution orders do "recite in haec v

2004As for the rules of the general church, we have already pointed out that paragraph 2537 of the Book of Discipline required an incorporated local church’s real property to be “held by and/or conveyed to the corporate body in its corporate name, in trust for the use and benefit of such local church and of The United Methodist Church” and that “[e]very instrument of conveyance of real estate shall contain the appropriate trust clause as set forth in the Discipline (§ 2503).” As for “relevant state statutes, if any, governing possession and disposition of such property” (Barker, supra, 115 Cal.App

2002Under such circumstances we can see no good reason for holding that the attorneys for the trustee should not be compensated for the entire service.” (Id. at p. 555.) In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the court expressly distinguished an earlier decision by the New York Court of Appeals, Bailey v. Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co. (1915) 214 N.Y. 689 [ 108 N.E. 561 ], in which attorney fees associated with a trust challenge were denied.

2002Under such circumstances we can see no good reason for holding that the attorneys for the trustee should not be compensated for the entire service.” (Id. at p. 555.) In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the court expressly distinguished an earlier decision by the New York Court of Appeals, Bailey v. Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co. (1915) 214 N.Y. 689 [ 108 N.E. 561 ], in which attorney fees associated with a trust challenge were denied.