49 New York opinions name it 7 courts 1873–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rosanogreen2 sentences2013The trial court instructed the jury, in accordance with Lien Law § 79-a (3), that “[fjailure of the trustee to keep books and records required by this section shall be presumptive evidence that the trustee has applied . . . trust funds . . . for purposes other than a purpose of the trust.” Like all statutory presumptions in New York, the presumption in Lien Law § 79-a (3) is permissive (see People v Rosano, 50 NY2d 1013, 1016 [1980]; see also Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d 92, 95 [2002]; People v McKenzie, 67 NY2d at 696 ). 2010The plaintiff established, prima facie, that the defendant UnBuildIt, Inc. (hereinafter UnBuildIt), improperly diverted trust assets, in that it paid, transferred, or applied trust assets for nontrust purposes before paying the trust claim (see Lien Law § 72 [1]; see also Lien Law § 75 [4]; People v Rosano, 50 NY2d 1013, 1016 [1980]). | 3 | 3 |
Dickinson v. . the Mayor, Etc., of City of N.Y.green2 sentences2016Accordingly, the Trust's claim, subject to the six-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract actions, accrued on March 28, 2006, when the MLPA was executed. ( Id. at 599.) The Court further held that defendant's refusal to cure or repurchase, following notice of breaches and the passage of the 60 and 90 day cure and repurchase periods, did not constitute a substantive condition precedent. ( Id. at 597.) Citing Dickinson v Mayor of City of New York (92 NY 584, 591 [1883]), the Court contrasted the situation where a demand is an element of a party's cause of action, in which event the d 2016(Id. at 597.) Citing Dickinson v Mayor of City of N.Y. ( 92 NY 584, 591 [1883]), the Court contrasted the situation where a demand is an element of a party’s cause of action, in which event the demand “delay [s] accrual of the cause of action,” with the situation “where a legal wrong has occurred and the only impediment to recovery is the defendant’s discovery of the wrong and notice to the defendant, [in which event] the claim accrues immediately.” (ACE III, 25 NY3d at 597 .) The Court expressly held that “DBSP’s failure to cure or repurchase was not a substantive condition precedent that def | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Raquel M.green2 sentences2013The trial court instructed the jury, in accordance with Lien Law § 79-a (3), that “[fjailure of the trustee to keep books and records required by this section shall be presumptive evidence that the trustee has applied . . . trust funds . . . for purposes other than a purpose of the trust.” Like all statutory presumptions in New York, the presumption in Lien Law § 79-a (3) is permissive (see People v Rosano, 50 NY2d 1013, 1016 [1980]; see also Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d 92, 95 [2002]; People v McKenzie, 67 NY2d at 696 ). 2013The trial court instructed the jury, in accordance with Lien Law § 79-a (3), that “[fjailure of the trustee to keep books and records required by this section shall be presumptive evidence that the trustee has applied . . . trust funds . . . for purposes other than a purpose of the trust.” Like all statutory presumptions in New York, the presumption in Lien Law § 79-a (3) is permissive (see People v Rosano, 50 NY2d 1013, 1016 [1980]; see also Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d 92, 95 [2002]; People v McKenzie, 67 NY2d at 696 ). | 2 | 2 |
Bette & Cring, LLC v. Brandle Meadows, LLCgreen2 sentences2012Moreover, Lien Law § 79 explicitly states that “[n]othing in this article shall prevent the enforcement of any lien as provided in articles [2] and [3] of this chapter” and that “[f]or the purposes of determining the share of any trust beneficiary upon any distribution in an action to enforce the trust, the trust claim of a trust beneficiary shall not be reduced by reason of any lien to which he [or she] is entitled or by reason of any rights under any bond to which he [or she] is entitled by reason of his [or her] lien.” Thus, we have previously held in a case involving, among other things, t 2012Moreover, Lien Law § 79 explicitly states that “[n]othing in this article shall prevent the enforcement of any lien as provided in articles [2] and [3] of this chapter” and that “[f]or the purposes of determining the share of any trust beneficiary upon any distribution in an action to enforce the trust, the trust claim of a trust beneficiary shall not be reduced by reason of any lien to which he [or she] is entitled or by reason of any rights under any bond to which he [or she] is entitled by reason of his [or her] lien.” Thus, we have previously held in a case involving, among other things, t | 2 | 2 |
ACE Securities Corp. v. DB Structured Products, Inc.green2 sentences2018Moreover, [the sponsor's] failure to cure or repurchase was not a substantive condition precedent that deferred accrual of the Trust's claim; instead, it was a procedural prerequisite to suit." [FN9] ( Id. , at 598-599.) 2. 2018Moreover, [the sponsor's] failure to cure or repurchase was not a substantive condition precedent that deferred accrual of the Trust's claim; instead, it was a procedural prerequisite to suit." [FN9] ( Id. , at 598-599.) 2. | 1 | 3 |
Village of Kiryas Joel v. County of Orangegreen2 sentences2025The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty are "(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant's misconduct" ( Village of Kiryas Joel v County of Orange , 144 AD3d 895, 898 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Varveris v Zacharakos , 110 AD3d 1059, 1059 [2013]). 2025The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty are "(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant's misconduct" ( Village of Kiryas Joel v County of Orange , 144 AD3d 895, 898 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Varveris v Zacharakos , 110 AD3d 1059, 1059 [2013]). | 1 | 1 |
Varveris v. Zacharakosgreen2 sentences2025The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty are "(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant's misconduct" ( Village of Kiryas Joel v County of Orange , 144 AD3d 895, 898 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Varveris v Zacharakos , 110 AD3d 1059, 1059 [2013]). 2025The elements of a breach of fiduciary duty are "(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant's misconduct" ( Village of Kiryas Joel v County of Orange , 144 AD3d 895, 898 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Varveris v Zacharakos , 110 AD3d 1059, 1059 [2013]). | 1 | 1 |
Panday v. Allengreen1 sentence2023"Easements by express grant are construed to give effect to the parties' intent, as manifested by the language of the grant" ( Dowd v Ahr , 78 NY2d 469, 473 ; see Panday v Allen , 187 AD3d 775 ). | 1 | 1 |
Kaminsky v. FSP Inc.green2 sentences2019We conclude that the Trust defendants' fiduciary duty, if it existed at all, arose from the terms of the contract by which plaintiffs became members of the Trust (Trust Agreement), and was not "independent of" or [*2]" extraneous to' " the contract ( LaBarte v Seneca Resources Corp. , 285 AD2d 974, 976 [4th Dept 2001]; see Kaminsky v FSP Inc. , 5 AD3d 251, 252 [1st Dept 2004]). 2019We conclude that the Trust defendants' fiduciary duty, if it existed at all, arose from the terms of the contract by which plaintiffs became members of the Trust (Trust Agreement), and was not "independent of" or [*2]" extraneous to' " the contract ( LaBarte v Seneca Resources Corp. , 285 AD2d 974, 976 [4th Dept 2001]; see Kaminsky v FSP Inc. , 5 AD3d 251, 252 [1st Dept 2004]). | 1 | 1 |
EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.green1 sentence2019There are no allegations, "apart from the terms of the contract . . . [that would have] created a relationship of higher trust than would arise from the [contract] alone" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 20 [2005]). | 1 | 1 |
LaBarte v. Seneca Resources Corp.green2 sentences2019We conclude that the Trust defendants' fiduciary duty, if it existed at all, arose from the terms of the contract by which plaintiffs became members of the Trust (Trust Agreement), and was not "independent of" or [*2]" extraneous to' " the contract ( LaBarte v Seneca Resources Corp. , 285 AD2d 974, 976 [4th Dept 2001]; see Kaminsky v FSP Inc. , 5 AD3d 251, 252 [1st Dept 2004]). 2019We conclude that the Trust defendants' fiduciary duty, if it existed at all, arose from the terms of the contract by which plaintiffs became members of the Trust (Trust Agreement), and was not "independent of" or [*2]" extraneous to' " the contract ( LaBarte v Seneca Resources Corp. , 285 AD2d 974, 976 [4th Dept 2001]; see Kaminsky v FSP Inc. , 5 AD3d 251, 252 [1st Dept 2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Cortez v. Northeast Realty Holdings, LLCgreen1 sentence2011Here, the Trust defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they did not own, occupy, control, or have special use of the premises where the accident occurred (see Cortez v Northeast Realty Holdings, LLC, 78 AD3d 754, 757 [2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Rykowski v. Automatic Data Press Mid-Atlantic, Inc.green1 sentence2010The plaintiff also established, prima facie, that the defendant Charles Fraser, who owned and controlled UnBuildIt, participated in that breach of trust (see Lien Law § 77 [3] [a] [i]; South Carolina Steel Corp. v Miller, 170 AD2d 592, 594-595 [1991]; cf. Medco Plumbing, Inc. v Sparrow Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospitalgreen1 sentence2010In moving for summary judgment on its cause of action to enforce a trust pursuant to Lien Law article 3-A, the plaintiff, the subrogee of the sole trust beneficiary’s trust claim (see Lien Law § 77 [1]), demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Wembly Management Co., Inc. v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hinesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Durandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Suarez v. de Montignygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Van Alen v. . American National Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lurie v. Lurie
neutral
2 sentences2024The factual and procedural history of this action is set forth in this Court's decision and order on a prior appeal ( see Lurie v Lurie , 200 AD3d 669 ) and in our decision and order on a related appeal ( see Lurie v Lurie , _____ AD3d _____ [Appellate Division Docket No. 2021-04524; decided herewith]). 2024The defendants moved for summary judgment on their counterclaims for declaratory relief and an accounting, which motion was denied by the Supreme Court in an order dated February 4, 2021, and affirmed by this Court on a prior appeal ( see Lurie v Lurie , 200 AD3d 669 ). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
NY Professional Drywall of OC, Inc. v. Rivergate Development, LLC
green
2 sentences2013However, contrary to the appellants’ contention, the discharge of a mechanic’s lien by the filing of a bond is not equivalent to payment or discharge of a trust claim pursuant to Lien Law article 3-A (see NY Professional Drywall of OC, Inc. v Rivergate Dev., LLC, 100 AD3d 216 , 220 [2012]). 2013However, contrary to the appellants’ contention, the discharge of a mechanic’s lien by the filing of a bond is not equivalent to payment or discharge of a trust claim pursuant to Lien Law article 3-A (see NY Professional Drywall of OC, Inc. v Rivergate Dev., LLC, 100 AD3d 216 , 220 [2012]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Miller
green
2 sentences2013Pursuant to Lien Law article 3-A, a contractor who receives funds under a contract for the improvement of real property must hold the funds as a trustee, and if the contractor applies trust funds for any purpose other than the purposes of the trust and fails to pay a trust claim within 31 days of the time it is due, he or she may be guilty of larceny {see Lien Law §§ 70, 71, 79-a [1] [b]; People v Miller, 23 AD3d at 700 ). 2013Pursuant to Lien Law article 3-A, a contractor who receives funds under a contract for the improvement of real property must hold the funds as a trustee, and if the contractor applies trust funds for any purpose other than the purposes of the trust and fails to pay a trust claim within 31 days of the time it is due, he or she may be guilty of larceny {see Lien Law §§ 70, 71, 79-a [1] [b]; People v Miller, 23 AD3d at 700 ). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. McKenzie
green
2 sentences2013The trial court instructed the jury, in accordance with Lien Law § 79-a (3), that “[fjailure of the trustee to keep books and records required by this section shall be presumptive evidence that the trustee has applied . . . trust funds . . . for purposes other than a purpose of the trust.” Like all statutory presumptions in New York, the presumption in Lien Law § 79-a (3) is permissive (see People v Rosano, 50 NY2d 1013, 1016 [1980]; see also Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d 92, 95 [2002]; People v McKenzie, 67 NY2d at 696 ). 2013The trial court instructed the jury, in accordance with Lien Law § 79-a (3), that “[fjailure of the trustee to keep books and records required by this section shall be presumptive evidence that the trustee has applied . . . trust funds . . . for purposes other than a purpose of the trust.” Like all statutory presumptions in New York, the presumption in Lien Law § 79-a (3) is permissive (see People v Rosano, 50 NY2d 1013, 1016 [1980]; see also Matter of Raquel M., 99 NY2d 92, 95 [2002]; People v McKenzie, 67 NY2d at 696 ). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Kalish v. . Kalish
green
2 sentences1975The objectant urges the court to apply the constructional device of excision in order to carry out as far as possible the intent of the testator. "[W]hen it is possible to cut out the invalid provisions, so as to leave intact the parts that are valid, and to preserve the general plan of the testator, such construction will be adopted as will prevent intestacy, either partial or total, as the case may be.” (Kalish v Kalish, 166 NY 368, 375 ; see, also, Matter of Durand, 250 NY 45, 53 .) The objectant says that this trust is in violation of the two-life rule, but urges that it be saved by excisi 1975Relying on Kalish v Kalish (supra), and Matter of Holmes ( 26 AD2d 151 ), objectant asks the court to construe the trust as having terminated upon the death of Anna Abrams or, in the alternative, upon the death of Gertrude Guthman who was alive at the testa tor’s death but was the next lineal descendant of Sarah to die after George Toeplitz died. | 2 | 1917–1975 |
Van Kleeck v. Dutch Church
neutral
2 sentences1873(Van Kleeck, v. The Dutch Church, 20 Wend., 457 ; S. C,, 6 Paige, 612 .) In the case cited the devise was void by reason of the incapacity of the devisee to take, but the principle of it applies equally where the devise is inoperative by reason of its being in violation of some rule of law. 1873But though the trust clause be void by reason of its creating an unlawful perpetuity, and cannot therefore operate as a devise, it must nevertheless be retained and considered for the purpose of ascertaining the intentions of the testator; and for this purpose it is as effectual, and its operation upon other clauses of the will is the same, as though no legal obstacle existed to its being carried into execution. ( Van Kleeck v. The Dutch Church, 20 Wend., 457 ; S.C., 6 Paige, 612 .) In the case cited the devise was void by reason of the incapacity of the devisee to take, but the principle of i | 2 | 1873–1873 |
Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v. Filardo
green
1 sentence2024The requests were overbroad and burdensome, failed to specify with reasonable particularity many of the documents requested ( see Matter of Terry D. , 81 NY2d 1042, 1044 ; Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v Filardo , 216 AD3d 839, 840 ), and were not material and necessary to the central issue of Neil Lurie's claim to ownership of LMC, which he based exclusively on the 1998 stock certificate. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Zwarycz v. Marnia Construction, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024As to the defendants' respective counterclaims for declaratory relief, the plaintiffs failed to establish as a matter of law that Neil Lurie directly and definitively repudiated the alleged ownership interests of the Trust defendants in LMC six or even three years before the defendants interposed their respective counterclaims ( see Mehdizadeh v Mehbisar, Inc. , 173 AD3d 851 , 852; Zwarycz v Marnia Constr., Inc. , 102 AD3d 774 , 776). 2024As to the defendants' respective counterclaims for declaratory relief, the plaintiffs failed to establish as a matter of law that Neil Lurie directly and definitively repudiated the alleged ownership interests of the Trust defendants in LMC six or even three years before the defendants interposed their respective counterclaims ( see Mehdizadeh v Mehbisar, Inc. , 173 AD3d 851 , 852; Zwarycz v Marnia Constr., Inc. , 102 AD3d 774 , 776). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Westhampton Beach Associates, LLC v. Incorporated Village of Westhampton Beach
green
1 sentence2024Machon Chana v Machon Chana Women's Inst., Inc. , 162 AD3d 635 , 637 [internal quotation marks omitted]) in LMC at that time ( see CPLR 3001; Westhampton Beach Assoc., LLC v Incorporated Vil. of Westhampton Beach , 151 AD3d 793, 796 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re Terry D.
green
1 sentence2024The requests were overbroad and burdensome, failed to specify with reasonable particularity many of the documents requested ( see Matter of Terry D. , 81 NY2d 1042, 1044 ; Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v Filardo , 216 AD3d 839, 840 ), and were not material and necessary to the central issue of Neil Lurie's claim to ownership of LMC, which he based exclusively on the 1998 stock certificate. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lewis v. Young
green
1 sentence2023"As a rule, where the intention in granting an easement is to afford only a right of ingress and egress, it is the right of passage, and not any right in a physical passageway itself, that is granted to the easement holder" ( Lewis v Young , 92 NY2d 443, 449 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Dowd v. Ahr
green
1 sentence2023"Easements by express grant are construed to give effect to the parties' intent, as manifested by the language of the grant" ( Dowd v Ahr , 78 NY2d 469, 473 ; see Panday v Allen , 187 AD3d 775 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hsu v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2019Here, the evidence submitted by Tim's Diagnostic's and Barrett in support of their cross motion failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether Barrett had displaced the Trust defendants' duty to the plaintiff regarding maintenance of the sidewalk ( see Hsu v City of New York , 145 AD3d at 760 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In re the Foreclosure of Tax Liens by Proceeding in Rem Pursuant to Article 11 of the Real Property Tax Law
green
1 sentence2017Here, as in Middlebrook ( 59 AD3d at 1065 ), we further conclude that the court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the Trust’s motion. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Hollowell
green
1 sentence2011Because Gerald Daly contracted with defendant after the effective date of the new amendment, he had a valid trust claim against the moneys advanced by him for his home improvement and the misappropriation of the money and the failure to pay the trust claim of Daly may constitute the crime of larceny under Lien Law § 79-a” (People v Hollowell, 168 AD2d at 971 ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Zuckerman v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2011In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Alsy Corp. v. Gindel green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| In re the Estate of Sackler green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Citibank, N. A. v. Kollen neutral | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Frankel v. Schilling green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In re the Trust Made by De Long green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In re the Estate May green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| De Zego v. Bruhn, M. D., P. C. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Leotta v. Plessinger green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| In re the Estate of Holmes green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Arnold green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| In re the Accounting of National Bank neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| In re the Construction of the Will of Fairchild green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Smith v. . City of Rochester green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| In re Osborn neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| In re the Estate of Benton neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| In re the Construction of the Will of Stephan green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| In Re the Accounting of Osborne green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Bankers Trust Co. v. Moy neutral | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| People v. . Doris neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| In re the Estate of Irvin green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Madison Trust Co. v. . Carnegie Trust Co. neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Matter of Cavin v. . Gleason green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| In Re the Accounting of Hicks green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| In re Deitz green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.