adhered rule in Oklahoma

1985Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., Okl., 646 P.2d 593 (1982), the court adhered to this rule: “ ‘In a law action the verdict of the jury is conclusive as to all disputed facts and all conflicting statements, and where there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict of the jury, this court will not disturb the verdict and judgment based thereon.’ [emphasis supplied]” In the present case Woods presented extensive evidence that the only factor that changed on the Taylor # 2 on May 17,1978, was the increase in the differential pressure.

1978The Commission then had authority upon receipt of the mandate to proceed to try the ease anew.” In Yeargin v. Gaar-Wooley Oil Co., Okl., 395 P.2d 564 (1964), this Court adhered to the rule promulgated in Adams, supra. Accord: Darby v. Boehnlein, Okl., 354 P.2d 446 (1960); Dixon Brothers Lumber and Supply Co. v. Watson, Okl., 353 P.2d 478 (1960).

1978The Commission then had authority upon receipt of the mandate to proceed to try the ease anew.” In Yeargin v. Gaar-Wooley Oil Co., Okl., 395 P.2d 564 (1964), this Court adhered to the rule promulgated in Adams, supra. Accord: Darby v. Boehnlein, Okl., 354 P.2d 446 (1960); Dixon Brothers Lumber and Supply Co. v. Watson, Okl., 353 P.2d 478 (1960).

1978The Commission then had authority upon receipt of the mandate to proceed to try the ease anew.” In Yeargin v. Gaar-Wooley Oil Co., Okl., 395 P.2d 564 (1964), this Court adhered to the rule promulgated in Adams, supra. Accord: Darby v. Boehnlein, Okl., 354 P.2d 446 (1960); Dixon Brothers Lumber and Supply Co. v. Watson, Okl., 353 P.2d 478 (1960).

1948In disposing of that question, this court adhered to the rule set forth in Collins v. State, 24 Okla.

1948Cr. 117 , 217 P. 896 , which is the principal ease cited and relied upon by the defendant to the effect that where the court indefinitely postpones the pronouncement of sentence for a long period of time, it loses jurisdiction to pronounce *197 judgment.

1947In Whitney v. Whitney, 194 Okla. 361 , 151 P. 2d 583 , involving an action for damages between the parties, the opinion made use of these words: “under the issues in the first suit, the court could not adjust the property rights,” and “the contract made between the parties during the pendency of the first suit was not construed or approved in our former opinion.” In Mountcastle v. Coppedge, 130 Okla. 293 , 267 P. 258 , this court adhered to the rule that: “Where a mandate is issued by the Supreme Court, it becomes the duty of the court to which the same is directed to comply therewith, interpr

1947In Whitney v. Whitney, 194 Okla. 361 , 151 P. 2d 583 , involving an action for damages between the parties, the opinion made use of these words: “under the issues in the first suit, the court could not adjust the property rights,” and “the contract made between the parties during the pendency of the first suit was not construed or approved in our former opinion.” In Mountcastle v. Coppedge, 130 Okla. 293 , 267 P. 258 , this court adhered to the rule that: “Where a mandate is issued by the Supreme Court, it becomes the duty of the court to which the same is directed to comply therewith, interpr

1947In Whitney v. Whitney, 194 Okla. 361 , 151 P. 2d 583 , involving an action for damages between the parties, the opinion made use of these words: “under the issues in the first suit, the court could not adjust the property rights,” and “the contract made between the parties during the pendency of the first suit was not construed or approved in our former opinion.” In Mountcastle v. Coppedge, 130 Okla. 293 , 267 P. 258 , this court adhered to the rule that: “Where a mandate is issued by the Supreme Court, it becomes the duty of the court to which the same is directed to comply therewith, interpr

1947In Whitney v. Whitney, 194 Okla. 361 , 151 P. 2d 583 , involving an action for damages between the parties, the opinion made use of these words: “under the issues in the first suit, the court could not adjust the property rights,” and “the contract made between the parties during the pendency of the first suit was not construed or approved in our former opinion.” In Mountcastle v. Coppedge, 130 Okla. 293 , 267 P. 258 , this court adhered to the rule that: “Where a mandate is issued by the Supreme Court, it becomes the duty of the court to which the same is directed to comply therewith, interpr

1945In Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Carsten, 175 Okla. 592 , 55 P. 2d 757 , this court adhered to the rule that where the evidence is undisputed the question of whether the relationship of the parties is that of independent contractor and contractee, or employer and employee, is one of law.

1945In Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Carsten, 175 Okla. 592 , 55 P. 2d 757 , this court adhered to the rule that where the evidence is undisputed the question of whether the relationship of the parties is that of independent contractor and contractee, or employer and employee, is one of law.

1941In support of their contention that in the absence of specific evidence of pecuniary loss there could be no recovery on behalf of Mary Garrett, defendants cite Catto v. Maxey, 170 Okla. 356 , 40 P. 2d 633 , and other cases holding that in actions for wrongful death the presumption of substantial loss-which is indulged as to the minor children of the deceased does not obtain as to adult children.

1941In support of their contention that in the absence of specific evidence of pecuniary loss there could be no recovery on behalf of Mary Garrett, defendants cite Catto v. Maxey, 170 Okla. 356 , 40 P. 2d 633 , and other cases holding that in actions for wrongful death the presumption of substantial loss-which is indulged as to the minor children of the deceased does not obtain as to adult children.

1935Shull, 149 Okla. 190 , 1 P. (2d) 358 .

1935Shull, 149 Okla. 190 , 1 P. (2d) 358 .

1923In the case of Rogers v. Rogers, 263 Fed. 160 , decided since the decision of Parker v. Richards, the court adhered to the rule announced in the case of Chupco v. Chapman.

1922In the case of Garrison v. Spencer et al., 58 Okla. 442 , 160 Pac. 493 , in the first paragraph of the syllabus, this court held: ‘‘A married man may during his lifetime, give away' his separate property, and such gift will be valid and binding against his widow, where she is not a creditor within the contemplation of the statute against fraudulent conveyances.” In this case the court adhered to the rule announced in Farrell v. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159 , 74 Pac. 96 , where the rule was announced as follows: “A married man during his lifetime may give away his separate property real or personal am

1922In the case of Garrison v. Spencer et al., 58 Okla. 442 , 160 Pac. 493 , in the first paragraph of the syllabus, this court held: ‘‘A married man may during his lifetime, give away' his separate property, and such gift will be valid and binding against his widow, where she is not a creditor within the contemplation of the statute against fraudulent conveyances.” In this case the court adhered to the rule announced in Farrell v. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159 , 74 Pac. 96 , where the rule was announced as follows: “A married man during his lifetime may give away his separate property real or personal am

1922In the case of Garrison v. Spencer et al., 58 Okla. 442 , 160 Pac. 493 , in the first paragraph of the syllabus, this court held: ‘‘A married man may during his lifetime, give away' his separate property, and such gift will be valid and binding against his widow, where she is not a creditor within the contemplation of the statute against fraudulent conveyances.” In this case the court adhered to the rule announced in Farrell v. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159 , 74 Pac. 96 , where the rule was announced as follows: “A married man during his lifetime may give away his separate property real or personal am

1922In the case of Garrison v. Spencer et al., 58 Okla. 442 , 160 Pac. 493 , in the first paragraph of the syllabus, this court held: ‘‘A married man may during his lifetime, give away' his separate property, and such gift will be valid and binding against his widow, where she is not a creditor within the contemplation of the statute against fraudulent conveyances.” In this case the court adhered to the rule announced in Farrell v. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159 , 74 Pac. 96 , where the rule was announced as follows: “A married man during his lifetime may give away his separate property real or personal am

1922In the case of Garrison v. Spencer et al., 58 Okla. 442 , 160 Pac. 493 , in the first paragraph of the syllabus, this court held: ‘‘A married man may during his lifetime, give away' his separate property, and such gift will be valid and binding against his widow, where she is not a creditor within the contemplation of the statute against fraudulent conveyances.” In this case the court adhered to the rule announced in Farrell v. Puthoff, 13 Okla. 159 , 74 Pac. 96 , where the rule was announced as follows: “A married man during his lifetime may give away his separate property real or personal am