adhered principle in Texas

2010(Uranga - 7) and the appellant was found guilty of murder.7 The federal District Court granted habeas- corpus relief because of prosecutorial misconduct, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.8 The Supreme Court, while “not condon[ing] the conduct of the prosecutors in this case,” held that their “failure to disclose [the juror’s] job application, although requiring a post- trial hearing on juror bias, did not deprive respondent of the fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.” 9 The Court adhered to a principle, established in its precedents, that in order to obtain relief, actual (as dist

2010(Uranga - 7) and the appellant was found guilty of murder.7 The federal District Court granted habeas- corpus relief because of prosecutorial misconduct, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.8 The Supreme Court, while “not condon[ing] the conduct of the prosecutors in this case,” held that their “failure to disclose [the juror’s] job application, although requiring a post- trial hearing on juror bias, did not deprive respondent of the fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.” 9 The Court adhered to a principle, established in its precedents, that in order to obtain relief, actual (as dist

1990In Keagan v. State, 618 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), this Court adhered to the rule that if there is an irreconcilable repug-nancy between the purport and tenor clauses in a forgery indictment, this will render the indictment fatally defective.

1990By utilizing the doctrine of idem sonans, we. found no irreconcilable repugnancy in Keagan, 618 S.W.2d at 59 .

1985In Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1982), the court adhered to the principle enunciated in Eggemeyer and concluded that art. 3.63(b) does not order division of what is considered "separate" property under community property law: [W]e hold that the property spouses acquire during marriage, except by gift, devise or descent should be divided upon *221 divorce in Texas in the same manner as community property, irrespective of the domicile of the spouses when they acquire the property.

1985In Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1982), the court adhered to the principle enunciated in Eggem-eyer and concluded that art. 3.63(b) does not order division of what is considered “separate” property under community property law: [W]e hold that the property spouses acquire during marriage, except by gift, devise or descent should be divided upon divorce in Texas in the same manner as community property, irrespective of the domicile of the spouses when they acquire the property.

1927Ed. 372 ].” So, in this very recent ease, the court adhered to its doctrine announced in the Dawson Case (264 U. S, 219, 44 S. Ct. 302 , 68 L.

1927Ed. 372 ].” So, in this very recent ease, the court adhered to its doctrine announced in the Dawson Case (264 U. S, 219, 44 S. Ct. 302 , 68 L.

1916App. 616 , 35 S. W. 738 , this court adhered to this doctrine; Lightfoot, C.