follows test in Pennsylvania

1995This follows the test applied by Mr. Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431 , 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972), where the improper admission of a co-defendant’s confession was held harmless because the evidence supporting the prosecution’s theory was “overwhelming” and “not contradicted by any other evidence in the case.” In Commonwealth v. Henderson, 456 Pa. 234 , 317 A.2d 288 (1974), this Court, per Mr. Justice Eagen (now Chief Justice), held an error not harmless under the overwhelming evidence test because there was evidence in the case which c

1995This follows the test applied by Mr. Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431 , 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972), where the improper admission of a co-defendant’s confession was held harmless because the evidence supporting the prosecution’s theory was “overwhelming” and “not contradicted by any other evidence in the case.” In Commonwealth v. Henderson, 456 Pa. 234 , 317 A.2d 288 (1974), this Court, per Mr. Justice Eagen (now Chief Justice), held an error not harmless under the overwhelming evidence test because there was evidence in the case which c

1995In that case, we distinguished Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253 , 277 A.2d 325 , cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 , 92 S.Ct. 1320 , 31 L.Ed.2d 589 (1972) (holding an error harmless), because in Camm “there was no evidence that could have supported acquittal.” 443 Pa. at 268-69 , 277 A.2d at 333 , quoted at 456 Pa. at 242 , 317 A.2d at 293 .

1995In that case, we distinguished Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253 , 277 A.2d 325 , cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 , 92 S.Ct. 1320 , 31 L.Ed.2d 589 (1972) (holding an error harmless), because in Camm “there was no evidence that could have supported acquittal.” 443 Pa. at 268-69 , 277 A.2d at 333 , quoted at 456 Pa. at 242 , 317 A.2d at 293 .

1995This follows the test applied by Mr. Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431 , 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972), where the improper admission of a co-defendant’s confession was held harmless because the evidence supporting the prosecution’s theory was “overwhelming” and “not contradicted by any other evidence in the case.” In Commonwealth v. Henderson, 456 Pa. 234 , 317 A.2d 288 (1974), this Court, per Mr. Justice Eagen (now Chief Justice), held an error not harmless under the overwhelming evidence test because there was evidence in the case which c

1995This follows the test applied by Mr. Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431 , 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972), where the improper admission of a co-defendant’s confession was held harmless because the evidence supporting the prosecution’s theory was “overwhelming” and “not contradicted by any other evidence in the case.” In Commonwealth v. Henderson, 456 Pa. 234 , 317 A.2d 288 (1974), this Court, per Mr. Justice Eagen (now Chief Justice), held an error not harmless under the overwhelming evidence test because there was evidence in the case which c

1995In that case, we distinguished Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253 , 277 A.2d 325 , cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 , 92 S.Ct. 1320 , 31 L.Ed.2d 589 (1972) (holding an error harmless), because in Camm "there was no evidence that could have supported acquittal." 443 Pa. at 268-69 , 277 A.2d at 333 , quoted at 456 Pa. at 242 , 317 A.2d at 293 .

1995In that case, we distinguished Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253 , 277 A.2d 325 , cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 , 92 S.Ct. 1320 , 31 L.Ed.2d 589 (1972) (holding an error harmless), because in Camm “there was no evidence that could have supported acquittal.” 443 Pa. at 268-69 , 277 A.2d at 333 , quoted at 456 Pa. at 242 , 317 A.2d at 293 .

1995In that case, we distinguished Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253 , 277 A.2d 325 , cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 , 92 S.Ct. 1320 , 31 L.Ed.2d 589 (1972) (holding an error harmless), because in Camm "there was no evidence that could have supported acquittal." 443 Pa. at 268-69 , 277 A.2d at 333 , quoted at 456 Pa. at 242 , 317 A.2d at 293 .

1995In that case, we distinguished Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253 , 277 A.2d 325 , cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 , 92 S.Ct. 1320 , 31 L.Ed.2d 589 (1972) (holding an error harmless), because in Camm “there was no evidence that could have supported acquittal.” 443 Pa. at 268-69 , 277 A.2d at 333 , quoted at 456 Pa. at 242 , 317 A.2d at 293 .

2007In Kincel v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 867 A.2d 758 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005), this Court held that a State trooper could not sue the Department of Transportation for tort damages because he had collected workers' compensation for his injuries from his employer, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. .

2007In Kincel v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 867 A.2d 758 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005), this Court held that a State trooper could not sue the Department of Transportation for tort damages because he had collected workers' compensation for his injuries from his employer, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. [12] Section 204(c) of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, Act of October 15, 1980, P.L. 950, 71 P.S. § 732-204(c), provides in relevant part: The Attorney General shall represent the Commonwealth and all Commonwealth agencies in any action brought by or against the Commonwealth or its agencies. [

1997This court also follows the rule that in order to properly certify a juvenile as an adult the “ ‘statement should be sufficient to demonstrate that ... the question [of certification] has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.’ ” Commonwealth v. Broome, 317 Pa.Super. 1, 3 , 463 A.2d 1053, 1053 (1983) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966).

1997This court also follows the rule that in order to properly certify a juvenile as an adult the “ ‘statement should be sufficient to demonstrate that ... the question [of certification] has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.’ ” Commonwealth v. Broome, 317 Pa.Super. 1, 3 , 463 A.2d 1053, 1053 (1983) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966).

1957This follows the principle enunciated in Hoch’s Estate, 154 Pa. 417 , as follows: “The Intestate Laws must control questions of distribution arising upon the settlement of estates of testators as well as intestates, unless the testator has clearly provided a different mode in his will.” In his supplemental adjudication, the learned auditing judge questions the authority of these cases as well as of Simpson’s Estate, supra, and Bowen’s Estate, supra, in all of which the principle has been followed.

1955This follows from the principle that where several persons make an enforcible promise without showing a different intention the presumption is that the engagement is joint: Morrison v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 224 Pa. 41 ; Mintz v. Tri-County Natural Gas Co., 259 Pa. 477 ; Yadusky et al. v. Shugars et al., 301 Pa. 99 ; Baldwin v. Ely, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 110 ; 1 A. L.

1955This follows from the principle that where several persons make an enforcible promise without showing a different intention the presumption is that the engagement is joint: Morrison v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 224 Pa. 41 ; Mintz v. Tri-County Natural Gas Co., 259 Pa. 477 ; Yadusky et al. v. Shugars et al., 301 Pa. 99 ; Baldwin v. Ely, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 110 ; 1 A. L.

1955This follows from the principle that where several persons make an enforcible promise without showing a different intention the presumption is that the engagement is joint: Morrison v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 224 Pa. 41 ; Mintz v. Tri-County Natural Gas Co., 259 Pa. 477 ; Yadusky et al. v. Shugars et al., 301 Pa. 99 ; Baldwin v. Ely, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 110 ; 1 A. L.

1955This follows from the principle that where several persons make an enforcible promise without showing a different intention the presumption is that the engagement is joint: Morrison v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 224 Pa. 41 ; Mintz v. Tri-County Natural Gas Co., 259 Pa. 477 ; Yadusky et al. v. Shugars et al., 301 Pa. 99 ; Baldwin v. Ely, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 110 ; 1 A. L.

1949Tronieri Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 435, 437 , 65 A. 2d 426 .

1949Tronieri Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 435, 437 , 65 A. 2d 426 .

1942“It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the iritention of it makers”: Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 ." In the above ease the Church of the Holy Trinity in New York City entered into an agreement with E.