follows rule in Ohio

2022“The plaintiff, in any event, can have but one satisfaction of his claim.” Losito, 136 Ohio St. at 187-188 , 24 N.E.2d 705 .

2022“The plaintiff, in any event, can have but one satisfaction of his claim.” Losito, 136 Ohio St. at 187-188 , 24 N.E.2d 705 .

2021“The plaintiff, in any event, can have but one satisfaction of his claim.” Losito, 136 Ohio St. at 187–188, 16 O.O. 185 , 24 N.E.2d 705 .

2014“The plaintiff, in any event, can have but one satisfaction of his claim.” Losito, 136 Ohio St. at 187-188 , 16 O.O. 185 , 24 N.E.2d 705 .

2026In that instance, “a trial court is not required to make findings with respect to the presumption of incarceration when the court follows the presumption by imposing a prison term.” Id. at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 9 .

2011Where the trial court chooses to allocate the exemption away from the residential parent, or chooses to continue allocating the exemption away from the residential parent, the trial court must “review all pertinent factors, including the parents’ gross incomes, the exemptions and deductions to which the parents are otherwise entitled, and the relevant federal, state, and local income tax rates.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

2002Willett v. Felger (Mar. 29, 1999), Columbiana App. No. 96-CO-40, unreported, 1999 WL 182510 *3; Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 223 , 226 .

1999Id ., citing United States v. Adamo (C.A. 6, 1984), 742 F.2d 927 , 940 .

1995If a court follows this rule strictly it will give effect only to the intention it finds expressed or implied in the instrument before it, thereby avoiding any tendency to redraft a provision in order to give effect to what it conceives to have been the actual intent of the testator, or its view of what the testator would have intended if he had thought of every contingency.” Carr v. Stradley (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 220, 227 , 6 O.O.3d 469, 473 , 371 N.E.2d 540, 545 , where the court approved and followed Townsend’s Exrs. v. Townsend (1874), 25 Ohio St. 477 .

1995If a court follows this rule strictly it will give effect only to the intention it finds expressed or implied in the instrument before it, thereby avoiding any tendency to redraft a provision in order to give effect to what it conceives to have been the actual intent of the testator, or its view of what the testator would have intended if he had thought of every contingency.” Carr v. Stradley (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 220, 227 , 6 O.O.3d 469, 473 , 371 N.E.2d 540, 545 , where the court approved and followed Townsend’s Exrs. v. Townsend (1874), 25 Ohio St. 477 .

1964This follows from the principle that property comes into a guardian’s possession subject to existing liens and preferences, which must be respected by the guardian. 26 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 445, Guardian and Ward, Section 102; Johnson v. Pomeroy (1877), 31 Ohio St. 247 ; Zinn v. Zinn (App. 1934), 17 Ohio Law Abs. 508 .

1963The Seventh District Court of Appeals also held, at page 452 of 88 Ohio Law Abs. that: *521 “The existence of snow and ice on a roadway or the difficulties of driving through a snow storm do not constitute a legal excuse for a violation of a statute which contains a specific requirement. * * *” To support this proposition, the court relies upon King v. Carnahan (1938), 61 Ohio App., 84 , another ice case.

1963This section is a specific requirement, a violation of which is negligence per se. * * *” This follows the rule set down by the Supreme Court in Brandt v. Mansfield Rapid Transit, Inc. (1950), 153 Ohio St., 429 .