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9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 2020–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2025See Johnson, 719 A.2d at 790 . 2023See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778 , 790 (Pa.Super. 1998), appeal denied, 739 A.2d 1056 (Pa. 1999). | 5 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamalgreen1 sentence2023See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 283 A.3d 178 , 188 (Pa. 2022) (“squarely reject[ing]” Taylor’s assertion that a judicial bias claim must be cognizable under state habeas corpus because the claim did not qualify for review under a PCRA timeliness exception); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 737-38 (Pa. 2003) (finding no merit to assertion that, “even if [petitioner’s] claims are time-barred under the PCRA, the PCRA court should have used its inherent power under common law to review his claims under Pennsylvania’s writ of habeas corpus”); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) ( | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fahygreen1 sentence2023See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 283 A.3d 178 , 188 (Pa. 2022) (“squarely reject[ing]” Taylor’s assertion that a judicial bias claim must be cognizable under state habeas corpus because the claim did not qualify for review under a PCRA timeliness exception); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 737-38 (Pa. 2003) (finding no merit to assertion that, “even if [petitioner’s] claims are time-barred under the PCRA, the PCRA court should have used its inherent power under common law to review his claims under Pennsylvania’s writ of habeas corpus”); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) ( | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wallacegreen1 sentence2020Recusal is required under the Federal Due Process Clause — and, by extension, the State Due Process Clause5 — only when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872 . 6 A court considering a judicial bias claim must ask “not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, ‘the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1905 , quoting Caperton, 556 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Eakin
green
1 sentence2021Commonwealth Answer at 13 (citing In re Eakin, 150 A.3d 1042 (Pa. Ct. Jus. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bracy v. Gramley
green
2 sentences2020Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 , 117 S. Ct. 1793 , 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997). 2020Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 , 117 S. Ct. 1793 , 138 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Williams v. Pennsylvania
green
1 sentence2020Recusal is required under the Federal Due Process Clause — and, by extension, the State Due Process Clause5 — only when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872 . 6 A court considering a judicial bias claim must ask “not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, ‘the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1905 , quoting Caperton, 556 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Recusal is required under the Federal Due Process Clause — and, by extension, the State Due Process Clause5 — only when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872 . 6 A court considering a judicial bias claim must ask “not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, ‘the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1905 , quoting Caperton, 556 2020Recusal is required under the Federal Due Process Clause — and, by extension, the State Due Process Clause5 — only when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872 . 6 A court considering a judicial bias claim must ask “not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, ‘the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’” Williams, 136 S.Ct. at 1905 , quoting Caperton, 556 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.