opportunity to address claim in Pennsylvania

2021In support of this argument, Appellant relies upon Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993), wherein our Supreme Court reversed a conviction for forcible rape, where the evidence, in its entirety, was so unreliable and contradictory that the guilty verdict rendered could not have been based upon anything other than conjecture and surmise.7 7The Commonwealth argues that Appellant waived this sufficiency claim because he failed to enumerate which convictions and what elements of the crime he is challenging in his Rule 1925(b) statement, thereby depriving the trial court the opportunity

2004As stated above, appellants seek medical monitoring for children who were injected with one of the potentially hazardous vaccines, but have not yet manifested symptoms of illness or disability. ¶ 13 Initially we note that while a request for medical monitoring is a viable cause of action in Pennsylvania, see Simmons v. Pacor, 543 Pa. 664 , 674 A.2d 232 (1996), 3 we conclude that as qualified claimants under the Act, appellants seeking relief in the form of medical monitoring are doing so as a result of their exposure to the purported poison included in the vaccine, and therefore must comply ma

2004As stated above, appellants seek medical monitoring for children who were injected with one of the potentially hazardous vaccines, but have not yet manifested symptoms of illness or disability. ¶ 13 Initially we note that while a request for medical monitoring is a viable cause of action in Pennsylvania, see Simmons v. Pacor, 543 Pa. 664 , 674 A.2d 232 (1996), 3 we conclude that as qualified claimants under the Act, appellants seeking relief in the form of medical monitoring are doing so as a result of their exposure to the purported poison included in the vaccine, and therefore must comply ma

2004We recently opined: Since deciding Grant , our supreme court has held that notwithstanding the new general rule, an appellate court may “review ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal for which there is an evidentiary record developing the claims and a trial court opinion addressing those claims.” Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1254 n. 6 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003).

2004We recently opined: Since deciding Grant , our supreme court has held that notwithstanding the new general rule, an appellate court may “review ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal for which there is an evidentiary record developing the claims and a trial court opinion addressing those claims.” Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1254 n. 6 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003).

2004We recently opined: Since deciding Grant , our supreme court has held that notwithstanding the new general rule, an appellate court may “review ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal for which there is an evidentiary record developing the claims and a trial court opinion addressing those claims.” Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1254 n. 6 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003).

2004We recently opined: Since deciding Grant , our supreme court has held that notwithstanding the new general rule, an appellate court may “review ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal for which there is an evidentiary record developing the claims and a trial court opinion addressing those claims.” Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1254 n. 6 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003).

2002This Court was presented with the opportunity to address a claim of deprivation of due process based upon a pre-arrest delay of eleven years and two months in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596 (1998).

2002This Court was presented with the opportunity to address a claim of deprivation of due process based upon a pre-arrest delay of eleven years and two months in Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44 , 713 A.2d 596 (1998).

2000Here, appellant initially raised the claims of misconduct in a post-trial motion addressed to the trial court. ¶ 30 Assuming arguendo that appellant’s allegations are true, we have a circumstance where: 1) the court left the bench on numerous occasions; 2) the court enlisted the assistance of a juror in a courtroom maintenance project during testimony; 3) the court made and received numerous phone calls of both a business and personal nature during testimony and closing argument; and 4) the court left the courtroom entirely, without explanation, on two separate occasions. ¶ 31 Appellant’s clai

1993In the recent case Commonwealth v. Enders, 407 Pa.Super. 201 , 595 A.2d 600 (1991), we had an opportunity to address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a case where defendants were convicted of false imprisonment.

1993In the recent case Commonwealth v. Enders, 407 Pa.Super. 201 , 595 A.2d 600 (1991), we had an opportunity to address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a case where defendants were convicted of false imprisonment.