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9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1935–1991 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Farquharsongreen2 sentences1991The significant phrase in our standard of review is “all the evidence and all the reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the [factfinder] could properly have based his verdict.” While a jury is not permitted to return a guilty verdict where the evidence offered is so unreliable or contradictory as to make any verdict based upon it pure conjecture, Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 60 , 354 A.2d 545, 550 (1976); Commonwealth v. Maute, 336 Pa.Super. 394, 406 , 485 A.2d 1138, 1144 (1984), this rule applies only to those cases in which the testimony is so patently unreliabl 1991The significant phrase in our standard of review is “all the evidence and all the reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the [factfinder] could properly have based his verdict.” While a jury is not permitted to return a guilty verdict where the evidence offered is so unreliable or contradictory as to make any verdict based upon it pure conjecture, Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 60 , 354 A.2d 545, 550 (1976); Commonwealth v. Maute, 336 Pa.Super. 394, 406 , 485 A.2d 1138, 1144 (1984), this rule applies only to those cases in which the testimony is so patently unreliabl | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Upshergreen2 sentences1991Commonwealth v. Upsher, 497 Pa. 621, 625 , 444 A.2d 90, 92 (1982). 1991Commonwealth v. Upsher, 497 Pa. 621, 625 , 444 A.2d 90, 92 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mautegreen2 sentences1991The significant phrase in our standard of review is “all the evidence and all the reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the [factfinder] could properly have based his verdict.” While a jury is not permitted to return a guilty verdict where the evidence offered is so unreliable or contradictory as to make any verdict based upon it pure conjecture, Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 60 , 354 A.2d 545, 550 (1976); Commonwealth v. Maute, 336 Pa.Super. 394, 406 , 485 A.2d 1138, 1144 (1984), this rule applies only to those cases in which the testimony is so patently unreliabl 1991The significant phrase in our standard of review is “all the evidence and all the reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the [factfinder] could properly have based his verdict.” While a jury is not permitted to return a guilty verdict where the evidence offered is so unreliable or contradictory as to make any verdict based upon it pure conjecture, Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 60 , 354 A.2d 545, 550 (1976); Commonwealth v. Maute, 336 Pa.Super. 394, 406 , 485 A.2d 1138, 1144 (1984), this rule applies only to those cases in which the testimony is so patently unreliabl | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abel v. Girard Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1956Sapper v. Mathers, 286 Pa. 364, 367 , 133 A. 565 ; Abel v. Girard Trust Company, 365 Pa. 34, 38 , 73 A. 2d 682 . 1956Sapper v. Mathers, 286 Pa. 364, 367 , 133 A. 565 ; Abel v. Girard Trust Company, 365 Pa. 34, 38 , 73 A. 2d 682 . | 2 | 1956–1956 |
Sapper v. Mathers
green
2 sentences1956Sapper v. Mathers, 286 Pa. 364, 367 , 133 A. 565 ; Abel v. Girard Trust Company, 365 Pa. 34, 38 , 73 A. 2d 682 . 1956Sapper v. Mathers, 286 Pa. 364, 367 , 133 A. 565 ; Abel v. Girard Trust Company, 365 Pa. 34, 38 , 73 A. 2d 682 . | 2 | 1956–1956 |
Commonwealth v. Pounds
green
2 sentences1989The question presented by appellant’s exception to the charge is whether Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621 , 417 A.2d 597 (1980) requires that the jury instruction on alibi testimony must include the language “even if not wholly believed.” For the reasons which follow, we hold that prior counsel were not ineffective because the trial court’s refusal to include the phrase in the instruction given in this case was not error. 1989The question presented by appellant’s exception to the charge is whether Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621 , 417 A.2d 597 (1980) requires that the jury instruction on alibi testimony must include the language “even if not wholly believed.” For the reasons which follow, we hold that prior counsel were not ineffective because the trial court’s refusal to include the phrase in the instruction given in this case was not error. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Peters v. EAST PENN TWP. SCH. DIST.
green
2 sentences1981School Dist., 182 Pa.Super. at 118 , 126 A.2d at 803 . 1981School Dist., 182 Pa.Super. at 118 , 126 A.2d at 803 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Williams v. Brice
green
1 sentence1947Were it entirely omitted or were it inverted so as to be the final phrase of the clause, we would probably have a different case, one nearer to Williams v. Brice, supra. But, as the auditing judge has held, this is the dominant phrase, and the disposing clause following it must be read solely in the light of its purpose; there is no express language or clear implication to the contrary. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, Etc., Ry.
green
2 sentences1935Co. v. Gulf, etc., 270 U. S. 266 , 277, 46 S. Ct. 263 , said: “It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations......The provisions now before us were among the additions made by Transportation Act, 1920, and the term 'public interest’ as thus used is not a concept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation to adequacy of transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and to appropriate provision and best use of transportation facilities, questions to which the Interstat 1935Co. v. Gulf, etc., 270 U. S. 266 , 277, 46 S. Ct. 263 , said: “It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations......The provisions now before us were among the additions made by Transportation Act, 1920, and the term 'public interest’ as thus used is not a concept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation to adequacy of transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and to appropriate provision and best use of transportation facilities, questions to which the Interstat | 1 | 1935–1935 |
United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc.
green
2 sentences1935Co. v. Gulf, etc., 270 U. S. 266 , 277, 46 S. Ct. 263 , said: “It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations......The provisions now before us were among the additions made by Transportation Act, 1920, and the term 'public interest’ as thus used is not a concept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation to adequacy of transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and to appropriate provision and best use of transportation facilities, questions to which the Interstat 1935Co. v. Gulf, etc., 270 U. S. 266 , 277, 46 S. Ct. 263 , said: “It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations......The provisions now before us were among the additions made by Transportation Act, 1920, and the term 'public interest’ as thus used is not a concept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation to adequacy of transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and to appropriate provision and best use of transportation facilities, questions to which the Interstat | 1 | 1935–1935 |
New York Central Securities Corporation v. United States
green
2 sentences1935Corp. v. U. S., 287 U. S. 12, 23 , 53 S. Ct. 45 , Chief Justice Hughes was considering the force of the phrase as a standard and, citing Texas & Pacific Ry. 1935Corp. v. U. S., 287 U. S. 12, 23 , 53 S. Ct. 45 , Chief Justice Hughes was considering the force of the phrase as a standard and, citing Texas & Pacific Ry. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.