phrase instruction in California

2026As Justice Baxter explained in the majority opinion in that case: “[T]he sua sponte instructional rule . . . prevents the ‘strategy, ignorance, or mistakes’ of either party from presenting the jury with an ‘unwarranted all-or-nothing choice,’ encourages ‘a verdict . . . no harsher or more lenient than the evidence merits’ [citation] and thus protects the jury’s ‘truth-ascertainment function’ [citation]. 5 “[T]he rule seeks the most accurate possible judgment by ‘ensur[ing] that the jury will consider the full range of possible verdicts’ included in the charge, regardless of the parties’ wishes

2024As Justice Baxter explained in the majority opinion in that case: “[T]he sua sponte instructional rule . . . prevents the ‘strategy, ignorance, or mistakes’ of either party from presenting the jury with an ‘unwarranted all-or-nothing choice,’ encourages ‘a verdict . . . no harsher or more lenient than the evidence merits’ [citation] and thus protects the jury’s ‘truth-ascertainment function’ [citation]. “[T]he rule seeks the most accurate possible judgment by ‘ensur[ing] that the jury will consider the full range of possible verdicts’ included in the charge, regardless of the parties’ wishes o

2021(People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300 [recognizing expert testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is admissible to rehabilitate the complaining witness when the defendant impeaches her credibility]; People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464 , 466 [recognizing that “reasoning of McAlpin is as valid today as it was in 1991 . . . .”) Defendant improperly isolates a single phrase in the instruction rather than considering the instruction as a whole.

2015(People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1300 .) Moreover, defendant is isolating a single phrase of the instruction and ignoring the rest, contrary to how we must view instructions.

2021(People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032 , 1074- 1075 [correctness of jury instructions determined from the entire set of instructions, not just an isolated part of an instruction].) CALCRIM No. 1193 as a whole told jurors that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence was not evidence defendant committed the crimes.

2015(People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1075 [we determine the correctness of jury instructions from the entire set of instructions, not just an isolated part of an instruction].) CALCRIM No. 1193 as a whole told the jurors that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome 6 evidence was not evidence defendant committed the crimes.

2025(See Yassin v. Solis (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 524, 536 .) 50 Although the trial court does not reference it, the trial court appears to be applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis (it is known by its associates), which is the principle that “ ‘ “the meaning of a word may be enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.” ’ ” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1391, fn. 14 .) However, that principle is “applicable to terms that are ‘associated’ by grouping or serial enumeration in the same phrase or clause, not to

2025(See Yassin v. Solis (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 524, 536 .) 50 Although the trial court does not reference it, the trial court appears to be applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis (it is known by its associates), which is the principle that “ ‘ “the meaning of a word may be enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.” ’ ” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1391, fn. 14 .) However, that principle is “applicable to terms that are ‘associated’ by grouping or serial enumeration in the same phrase or clause, not to

2025(See Yassin v. Solis (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 524, 536 .) 50 Although the trial court does not reference it, the trial court appears to be applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis (it is known by its associates), which is the principle that “ ‘ “the meaning of a word may be enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.” ’ ” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1391, fn. 14 .) However, that principle is “applicable to terms that are ‘associated’ by grouping or serial enumeration in the same phrase or clause, not to

2024The missing phrase was as follows: “If you decide that all of these requirements have been met, you may conclude that the defendant admitted the statement was true.” (CALCRIM No. 357.) Although the trial court’s omission of this language may have benefitted defendant (see People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 932 [“Under these circumstances, any failure to instruct on causation could only have inured to [the] defendant’s benefit.”]), it still did not remove the probability the jury used his silence as an adoptive admission.

2021That is, a sexual interest that would be natural and normal if motivated by conduct directed at an 18-year old becomes unnatural or abnormal under [section] 647.6[, subdivision ](a) if directed at someone who is underage.” (Ibid.; see People v. Thompson (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459, 466, fn. 3 .) Indeed, it has been stated that “there can be no normal sexual interest in any child.” (People v. Shaw, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 103 [interpreting section 647.6].) We turn now to case law construing the challenged phrase in the context of section 288.4.

2021(See People v. Shaw (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 92, 103-104 [explaining origins of the phrase and requirement that defendant be motivated by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the child victim], with Fromuth, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 102, fn. 11 [“Section 288.4 explicitly uses the word ‘children’ in defining the motive element”].) 8 unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent with respect to children.” ( Pallares, supra, at p. 901 .) Our Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed this construction and held the statute “applies only to offenders who are motivated by an unnatural or abnormal s

2021That is, a sexual interest that would be natural and normal if motivated by conduct directed at an 18-year old becomes unnatural or abnormal under [section] 647.6[, subdivision ](a) if directed at someone who is underage.” (Ibid.; see People v. Thompson (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459, 466, fn. 3 .) Indeed, it has been stated that “there can be no normal sexual interest in any child.” (People v. Shaw, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 103 [interpreting section 647.6].) We turn now to case law construing the challenged phrase in the context of section 288.4.

2021(See People v. Shaw (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 92, 103-104 [explaining origins of the phrase and requirement that defendant be motivated by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the child victim], with Fromuth, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 102, fn. 11 [“Section 288.4 explicitly uses the word ‘children’ in defining the motive element”].) 8 unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent with respect to children.” ( Pallares, supra, at p. 901 .) Our Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed this construction and held the statute “applies only to offenders who are motivated by an unnatural or abnormal s

2021(See People v. Shaw (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 92, 103-104 [explaining origins of the phrase and requirement that defendant be motivated by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the child victim], with Fromuth, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 102, fn. 11 [“Section 288.4 explicitly uses the word ‘children’ in defining the motive element”].) 8 unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent with respect to children.” ( Pallares, supra, at p. 901 .) Our Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed this construction and held the statute “applies only to offenders who are motivated by an unnatural or abnormal s

2021(See People v. Shaw (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 92, 103-104 [explaining origins of the phrase and requirement that defendant be motivated by unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the child victim], with Fromuth, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 102, fn. 11 [“Section 288.4 explicitly uses the word ‘children’ in defining the motive element”].) 8 unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent with respect to children.” ( Pallares, supra, at p. 901 .) Our Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed this construction and held the statute “applies only to offenders who are motivated by an unnatural or abnormal s

2016(People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 .) CALJIC No. 3.32 is a limiting instruction.

2016(People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648 , 945 P.2d 1197 ].) CALJIC No. 3.32 is a limiting instruction.

2015(See, e.g., People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 980.) Defendant admits the instructional language “is neither unclear nor ambiguous,” but complains that during pretrial voir dire proceedings, the trial court injected ambiguity into the trial by commenting to the prospective jurors that the phrase “so substantial” in CALJIC No. 8.88 was “fairly ambiguous.” Thus, for example, the trial court informed a panel of venirepersons: “The key phrase in that instruction is: ‘are so substantial.’ And that is a fairly ambiguous phrase.

2006Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) “[Provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 ].) In light of the similarity of the phrases employed, the entities referred to, and the subjects of sections 19057, 19059, and 19060, and other sections within *910 that statutory sequence (cf. §§ 19057-19065), it is evident that the phrase of exception provided in section 19057 refers to the applicability of one of those provisions. 7 It al

2006Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) “[Provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 ].) In light of the similarity of the phrases employed, the entities referred to, and the subjects of sections 19057, 19059, and 19060, and other sections within *910 that statutory sequence (cf. §§ 19057-19065), it is evident that the phrase of exception provided in section 19057 refers to the applicability of one of those provisions. 7 It al

2006Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) “[Provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 ].) In light of the similarity of the phrases employed, the entities referred to, and the subjects of sections 19057, 19059, and 19060, and other sections within *910 that statutory sequence (cf. §§ 19057-19065), it is evident that the phrase of exception provided in section 19057 refers to the applicability of one of those provisions. 7 It al

2006Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) “[Provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 ].) In light of the similarity of the phrases employed, the entities referred to, and the subjects of sections 19057, 19059, and 19060, and other sections within *910 that statutory sequence (cf. §§ 19057-19065), it is evident that the phrase of exception provided in section 19057 refers to the applicability of one of those provisions. 7 It al

2006Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) “[Provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 ].) In light of the similarity of the phrases employed, the entities referred to, and the subjects of sections 19057, 19059, and 19060, and other sections within *910 that statutory sequence (cf. §§ 19057-19065), it is evident that the phrase of exception provided in section 19057 refers to the applicability of one of those provisions. 7 It al

2006Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 388 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523 , 853 P.2d 978 ].) “[Provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 755 P.2d 299 ].) In light of the similarity of the phrases employed, the entities referred to, and the subjects of sections 19057, 19059, and 19060, and other sections within *910 that statutory sequence (cf. §§ 19057-19065), it is evident that the phrase of exception provided in section 19057 refers to the applicability of one of those provisions. 7 It al

1992(See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1152; People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 142 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 486 P.2d 129 ]; Brooks v. County of Santa Clara (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 750, 759 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 509 ].) Section 101 cannot reasonably be read to group the terms “insurance” and *474 “annuities” together because the statute sets the two terms apart in separate clauses with different qualifying phrases.

1992(See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1152; People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 142 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 486 P.2d 129 ]; Brooks v. County of Santa Clara (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 750, 759 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 509 ].) Section 101 cannot reasonably be read to group the terms “insurance” and *474 “annuities” together because the statute sets the two terms apart in separate clauses with different qualifying phrases.