widow claim in Pennsylvania

1941To so hold disregards the broad purpose of our law to give the widow her exemption, which is recognized as a preferred claim or gift prompted by consideration of public policy: Peeble’s Estate, 157 Pa. 605 , 27 A. 792 .

1941To so hold disregards the broad purpose of our law to give the widow her exemption, which is recognized as a preferred claim or gift prompted by consideration of public policy: Peeble’s Estate, 157 Pa. 605 , 27 A. 792 .

1927As to her remedy: A widow may claim her statutory dower by the common-law action when the land is in the adverse possession of one denying her right or of one not amenable to the Orphans’ Court process: Evans v. Evans, 29 Pa. 277 .” The action was also brought in Common Pleas No. 4 in Reuss v. Le Gierse, 25 Dist.

1907As to her remedy: A widow may claim her statutory dower by the common-law action, when the land is in the adverse possession of one denying her right, or of one not amenable to the orphans’ court process : Evans v. Evans, 29 Pa. 277 .

1977While Kujawa v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 454 Pa. 165 , 312 A.2d 411 (1973), concerned a claim by a widow under Section 307 filed after the 300 week limitation on death claims provided by Section 301(c), 77 P.S. §411, and not, as here, a claim by the widow for disability compensation, one of claimant’s theses in Kujawa was the same as the claimant’s here — that the widow has a claim on account of her husband’s disability compensation payments, although all payments due under the award or agreement with the decedent were made during his lifetime.

1977While Kujawa v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 454 Pa. 165 , 312 A.2d 411 (1973), concerned a claim by a widow under Section 307 filed after the 300 week limitation on death claims provided by Section 301(c), 77 P.S. §411, and not, as here, a claim by the widow for disability compensation, one of claimant’s theses in Kujawa was the same as the claimant’s here — that the widow has a claim on account of her husband’s disability compensation payments, although all payments due under the award or agreement with the decedent were made during his lifetime.

1974See Estate of Johnson, 202 Kan. 684 , 452 P.2d 286 (1969) ; Cantor v. Cantor, 174 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio Prob. 1959).

1951Under the antenuptial contract the wife became a creditor: Mahoney’s Estate, 356 Pa. 358 ; Goeckel’s Estate, 131 Pa. Superior Ct. 36 .

1951Under the antenuptial contract the wife became a creditor: Mahoney’s Estate, 356 Pa. 358 ; Goeckel’s Estate, 131 Pa. Superior Ct. 36 .

1941Beetem & Co. v. Getz et al., 5 Pa. Superior Ct. 71, 75 , we held that while the Acts of 1849, April 9, P. L. 533 12 PS 2161 et seq. and 1851, April 14, P. L. 612, upon which section 12 of the Act of 1917, supra, is founded, fixed no time limit for a widow to claim her exemption, it must be made within a reasonable time after the right accrues, and a reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.

1941In Estate of William Cram, Deceased, 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 463 , 174 A. 838 , we held under the circumstances existing there, that the delay of the widow for nineteen months after her husband’s death and for more than thirteen months after letters testamentary were issued on his estate, convicted her of laches.

1941In Estate of William Cram, Deceased, 114 Pa. Superior Ct. 463 , 174 A. 838 , we held under the circumstances existing there, that the delay of the widow for nineteen months after her husband’s death and for more than thirteen months after letters testamentary were issued on his estate, convicted her of laches.

1941The principal case on which appellant relies *11 is Clark Estate, 275 Pa. 506 , 119 A. 590 , wherein Mr. Justice Simpson, speaking for the court, said: “It may now be considered as established by Kern’s App., 120 Pa. 523 , and Machemer’s Est., 140 Pa. 544 , — the earlier conflicting authorities being overruled therein, — that if there has been no sale of the property allotted to a widow, an award of exemption to her may be set aside, on due application, if she had remarried ‘before her election was made’ or if there was ‘a delay of a year in claiming her exemption.’ ” In that case the widow di

1941The principal case on which appellant relies *11 is Clark Estate, 275 Pa. 506 , 119 A. 590 , wherein Mr. Justice Simpson, speaking for the court, said: “It may now be considered as established by Kern’s App., 120 Pa. 523 , and Machemer’s Est., 140 Pa. 544 , — the earlier conflicting authorities being overruled therein, — that if there has been no sale of the property allotted to a widow, an award of exemption to her may be set aside, on due application, if she had remarried ‘before her election was made’ or if there was ‘a delay of a year in claiming her exemption.’ ” In that case the widow di

1941The principal case on which appellant relies *11 is Clark Estate, 275 Pa. 506 , 119 A. 590 , wherein Mr. Justice Simpson, speaking for the court, said: “It may now be considered as established by Kern’s App., 120 Pa. 523 , and Machemer’s Est., 140 Pa. 544 , — the earlier conflicting authorities being overruled therein, — that if there has been no sale of the property allotted to a widow, an award of exemption to her may be set aside, on due application, if she had remarried ‘before her election was made’ or if there was ‘a delay of a year in claiming her exemption.’ ” In that case the widow di

1941The principal case on which appellant relies *11 is Clark Estate, 275 Pa. 506 , 119 A. 590 , wherein Mr. Justice Simpson, speaking for the court, said: “It may now be considered as established by Kern’s App., 120 Pa. 523 , and Machemer’s Est., 140 Pa. 544 , — the earlier conflicting authorities being overruled therein, — that if there has been no sale of the property allotted to a widow, an award of exemption to her may be set aside, on due application, if she had remarried ‘before her election was made’ or if there was ‘a delay of a year in claiming her exemption.’ ” In that case the widow di

1935They had record notice that the interest of the widow stood as a charge against the title, and they were bound by whatever the proceedings in that estate disclosed: Diefenderfer v. Eshleman, 113 Pa. 305 , 6 A. 568 .

1902With us, as long ago as Kelly v. Mahan, 2 Yeates, 515 , it was held that dower lay for lands held by improvement right alone, the court saying, “ We have gone too far into the improvement doctrine, to exclude a widow from her claim of dower of lands, held under such equitable, though imperfect title, so frequently recognized by the laws and usage of this state; ” and in Pritts v. Ritchey, 29 Pa. 71 , it was held that an equitable title was equivalent to a legal seisen.

1902With us, as long ago as Kelly v. Mahan, 2 Yeates, 515 , it was held that dower lay for lands held by improvement right alone, the court saying, “ We have gone too far into the improvement doctrine, to exclude a widow from her claim of dower of lands, held under such equitable, though imperfect title, so frequently recognized by the laws and usage of this state; ” and in Pritts v. Ritchey, 29 Pa. 71 , it was held that an equitable title was equivalent to a legal seisen.