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9 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gutierrez v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Gutierrez, 8 S.W.3d at 747-48 . 2004See Gutierrez, 8 S.W.3d at 747-48 . | 3 | 3 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2004Although the Gutierrez court does not say the failure to elect is a constitutional error, the cases cited, and its description of them, certainly indicate that the court believed the error was constitutional in nature: "[A] person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend," citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); and "No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that 2004Although the Gutierrez court does not say the failure to elect is a constitutional error, the cases cited, and its description of them, certainly indicate that the court believed the error was constitutional in nature: "[A] person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend," citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); and "No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that | 2 | 3 |
Cole v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2004Although the Gutierrez court does not say the failure to elect is a constitutional error, the cases cited, and its description of them, certainly indicate that the court believed the error was constitutional in nature: "[A] person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend," citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); and "No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that 2004Although the Gutierrez court does not say the failure to elect is a constitutional error, the cases cited, and its description of them, certainly indicate that the court believed the error was constitutional in nature: "[A] person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend," citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); and "No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that | 2 | 3 |
Ganther v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Jasper, 61 S.W.3d at 421 (holding that even under reasoning of Blue, trial judge’s comments would not rise to level of fundamental error because they lacked elements that would taint presumption of innocence or prejudice jury); Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 650-51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (concluding that even if court of appeals were bound by Blue plurality, trial judge’s comments did not rise to level of tainting presumption of innocence or vitiating impartiality of jury). 2012See, e.g., Jasper , 61 S.W.3d at 421 (holding that even under reasoning of Blue , trial judge's comments would not rise to level of fundamental error because they lacked elements that would taint presumption of innocence or prejudice jury); Ganther v. State , 187 S.W.3d 641, 650-51 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) (concluding that even if court of appeals were bound by Blue plurality, trial judge's comments did not rise to level of tainting presumption of innocence or vitiating impartiality of jury). | 2 | 2 |
Jasper v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Jasper, 61 S.W.3d at 421 (holding that even under reasoning of Blue, trial judge’s comments would not rise to level of fundamental error because they lacked elements that would taint presumption of innocence or prejudice jury); Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 650-51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (concluding that even if court of appeals were bound by Blue plurality, trial judge’s comments did not rise to level of tainting presumption of innocence or vitiating impartiality of jury). 2012See, e.g., Jasper , 61 S.W.3d at 421 (holding that even under reasoning of Blue , trial judge's comments would not rise to level of fundamental error because they lacked elements that would taint presumption of innocence or prejudice jury); Ganther v. State , 187 S.W.3d 641, 650-51 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) (concluding that even if court of appeals were bound by Blue plurality, trial judge's comments did not rise to level of tainting presumption of innocence or vitiating impartiality of jury). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Tenbuschgreen2 sentences1999See Tenbusch , 886 P.2d at 1082 n. 6. 1999See Tenbusch, 886 P.2d at 1082 n.6. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sakil v. State
green
1 sentence2009Appellant to prove that he was not voluntarily intoxicated.” Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Pittman v. State
green
1 sentence1978Although responding to a different argument, this Court in Williams v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 370 , 235 S.W.2d 166 (1950), approved the same wording in the charge, with the further observation: We fail to see how the jury could have been misled, or how they could have failed to have comprehended the law on the subject of alibi.” Reviewing the charge as a whole, appellant’s rights were adequately protected, Art. 36.19, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.; Pittman v. State, 554 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences1978Although responding to a different argument, this Court in Williams v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 370 , 235 S.W.2d 166 (1950), approved the same wording in the charge, with the further observation: We fail to see how the jury could have been misled, or how they could have failed to have comprehended the law on the subject of alibi.” Reviewing the charge as a whole, appellant’s rights were adequately protected, Art. 36.19, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.; Pittman v. State, 554 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). 1978Although responding to a different argument, this Court in Williams v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 370 , 235 S.W.2d 166 (1950), approved the same wording in the charge, with the further observation: We fail to see how the jury could have been misled, or how they could have failed to have comprehended the law on the subject of alibi.” Reviewing the charge as a whole, appellant’s rights were adequately protected, Art. 36.19, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.; Pittman v. State, 554 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.