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9 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2007“Under the ‘placed in fear’ language in section 29.02 of the Texas Penal Code, the factfinder may conclude that an individual perceived fear or was ‘placed in fear,’ in circumstances where no actual threats were conveyed by the accused.” Williams v. State, 827 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex.App.–Houston [1 st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d). 2007“Under the ‘placed in fear’ language in section 29.02 of the Texas Penal Code, the factfinder may conclude that an individual perceived fear or was ‘placed in fear,’ in circumstances where no actual threats were conveyed by the accused.” Williams v. State, 827 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d). | 4 | 4 |
Kitchens v. Stategreen1 sentence2007The State elected to try appellant only on Count II. 2: Although photographs and other testimony indicate the item actually was a tire iron, it was often referred to as a crow bar. 3: Appellant contrasts the verdict form provided by the court with a “general verdict form for ‘burglary of a habitation, as alleged in the indictment,’ “ which, he states, would have included “all three manner and means or definitions” of the offense. 4: While the State may allege alternative means of commission of an offense in the conjunctive in an indictment and describe them in the disjunctive in the jury charg | 1 | 1 |
Fowler v. Stategreen1 sentence2007Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex.Crim App. 1996); Fowler v. State, 65 S.W.3d 116, 118 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2001, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Clewis v. Statered1 sentence2007Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex.Crim App. 1996); Fowler v. State, 65 S.W.3d 116, 118 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2001, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. McCoygreen1 sentence2005See Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works v. Lipscomb, 87 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1935, writ ref’d); Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, writ dism’d). | 1 | 1 |
Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works v. Lipscombgreen1 sentence2005See Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works v. Lipscomb, 87 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1935, writ ref’d); Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1976, writ dism’d). | 1 | 1 |
Canales v. Laughlingreen2 sentences2005The first action, the requests by Commissioners Fox and Johnson, were not actions of the County because “the individual commissioners have no authority to bind the county by their separate action.” Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 176 , 214 S.W.2d 451, 455 (1948). 2005The first action, the requests by Commissioners Fox and Johnson, were not actions of the County because “the individual commissioners have no authority to bind the county by their separate action.” Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169, 176 , 214 S.W.2d 451, 455 (1948). | 1 | 1 |
Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Sieglergreen2 sentences2000See Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995); Wilcox v. Hempstead, 992 S.W.2d 652, 656 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). 2000See Cen-teq Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197 ; Wilcox, 992 S.W.2d at 656 . | 1 | 1 |
American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnellgreen1 sentence2000See American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Wilcox v. Hempsteadgreen2 sentences2000See Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.1995); Wilcox v. Hempstead, 992 S.W.2d 652, 656 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). 2000See Cen-teq Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197 ; Wilcox, 992 S.W.2d at 656 . | 1 | 1 |
\ MOORE\" BURGERgreen2 sentences1997Harkinson relies on our decision in “Moore” Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 937-38 (Tex.1972), where we recognized the doctrine of promissory estoppel as an exception to the statute of frauds. 1997Harkinson relies on our decision in " Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 937-38 (Tex.1972), where we recognized the doctrine of promissory estoppel as an exception to the statute of frauds. | 1 | 1 |
Bray v. Curtisgreen1 sentence1983See Bray v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 816 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.), where it was held that the operator of a towing service who prevailed on a suit for services rendered could not recover attorney’s fees for that portion of the attorney’s time devoted to defending a counterclaim based on the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bignall v. State
green
1 sentence2006Moreover, A it is not enough that the jury may disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense; there must be some evidence directly germane to a lesser-included offense for the factfinder to consider before an instruction on a lesser-included offense is warranted. @ Bignall , 887 S.W.2d at 24 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.