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9 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Devittgreen2 sentences2010Estate of Devitt , 758 S.W.2d 601, 604-05 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, pet. denied). 2010Estate of Devitt, 758 S.W.2d 601, 604-05 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1988, pet. denied). | 4 | 4 |
Lee v. Leegreen2 sentences2004See Lee, 43 S.W.3d at 641-42 ; Dowelanco, 4 S.W.3d at 871 . 2004Lee, 43 S.W.3d at 641 ; Sherman, 106 S.W.3d at 140 . | 2 | 2 |
Roosevelt v. Rooseveltgreen2 sentences2016To this Susan responded in part that Otis had judicially admitted that any value in excess of $9,401 belonged to the community estate, thereby preserving that contention. 3 I would hold, as have sister courts in similar circumstances, that Otis’s statements in his sworn inventories (if not others he made) had the effect of judicial admissions that barred him from claiming any separate-property share of the Midland Life policy’s cash surrender value in excess of $9,401.4 A judicial admission “establishes the issue in dispute as a matter of law on behalf of the adversary of the one making such a 2016Cf. Rivera v. Hernandez, 441 S.W.3d 413 , 416–18, 420–24 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied) (husband’s sworn inventory characterizing real estate as community asset did not bind him as judicial admission where parties’ pleadings and discovery were consistent with his assertion of separate-property claim instead, husband sought and was granted leave to amend his inventory to correct the “mistake,” and evidence establishing separate-property status was admitted without objection). 5 Tschirhart v. Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d 507 , 509 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ) (citing Roosevelt, 699 S.W. | 1 | 1 |
Dutton v. Duttongreen2 sentences2016To this Susan responded in part that Otis had judicially admitted that any value in excess of $9,401 belonged to the community estate, thereby preserving that contention. 3 I would hold, as have sister courts in similar circumstances, that Otis’s statements in his sworn inventories (if not others he made) had the effect of judicial admissions that barred him from claiming any separate-property share of the Midland Life policy’s cash surrender value in excess of $9,401.4 A judicial admission “establishes the issue in dispute as a matter of law on behalf of the adversary of the one making such a 2016Cf. Rivera v. Hernandez, 441 S.W.3d 413 , 416–18, 420–24 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied) (husband’s sworn inventory characterizing real estate as community asset did not bind him as judicial admission where parties’ pleadings and discovery were consistent with his assertion of separate-property claim instead, husband sought and was granted leave to amend his inventory to correct the “mistake,” and evidence establishing separate-property status was admitted without objection). 5 Tschirhart v. Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d 507 , 509 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ) (citing Roosevelt, 699 S.W. | 1 | 1 |
in the Interest of A.E.A., a Childgreen1 sentence2015“Admissions in trial pleadings are judicial admissions in the case in which the pleadings are filed; the facts judicially admitted require no proof and preclude the introduction of evidence to the contrary.” Rippey v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 02-13-00190, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 2911 , at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 13, 2014, no pet.) (quoting In re A.E.A., 406 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2013, no pet.)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sherman v. Merit Office Portfolio, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2004Lee, 43 S.W.3d at 641 ; Sherman, 106 S.W.3d at 140 . 2004Lee , 43 S.W.3d at 641 ; Sherman , 106 S.W.3d at 140 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Dowelanco v. Benitez
green
2 sentences2004See Lee, 43 S.W.3d at 641-42 ; Dowelanco, 4 S.W.3d at 871 . 2004See Lee , 43 S.W.3d at 641-42 ; Dowelanco , 4 S.W.3d at 871 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Guillermo Rivera v. Maria E. Hernandez
green
1 sentence2016Cf. Rivera v. Hernandez, 441 S.W.3d 413 , 416–18, 420–24 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied) (husband’s sworn inventory characterizing real estate as community asset did not bind him as judicial admission where parties’ pleadings and discovery were consistent with his assertion of separate-property claim instead, husband sought and was granted leave to amend his inventory to correct the “mistake,” and evidence establishing separate-property status was admitted without objection). 5 Tschirhart v. Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d 507 , 509 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ) (citing Roosevelt, 699 S.W. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Tschirhart v. Tschirhart
green
2 sentences2016Cf. Rivera v. Hernandez, 441 S.W.3d 413 , 416–18, 420–24 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied) (husband’s sworn inventory characterizing real estate as community asset did not bind him as judicial admission where parties’ pleadings and discovery were consistent with his assertion of separate-property claim instead, husband sought and was granted leave to amend his inventory to correct the “mistake,” and evidence establishing separate-property status was admitted without objection). 5 Tschirhart v. Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d 507 , 509 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ) (citing Roosevelt, 699 S.W. 2016It invokes the concept that judicial admissions must concern facts, not conclusions of law, and reasons that Otis’s assertions recognizing a community interest in the Midland Life policy are only the latter.10 But whether a particular asset is owned by husband, wife, or the community, though necessarily turning on some application of legal principles, has long been considered of a sufficiently factual nature to be susceptible to judicial admission.11 That is the longstanding view of this Court, in fact.12 The substance of the Court’s concern here may instead implicate whether Susan waived her | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Coleman v. Klöckner & Co. AG
green
2 sentences2015Indeed, contrary to its burden “of pleading sufficient allegations to bring the non-resident defendant within the personal jurisdiction of a Texas court,”10 LMS Consulting pled facts conclusively disproving personal jurisdiction over Appellants. 10 Coleman v. Klockner & Co. AG, 180 S.W.3d 577 , 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). 10 A. The doctrine of judicial admissions. 2015Indeed, contrary to its burden “of pleading sufficient allegations to bring the non-resident defendant within the personal jurisdiction of a Texas court,”10 LMS Consulting pled facts conclusively disproving personal jurisdiction over Appellants. 10 Coleman v. Klockner & Co. AG, 180 S.W.3d 577 , 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). 10 A. The doctrine of judicial admissions. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Catherman v. First State Bank of Smithville
green
2 sentences1995Appellant’s pleadings, sworn response to the plea in abatement, deposition answers, and open court statements to the trial court during the plea in abatement hearing are judicial admissions because (1) they were “made during the course of a judicial proceeding,” (2) they were contrary to an essential fact asserted by the appellant, (3) they were “deliberate, clear, and unequivocal,” (4) the conclusive effect is consistent with public policy, Catherman, 796 S.W.2d at 302 , and (5) they were judicial admissions relating to a fact upon which a summary judgment in favor of appel-lees may be based. 1995Appellant's pleadings, sworn response to the plea in abatement, deposition answers, and open court statements to the trial court during the plea in abatement hearing are judicial admissions because (1) they were "made during the course of a judicial proceeding," (2) they were contrary to an essential fact asserted by the appellant, (3) they were "deliberate, clear, and unequivocal," (4) the conclusive effect is consistent with public policy, Catherman, 796 S.W.2d at 302 , and (5) they were judicial admissions relating to a fact upon which a summary judgment in favor of appellees may be based. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.