must consider factors in Ohio

2024“Further, pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(A), the court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct, as well as the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E) relating to the likelihood of recidivism, along with any other relevant factors.” Id.

2021Nos. 20AP-297 and 20AP-298 3 2929.12(A), the court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C) relating to the seriousness of the offender's conduct, as well as the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E) relating to the likelihood of recidivism, along with any other relevant factors." Id. {¶ 8} The trial court has the discretion to determine, upon considering and weighing all relevant factors, what sentence would best serve the purposes and principles of sentencing.

2005Furthermore, the trial court must indicate the basis for its spousal support award in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that "the award is fair, equitable and in accordance with the law." Kaechele v. Kaechele (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 93 , 518 N.E.2d 1197 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 12} R.C. 3105.18 (C)(1) provides that, in determining whether spousal support is "appropriate and reasonable, and in determining the nature, amount, and terms of payment, and duration of spousal support," the court must consider the factors enumerated in R.C. 3105.18 (C)(1)(a) — (n).

2005Furthermore, the trial court must indicate the basis for its spousal support award in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that "the award is fair, equitable and in accordance with the law." Kaechele v. Kaechele (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 93 , 518 N.E.2d 1197 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 12} R.C. 3105.18 (C)(1) provides that, in determining whether spousal support is "appropriate and reasonable, and in determining the nature, amount, and terms of payment, and duration of spousal support," the court must consider the factors enumerated in R.C. 3105.18 (C)(1)(a) — (n).

2007It does not mean clear and unequivocal." State v. Eppinger , 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 164 , 2001-Ohio-247 , 743 N.E.2d 881 , quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469 , 477 , 120 N.E.2d 118 . {¶ 45} When determinating whether an offender is a sexual predator, the court must consider the factors enumerated in R.C. 2950.09 (B)(2): {¶ 46} "(a) The offender's age; {¶ 47} "(b) The offender's prior criminal record regarding all offenses, including, but not limited to, all sexual offenses; {¶ 48} "(c) The age of the victim of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed; {¶ 49

2007It does not mean clear and unequivocal." State v. Eppinger , 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 164 , 2001-Ohio-247 , 743 N.E.2d 881 , quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469 , 477 , 120 N.E.2d 118 . {¶ 45} When determinating whether an offender is a sexual predator, the court must consider the factors enumerated in R.C. 2950.09 (B)(2): {¶ 46} "(a) The offender's age; {¶ 47} "(b) The offender's prior criminal record regarding all offenses, including, but not limited to, all sexual offenses; {¶ 48} "(c) The age of the victim of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed; {¶ 49

2019Id. {¶11} The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the first factor, length of the delay, involves a double inquiry.

2009Id. *Page 17 {¶ 33} The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the first factor, length of the delay, involves a double inquiry.

2012The failure to consider these factors is an abuse of discretion.”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Polick (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 428, 431 , 655 N.E.2d 820 (“Although none of the statutory criteria absolutely mandate a certain result and the court may consider other relevant matter in sentencing a defendant on a misdemeanor, the court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.22.”). {¶30} Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 180 days in jail.

2012The failure to consider these factors is an abuse of discretion.”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Polick (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 428, 431 , 655 N.E.2d 820 (“Although none of the statutory criteria absolutely mandate a certain result and the court may consider other relevant matter in sentencing a defendant on a misdemeanor, the court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.22.”). {¶30} Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 180 days in jail.

2007It does not mean clear and unequivocal." State v. Eppinger , 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 164 , 2001-Ohio-247 , 743 N.E.2d 881 , quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469 , 477 , 120 N.E.2d 118 . {¶ 45} When determinating whether an offender is a sexual predator, the court must consider the factors enumerated in R.C. 2950.09 (B)(2): {¶ 46} "(a) The offender's age; {¶ 47} "(b) The offender's prior criminal record regarding all offenses, including, but not limited to, all sexual offenses; {¶ 48} "(c) The age of the victim of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed; {¶ 49

2006It does not mean clear and unequivocal." State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d 158 , 164 , 2001-Ohio-247 , 743 N.E.2d 881 , quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469 , 477 , 120 N.E.2d 118 . {¶ 24} When determining whether an offender is a sexual predator, the court must consider the factors enumerated in R.C. 2950.09 (B)(3): (a) The offender's or delinquent child's age; (b) The offender's or delinquent child's prior criminal or delinquency record regarding all offenses, including, but not limited to, all sexual offenses; (c) The age of the victim of the sexually oriented offense for which

2005Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 ; (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed, State v. Smith, Ross App. No. 02CA2687, 2003-Ohio-5524 ; and (4) the location of the other acts, State v. Moorehead (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 166 . {¶ 31} Here, the state alleged that Dunham and Neeley illegally possessed a large quantity of drugs.

2003Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Chapman (1959), 111 Ohio App. 441 (evidence of other act committed eight years prior to the time of crime charged inadmissible as being too remote in time); see, also, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 (evidence of other act committed three years prior admitted to show scheme and intent); (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed,

2005Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 ; (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed, State v. Smith, Ross App. No. 02CA2687, 2003-Ohio-5524 ; and (4) the location of the other acts, State v. Moorehead (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 166 . {¶ 31} Here, the state alleged that Dunham and Neeley illegally possessed a large quantity of drugs.

2003Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Chapman (1959), 111 Ohio App. 441 (evidence of other act committed eight years prior to the time of crime charged inadmissible as being too remote in time); see, also, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 (evidence of other act committed three years prior admitted to show scheme and intent); (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed,

2005Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 ; (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed, State v. Smith, Ross App. No. 02CA2687, 2003-Ohio-5524 ; and (4) the location of the other acts, State v. Moorehead (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 166 . {¶ 31} Here, the state alleged that Dunham and Neeley illegally possessed a large quantity of drugs.

2003Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Chapman (1959), 111 Ohio App. 441 (evidence of other act committed eight years prior to the time of crime charged inadmissible as being too remote in time); see, also, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 (evidence of other act committed three years prior admitted to show scheme and intent); (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed,

2005Id. {¶ 24} R.C. 2929.12 (A) provides a trial court with some discretion in determining "the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code." R.C. 2929.12 (A) requires the court to consider specific factors "relating to the seriousness of the conduct," as set forth in R.C. 2929.12 (B) and (C), and "relating to the likelihood of the offender's recidivism, as set forth in R.C. 2929.12 (D) and (E).

2004Id. {¶ 33} When choosing the type of sentence to impose, R.C. 2929.14 (B) requires the court to impose the shortest prison term authorized for the offense if (1) the offender previously has not served a prison term, and (2) the court does not find on the record that "the shortest prison term will demean the seriousness of the offender's conduct or will not adequately protect the public from future crimes by the offender or others." "On the record" means that the trial court must make these findings at the sentencing hearing.

2005Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 ; (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed, State v. Smith, Ross App. No. 02CA2687, 2003-Ohio-5524 ; and (4) the location of the other acts, State v. Moorehead (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 166 . {¶ 31} Here, the state alleged that Dunham and Neeley illegally possessed a large quantity of drugs.

2003Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Chapman (1959), 111 Ohio App. 441 (evidence of other act committed eight years prior to the time of crime charged inadmissible as being too remote in time); see, also, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 (evidence of other act committed three years prior admitted to show scheme and intent); (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed,

2020Id. {¶ 47} In determining a child’s “best interest” under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a court must consider the factors set forth at R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

2020Id. {¶ 27} In determining a child’s “best interest” under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a court must consider the factors set forth at R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

2017Wayne No. 11CA0012, 2012-Ohio-5433, ¶ 12 . {¶39} Husband argues that the court abused its discretion in its spousal support determination because it did not fully consider the parties’ “relative assets and liabilities” under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(i).

2016Wayne No. 11CA0012, 2012-Ohio-5433, ¶ 12 . {¶8} Initially, we note that Husband repeatedly asserts in his brief that the trial court erred by not imputing income to Wife for purposes of its spousal support award.

2007State v. McBooth , Cuyahoga App. No. 85209, 2005-Ohio-3592 . {¶ 49} A trial court's determination that an offender is a sexual predator must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, R.C. 2950.09 (B)(4), and it is the state's burden to establish such proof.

2007State v. McBooth , Cuyahoga App. No. 85209, 2005-Ohio-3592 . {¶ 65} A trial court's determination that an offender is a sexual predator must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, R.C. 2950.09 (B)(4), and it is the state's burden to establish such proof.

1999Farley v. Farley (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 351 , 355 , 646 N.E.2d 875 , citing Lee v. Lee (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 113 , 460 N.E.2d 710 . * * * Attorney fees are awarded as spousal support, and in awarding such fees, the court must consider the factors of R.C. 3105.18 (C).

1999Farley v. Farley (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 351 , 355 , 646 N.E.2d 875 , citing Lee v. Lee (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 113 , 460 N.E.2d 710 . * * * Attorney fees are awarded as spousal support, and in awarding such fees, the court must consider the factors of R.C. 3105.18 (C).

2003State v. Wagner (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 88 , 95 , 608 N.E.2d 852 , 856-857 ; State v. Pump (June 22, 1994), Ross App. No. 93CA1968 * * *.

2003State v. Wagner (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 88 , 95 , 608 N.E.2d 852 , 856-857 ; State v. Pump (June 22, 1994), Ross App. No. 93CA1968 * * *.

2003Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Chapman (1959), 111 Ohio App. 441 (evidence of other act committed eight years prior to the time of crime charged inadmissible as being too remote in time); see, also, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 (evidence of other act committed three years prior admitted to show scheme and intent); (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed,

2003Additionally, the court must consider factors such as (1) the time of the other act, State v. Chapman (1959), 111 Ohio App. 441 (evidence of other act committed eight years prior to the time of crime charged inadmissible as being too remote in time); see, also, State v. Henderson (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 ; Young v. State (1932), 44 Ohio App. 1 (evidence of other act committed three years prior admitted to show scheme and intent); (2) the accused's modus operandi, State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286 ; State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313 ; (3) the nature of the other acts committed,

2024Devito at ¶ 26 , citing Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St.3d 275 , 2003-Ohio- 3624, 791 N.E.2d 434 , ¶ 5. {¶14} In addition to an equitable division of marital property, the court may make a distributive award.

2022Further, a felony sentence " 'shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in [R.C. 2929.11], commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.' " Id., quoting R.C. 2929.11(B). {¶ 42} Further, pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(A), the court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C) relating to the seriousness of the offender's conduct, the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(D)

2019Hamilton No. C-150363, 2016-Ohio-5110, ¶ 19 . {¶35} Frank contends that RH, by engaging in deceptive acts, such as falsely indicating that it would pay to repair his fountain with insurance proceeds, also engaged in unconscionable acts and practices. {¶36} While deceptive conduct may also be deemed to constitute an unconscionable act, the law is clear that to establish an unconscionable act or practice, the consumer must show a degree of knowledge sufficient to establish scienter.

2019In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, a court must consider the factors, set forth in R.C. 1345.03(B), which generally sanction acts and practices of suppliers that “manipulat[e] a consumer’s understanding of the nature of the transaction at issue.” Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 106 Ohio St.3d 278 , 2005-Ohio-4985 , 834 N.E.2d 791 , ¶ 24, quoted in Hathorn v. Dana Motor, LLC, 1st Dist.

2019Id. {¶ 36} Under R.C. 2929.12, the court must consider factors relating to the seriousness of the conduct, factors relating to the likelihood of recidivism, and factors pertaining to the offender’s service in the armed forces of the United States, if applicable, along with any other factors relevant to achieving the purposes and principles of sentencing.

2016State v. Phipps, 13AP-640, 2014-Ohio-2905, ¶ 46 , citing State v. Patrick, 10th Dist.

2014Cuyahoga No. 98622, 2013-Ohio-2525, ¶ 10 , citing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 , 2008-Ohio-4912 , 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 18 . {¶8} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that [t]he overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. {¶9} Under R.C. 2929.12(A), trial courts must consider a nonexhaustive list of factors, including the seriousness of the defendant’s c

2014Cuyahoga No. 98622, 2013-Ohio-2525, ¶ 10 , citing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 , 2008-Ohio-4912 , 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 18 . {¶8} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that [t]he overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. {¶9} Under R.C. 2929.12(A), trial courts must consider a nonexhaustive list of factors, including the seriousness of the defendant’s c

2014Cuyahoga No. 98622, 2013-Ohio-2525, ¶ 10 , citing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 , 2008-Ohio-4912 , 896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 18 . {¶8} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that [t]he overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources. {¶9} Under R.C. 2929.12(A), trial courts must consider a nonexhaustive list of factors, including the seriousness of the defendant’s c

2013(Citations omitted.) Ruckman, 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 120 , 689 N.E.2d 917 . {¶18} “In analyzing whether an injury occurred in the course of employment, a court must consider factors such as ‘time, place, and circumstances’ of the injury to determine the existence of a nexus between the employment and the activity causing the injury.” Woodard v. Cassens Transport Co., 3d Dist.

2013(Citations omitted.) Ruckman, 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 120 , 689 N.E.2d 917 . {¶18} “In analyzing whether an injury occurred in the course of employment, a court must consider factors such as ‘time, place, and circumstances’ of the injury to determine the existence of a nexus between the employment and the activity causing the injury.” Woodard v. Cassens Transport Co., 3d Dist.