must consider factors in Connecticut

2001With respect to alimony, support and a division of property, the law to be considered has been stated as follows: To begin with, our alimony statute does not recognize an absolute right to alimony, General Statutes § 46b-82 ; Thomas v. Thomas, 159 Conn. 477 , 487 , 271 A.2d 42 (1970); "This court has reiterated time and again that awards of financial settlement ancillary to a marital dissolution rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.' (Citation omitted.) Although the court is required to consider the statutory criteria of length of marriage, causes for dissolution, the age, health, s

1998With respect to alimony and a division of the property of the parties, the law to be considered has been stated as follows: To begin with, our alimony statute does not recognize an absolute right to alimony, General Statutes § 46b-82 ; CT Page 12115 Thomas v. Thomas , 159 Conn. 477 , 487 , 271 A.2d 42 (1970); `This court has reiterated time and again that awards of financial settlement ancillary to a marital dissolution rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.' (Citation omitted.) Although the court is required to consider the statutory criteria of length of marriage, causes for dissol

2001With respect to alimony, support and a division of property, the law to be considered has been stated as follows: To begin with, our alimony statute does not recognize an absolute right to alimony, General Statutes § 46b-82 ; Thomas v. Thomas, 159 Conn. 477 , 487 , 271 A.2d 42 (1970); "This court has reiterated time and again that awards of financial settlement ancillary to a marital dissolution rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.' (Citation omitted.) Although the court is required to consider the statutory criteria of length of marriage, causes for dissolution, the age, health, s

1998With respect to alimony and a division of the property of the parties, the law to be considered has been stated as follows: To begin with, our alimony statute does not recognize an absolute right to alimony, General Statutes § 46b-82 ; CT Page 12115 Thomas v. Thomas , 159 Conn. 477 , 487 , 271 A.2d 42 (1970); `This court has reiterated time and again that awards of financial settlement ancillary to a marital dissolution rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.' (Citation omitted.) Although the court is required to consider the statutory criteria of length of marriage, causes for dissol

2000In addition, in considering the desire of a parent to relocate with a child to a different state, the court must consider the factors endorsed by the Supreme Court in Ireland: "[E]ach parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial and noncustodial parents, the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child's future contact with the noncustodial parent, the degree to which the custodial parent's and child's life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally by the move, and the feasibility of pre

2000In addition, in considering the desire of a parent to relocate with a child to a different state, the court must consider the factors endorsed by the Supreme Court in Ireland: "[E]ach parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial and noncustodial parents, the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child's future contact with the noncustodial parent, the degree to which the custodial parent's and child's life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally by the move, and the feasibility of pre

2000The court must consider the factors “ ‘cumulatively’ Connecticut Humane Society v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 218 Conn. 761 ; and weigh them on the scale of the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act “in favor of the open conduct of government and free public access to *122 government records.” Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328 , 435 A.2d 353 (1980); see Board of Trustees v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 181 Conn. 550 .

2000The court must consider the factors “ ‘cumulatively’ Connecticut Humane Society v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 218 Conn. 761 ; and weigh them on the scale of the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act “in favor of the open conduct of government and free public access to *122 government records.” Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328 , 435 A.2d 353 (1980); see Board of Trustees v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 181 Conn. 550 .

2018Only by considering all relevant factors in a given case can a court properly determine whether a rational defendant would have desired an appeal or that the particular defendant sufficiently demonstrated to counsel an interest in an appeal.' ... [Id., at] 480 [ 120 S.Ct. 1029 ].

2016In making that determination, the court must consider the factors delineated in § 45a-717 (h)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sydnei V ., 168 Conn.App. 538 , 554, 147 A.3d 147 (2016).

2016In making that determination, the court must consider the factors delineated in § 45a-717 (h)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sydnei V ., 168 Conn.App. 538 , 554, 147 A.3d 147 (2016).

2014We are not persuaded. ‘‘When making an order for the payment of attorney’s fees, the court must consider factors that are essentially the same as those that must be considered when award- ing alimony. . . . [General Statutes §] 46b-62 governs the award of attorney’s fees in dissolution proceedings and provides that the court may order either spouse . . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in [§] 46b-82.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pacchiana v. McAree, 94 Conn. App. 6

2014We are not persuaded. ‘‘When making an order for the payment of attorney’s fees, the court must consider factors that are essentially the same as those that must be considered when award- ing alimony. . . . [General Statutes §] 46b-62 governs the award of attorney’s fees in dissolution proceedings and provides that the court may order either spouse . . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in [§] 46b-82.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pacchiana v. McAree, 94 Conn. App. 6

2014We are not persuaded. ‘‘When making an order for the payment of attorney’s fees, the court must consider factors that are essentially the same as those that must be considered when award- ing alimony. . . . [General Statutes §] 46b-62 governs the award of attorney’s fees in dissolution proceedings and provides that the court may order either spouse . . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in [§] 46b-82.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pacchiana v. McAree, 94 Conn. App. 6

2014We are not persuaded. ‘‘When making an order for the payment of attorney’s fees, the court must consider factors that are essentially the same as those that must be considered when award- ing alimony. . . . [General Statutes §] 46b-62 governs the award of attorney’s fees in dissolution proceedings and provides that the court may order either spouse . . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in [§] 46b-82.’’ (Citation omit- ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pacchiana v. McAree, 94 Conn. App. 6

2011Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378 , 698 A.2d 589 (1997).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The trial court explained that in ruling on the motion in the present case, “the court must consider the doctrine of governmental immunity.

2006Maguire v. Maguire, 222 Conn. 32, 43 , 608 A.2d 79 (1992).

2006Maguire v. Maguire, 222 Conn. 32, 43 , 608 A.2d 79 (1992).

2000The court must consider the factors "cumulatively" (Connecticut Humane Society v. Freedom of Information Commission , supra, p. 761) and weigh them on the scale of the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act "in favor of open conduct of government and free public access to government records." Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission , 181 Conn. 324 , 328 (1980); Board of Trustees v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 544 , 550 (1980).

1994In passing on the validity of an ordinance the court must consider the requirement that "every intendment is to be made in favor of the validity of [an] ordinance and it is the duty of the court to sustain the ordinance unless its invalidity is established beyond a reasonable doubt." Connecticut Theatrical Corporation v. New Britain, 147 Conn. 546 , 553 , 163 A.2d 548 (1960); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532 , 537 , 441 A.2d 30 (1981); Riley v. Board of Police Commissioners, 147 Conn. 113 , 117 , 157 A.2d 590 (1960). "[T]he court presumes validity and sustains the legislation un

1994In passing on the validity of an ordinance the court must consider the requirement that "every intendment is to be made in favor of the validity of [an] ordinance and it is the duty of the court to sustain the ordinance unless its invalidity is established beyond a reasonable doubt." Connecticut Theatrical Corporation v. New Britain, 147 Conn. 546 , 553 , 163 A.2d 548 (1960); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532 , 537 , 441 A.2d 30 (1981); Riley v. Board of Police Commissioners, 147 Conn. 113 , 117 , 157 A.2d 590 (1960). "[T]he court presumes validity and sustains the legislation un

1994This is especially true where the apparent intent of the enactment is to serve some phase of the public welfare." State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698 , 703 , 125 A.2d 477 (1956); Blue Sky Bar, Inc. v. Stratford, 203 Conn. 14 , 23 , 523 A.2d 467 (1987).

1994This is especially true where the apparent intent of the enactment is to serve some phase of the public welfare." State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698 , 703 , 125 A.2d 477 (1956); Blue Sky Bar, Inc. v. Stratford, 203 Conn. 14 , 23 , 523 A.2d 467 (1987).

1994This is especially true where the apparent intent of the enactment is to serve some phase of the public welfare." State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698 , 703 , 125 A.2d 477 (1956); Blue Sky Bar, Inc. v. Stratford, 203 Conn. 14 , 23 , 523 A.2d 467 (1987).

1994This is especially true where the apparent intent of the enactment is to serve some phase of the public welfare." State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698 , 703 , 125 A.2d 477 (1956); Blue Sky Bar, Inc. v. Stratford, 203 Conn. 14 , 23 , 523 A.2d 467 (1987).

1994In passing on the validity of an ordinance the court must consider the requirement that "every intendment is to be made in favor of the validity of [an] ordinance and it is the duty of the court to sustain the ordinance unless its invalidity is established beyond a reasonable doubt." Connecticut Theatrical Corporation v. New Britain, 147 Conn. 546 , 553 , 163 A.2d 548 (1960); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532 , 537 , 441 A.2d 30 (1981); Riley v. Board of Police Commissioners, 147 Conn. 113 , 117 , 157 A.2d 590 (1960). "[T]he court presumes validity and sustains the legislation un

1994In passing on the validity of an ordinance the court must consider the requirement that "every intendment is to be made in favor of the validity of [an] ordinance and it is the duty of the court to sustain the ordinance unless its invalidity is established beyond a reasonable doubt." Connecticut Theatrical Corporation v. New Britain, 147 Conn. 546 , 553 , 163 A.2d 548 (1960); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532 , 537 , 441 A.2d 30 (1981); Riley v. Board of Police Commissioners, 147 Conn. 113 , 117 , 157 A.2d 590 (1960). "[T]he court presumes validity and sustains the legislation un

1994In passing on the validity of an ordinance the court must consider the requirement that "every intendment is to be made in favor of the validity of [an] ordinance and it is the duty of the court to sustain the ordinance unless its invalidity is established beyond a reasonable doubt." Connecticut Theatrical Corporation v. New Britain, 147 Conn. 546 , 553 , 163 A.2d 548 (1960); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532 , 537 , 441 A.2d 30 (1981); Riley v. Board of Police Commissioners, 147 Conn. 113 , 117 , 157 A.2d 590 (1960). "[T]he court presumes validity and sustains the legislation un

1994In passing on the validity of an ordinance the court must consider the requirement that "every intendment is to be made in favor of the validity of [an] ordinance and it is the duty of the court to sustain the ordinance unless its invalidity is established beyond a reasonable doubt." Connecticut Theatrical Corporation v. New Britain, 147 Conn. 546 , 553 , 163 A.2d 548 (1960); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532 , 537 , 441 A.2d 30 (1981); Riley v. Board of Police Commissioners, 147 Conn. 113 , 117 , 157 A.2d 590 (1960). "[T]he court presumes validity and sustains the legislation un

1993"Pleading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal." Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59 , 65 (1984).