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9 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bott v. DeLandgreen2 sentences2022The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the unnecessary rigor clause contained in Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution “is a self-executing provision.” Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Spackman ex rel. 2022It thus centers on “the circumstances and nature of the process and conditions of confinement.” Id. ¶44 The Utah Supreme Court has explained that the unnecessary rigor clause protects prisoners and arrestees against “unnecessary abuse.” Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Spackman, 2000 UT 87 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Moengreen2 sentences1997We also noted that the Oregon Supreme Court does not apply the unnecessary rigor clause "to the quality of the charges that bring a defendant into custody, [but] only to the conditions of his incarceration." Id. (citing State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45 , 786 P.2d 111, 142 (1990)). 1997We also noted that the Oregon Supreme Court does not apply the unnecessary rigor clause "to the quality of the charges that bring a defendant into custody, [but] only to the conditions of his incarceration." Id. (citing State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45 , 786 P.2d 111, 142 (1990)). | 3 | 3 |
Sealock v. State Of Coloradogreen1 sentence2022(Cleaned up.) See generally Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment.” (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976))); Bott, 922 P.2d at 738 (noting that a prisoner may recover for “inadequate medical care only upon a showing of ‘deliberate indifference,’ as defined by the United States Supreme Court”). | 1 | 1 |
Estelle v. Gamblegreen1 sentence2022(Cleaned up.) See generally Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment.” (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976))); Bott, 922 P.2d at 738 (noting that a prisoner may recover for “inadequate medical care only upon a showing of ‘deliberate indifference,’ as defined by the United States Supreme Court”). | 1 | 1 |
Dexter v. Boskogreen2 sentences2022Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.” The first sentence of this section “closely approximates the language of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,” Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 7 , 184 P.3d 592 , and it is “directed to the sentence imposed” on a criminal defendant, see id. ¶ 17. ¶43 The second sentence of Article I, Section 9—the unnecessary rigor clause—is at issue here. 2022Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.” The first sentence of this section “closely approximates the language of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,” Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 7 , 184 P.3d 592 , and it is “directed to the sentence imposed” on a criminal defendant, see id. ¶ 17. ¶43 The second sentence of Article I, Section 9—the unnecessary rigor clause—is at issue here. | 1 | 1 |
Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc.green2 sentences1997I do not reach the unnecessary rigor clause analysis, however, because I would hold that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of section 9 is dispositive. 2 “Because the issue of constitutionality presents a question of law, ‘we review the trial court’s ruling for correctness and accord it no particular deference.’ ” Ryan v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995) (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988)). 1997I do not reach the unnecessary rigor clause analysis, however, because I would hold that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of section 9 is dispositive. [2] "Because the issue of constitutionality presents a question of law, `we review the trial court's ruling for correctness and accord it no particular deference.'" Ryan v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995) (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Amiconegreen1 sentence1997We thus decline to further address defendant’s constitutional argument. 3 See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah *655 1984) (declining to rule on constitutional issue unsupported by legal analysis or authority). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bishopgreen2 sentences1997Defendants argue that we should strike down section 76-5-103.5(2)(b) under the unnecessary rigor clause of section 9, which, as we noted in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1986), has no counterpart in the federal constitution. 1997Defendants argue that we should strike down section 76-5-103.5(2)(b) under the unnecessary rigor clause of section 9, which, as we noted in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1986), has no counterpart in the federal constitution. | 1 | 1 |
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.green2 sentences1997I do not reach the unnecessary rigor clause analysis, however, because I would hold that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of section 9 is dispositive. 2 “Because the issue of constitutionality presents a question of law, ‘we review the trial court’s ruling for correctness and accord it no particular deference.’ ” Ryan v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995) (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988)). 1997I do not reach the unnecessary rigor clause analysis, however, because I would hold that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of section 9 is dispositive. [2] "Because the issue of constitutionality presents a question of law, `we review the trial court's ruling for correctness and accord it no particular deference.'" Ryan v. Gold Cross Serv., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995) (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2008But see Sanders v. State, 216 Tenn. 425 , 392 S.W.2d 916, 918-19 (1965) (stating that there was no violation of the unnecessary rigor clause where arresting officers provided medical treatment for a fractured leg several hours after an arrest). 2008But see Sanders v. State, 392 S.W.2d 916, 918-19 (Tenn. 1965) (stating that there was no violation of the unnecessary rigor clause where arresting officers provided medical treatment for a fractured leg several hours after an arrest). | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Suter v. State
green
2 sentences1997M.L.C. does cite Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648 , 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949), and Sanders v. State, 216 Tenn. 425 , 392 S.W.2d 916 (1965), for the proposition that other states whose constitutions have an unnecessary rigor clause "generally apply it to abuses which occur during pretrial incarceration." However, neither of these cases addresses the right to bail issue under the respective unnecessary rigor provisions. 1997M.L.C. does cite Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648 , 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949), and Sanders v. State, 216 Tenn. 425 , 392 S.W.2d 916 (1965), for the proposition that other states whose constitutions have an unnecessary rigor clause "generally apply it to abuses which occur during pretrial incarceration." However, neither of these cases addresses the right to bail issue under the respective unnecessary rigor provisions. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Christensen v. Salt Lake County
green
2 sentences2022The County Defendants respond that the established facts show “all care and treatment [of Casie] was appropriate” and “within the standard of care” and that Spencer thus cannot show unnecessary rigor. 20200220-CA 14 2022 UT App 51 Christensen v. Salt Lake County ¶40 We conclude that the district court correctly determined that Spencer’s unnecessary rigor claim fails as a matter of law. 6 We first set forth the law involved when a party asserts a violation of the unnecessary rigor clause, and we then address its application to this case. 2022The court’s decision demonstrates it understood that Spencer’s unsuccessful deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment in federal court did not necessarily foreclose an unnecessary rigor claim under Article 1, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution in state court. 20200220-CA 18 2022 UT App 51 Christensen v. Salt Lake County ¶48 Spencer further asserts that the district court “failed to appreciate that unnecessary rigor easily can arise out of the same facts that may fail to establish a federal claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment” to the United States Constit | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Spackman Ex Rel. Spackman v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences2022Spackman v. Board of Educ. of Box Elder County School Dist., 2000 UT 87 , 16 P.3d 533 ; accord Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ¶ 21 , 184 P.3d 592 . 8. 2022It thus centers on “the circumstances and nature of the process and conditions of confinement.” Id. ¶44 The Utah Supreme Court has explained that the unnecessary rigor clause protects prisoners and arrestees against “unnecessary abuse.” Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Spackman, 2000 UT 87 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2015Mr. Houston argues that his sentence: (A) is unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court case Apprendi v. New Jersey,50 (B) is unconstitutional because the 48 Infra ¶¶ 128–29. 49In light of this limiting construction, we decline the State‘s request for us to overrule our holding in Candedo, 2010 UT 32 . 50 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 13 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court sentencing statute does not contain a ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ standard of proof, (C) violates the Utah uniform operation of laws clause and the United States Equal Protection Clause, (D) violates the due process cla | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Perea
green
2 sentences2015But Mr. Houston does not claim that LWOP constitutes unnecessary rigor given the specifics of his case; he argues that LWOP is unnecessarily rigorous when applied to any juvenile offender, regardless of the facts of the crime. 80 State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 124 , 322 P.3d 624 . 21 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court confinement,‖ not on ―the sentence imposed.‖81 This provision is targeted at eliminating ―unreasonably harsh, strict, or severe treatment‖ in prison such as ―being unnecessarily exposed to an increased risk of serious harm.‖82 ¶ 51 We hold that the unnecessary rigor clause does 2015But Mr. Houston does not claim that LWOP constitutes unnecessary rigor given the specifics of his case; he argues that LWOP is unnecessarily rigorous when applied to any juvenile offender, regardless of the facts of the crime. 80 State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 124 , 322 P.3d 624 . 21 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court confinement,‖ not on ―the sentence imposed.‖81 This provision is targeted at eliminating ―unreasonably harsh, strict, or severe treatment‖ in prison such as ―being unnecessarily exposed to an increased risk of serious harm.‖82 ¶ 51 We hold that the unnecessary rigor clause does | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Candedo
green
1 sentence2015Mr. Houston argues that his sentence: (A) is unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court case Apprendi v. New Jersey,50 (B) is unconstitutional because the 48 Infra ¶¶ 128–29. 49In light of this limiting construction, we decline the State‘s request for us to overrule our holding in Candedo, 2010 UT 32 . 50 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 13 STATE v. HOUSTON Opinion of the Court sentencing statute does not contain a ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ standard of proof, (C) violates the Utah uniform operation of laws clause and the United States Equal Protection Clause, (D) violates the due process cla | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Reece
green
1 sentence2015We rejected the unnecessary rigor challenge because that provision ―applies only to the conditions of one‘s confinement and does not speak to the proportionality of the particular sentence imposed,‖ so the provision was ―not implicated by the imposition of‖ an LWOP sentence.144 And we determined that the cruel and unusual punishment challenge was meritless because the defendant was an adult, did not face the death penalty, and did not commit a non-homicide crime, so none of the United States Supreme Court precedent the defendant cited demonstrated that an LWOP sentence violated the Eighth 141 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.